50. Letter From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy)1
Dear Walter: [Here follows discussion of administrative matters and brief comments concerning the previous day’s meeting.]
I presume that you are reconciled, and prepared for Wang screaming loud and hard when I refuse to go on immediately to item two following the announcement. I hope we will be successful in our tactic but believe we must recognize that the July 25th announcement does not in any way imply that we would not talk about other practical matters until all the Americans were released. In fact, if they had not released the flyers, I would have had from the very beginning to have talked about that “other practical matter”. Of course the agenda proposal which they made greatly helps and strengthens our ability to maintain this tactic, but I see some rough seas ahead.
While it may be true that if we do not get all the Americans out before we undertake discussion of item two, we will not be able to do so; at the same time I am not sure it is going to be at all easy to get the PRC to fall in with this. I most certainly do not expect any mass release in any ten days or two weeks and think it would be wrong to base our plans on this even being a possibility. In spite of the satisfactory nature of the “agreed announcement” and our ability to use it to put public pressure on them, we must recognize that “improvement of relations” is still being maintained by them as a factor in the release of all Americans. If we too obviously stall on coming to grips with item two, they may well get their backs up on the release of further Americans, and we will again face another impasse. We can, of course, publicly beat them over the head with the “agreed announcement” and will do so, but the entire operation is not going to be easy or simple.
I will greatly appreciate all the thoughts and suggestions that you can give me on how you visualize my handling of “what should constitute item two of the agenda”. That is, do you visualize a program which would have for its ostensible purpose the establishing of an agreement upon the sub-points to be discussed under agenda item two? If so, how do you visualize my formulation of our points, particularly the “no force” point?
As soon as you have a chance to do so, I would greatly appreciate an outline of the whole trend of our thinking on our tactics under agenda item two. There are, of course, many difficulties in attempting just to keep talking without asking for or giving concessions. [Page 79] We have a great paucity of subjects which can be raised without involving the interests of the GRC. If the PRC has definite objectives, as it probably does, under item two, it will be easy for them to seize and retain the initiative and I will be continually on the defensive. It seems to me that it will also be difficult in such circumstances for me to avoid being too obviously in the position of simply stalling. I wish I could think of some positive and offensive approach we could make, but thus far have not been able to do so.2
On the whole question of renunciation of force, I believe it important that we have a carefully thought out program. We have clearly renounced force in Article I of our Treaty with the GRC, as well as under our United Nations obligations, but it does not seem to me at all clear that the GRC has done so since it considers action against the mainland as an internal matter. It seems to me that the PRC is playing the present situation very cleverly by talking softly, apparently engaging in no overt offensive operations, while the Nationalists still continue their small-scale raids, their reconnaissance flights and their belligerent statements. How do I answer PRC allegations that our Treaty with the GRC and the accompanying exchange of notes, together with our supply and equipment to the GRC, simply proves that we are approving and supporting the military activities of the GRC against the mainland? Also what do I say when the PRC quotes GRC official statements in questioning whether the GRC has in fact accepted the principle of nonrecourse to force with respect to the mainland? Perhaps there are easy answers to these questions, but I must confess that I do not know what they are.
When this entire question comes up, I believe we should anticipate the possibility of PRC proposing to us a joint declaration perhaps something along the lines of Chou’s “five principles”3 or perhaps [Page 80] even Article I of our Treaty with the GRC which would not in the slightest affect their “right” to use force to “liberate” Taiwan as long as they treat it as an internal matter. If, as I assume, we reject any joint declaration, what are we proposing in its stead? Do we want a general unilateral declaration on renunciation of force so worded as also to specifically apply to the Formosa situation, and, if so, are we not asking for something which the GRC would refuse to do? Or rather than a renunciation of force, are we looking for a de facto cease fire between the PRC and GRC? If so, this seems to be outside the scope of these talks as clearly something that directly involves the GRC.
All the foregoing I realize is very confused as it simply reflects my very confused thinking which I am sharing out loud with you and know that you will treat it as such. I will appreciate all the thoughts you can send me, however preliminary they may be, as I would very much like to have this thought through clearly in my own mind before I come up against it. I am sorry that there was not sufficient time while I was in Washington really to talk these things through. I hope that you will have an opportunity thoroughly to do so with the Secretary and Walter Robertson.4
[Here follow personal remarks and a request for a number of documents.]
With kindest regards.
Sincerely,
- Alex
- U. Alexis Johnson
- Source: Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956. Secret; Official–Informal.↩
- Johnson wrote in letter No. 8 to McConaughy, September 15, that he had forgotten to mention in his last letter that Wang invited him, his advisers Ralph N. Clough and Douglas N. Forman, and Ekvall to the gala opening of the Peking Opera in Geneva. Wang called to ask if Johnson would be willing to accept the invitation. Johnson replied that although he would be glad to see the opera, he could not attend the opening night with its inevitable publicity. Wang then sent tickets for the following night with the promise that Johnson’s presence would not be publicized, and Johnson reciprocated by sending him tickets for a concert in Geneva by the New York Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra. He commented that he was doing this “with the thought this sort of thing will help me carry out our objectives in the difficult days ahead” and felt that “by maintaining a reasonably easy personal relationship to which he has been responsive, I can do much to avoid or postpone a break when the going gets tough.” (Ibid.)↩
- The “five principles of peaceful coexistence”, as set forth in a Sino-Indian communiqué of June 28, 1954, were mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. For text of the communiqué, see Documents on International Affairs, 1954, pp. 313–314.↩
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McConaughy wrote to Johnson in letter No. 15, September 23:
“The Secretary read the latter half of your letter No. 7, when we briefed him and received new guidance from him at his home on September 18 right after his return from Duck Island. So the Secretary is aware of the general nature of your forebodings about the ‘no force’ issue. In general we attach more weight than you apparently have so far to the commitment we have from the GRC in the Exchange of Notes of Dec. 10 pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. Admittedly this commitment has not prevented and will not prevent minor sea, air and artillery incidents. But these are mere pin pricks which are going to have to be considered as something which must be lived with in the present situation. We must look to the central issue which is major invocation of force for a general offensive purpose. On this we have a commitment from the Nationalists which ties in with our own renunciation. We believe this should give you a somewhat stronger position than you have recognized. But admittedly you would have to develop a tactic for brushing aside the small incidents as trivial and inevitable, as not essentially bearing on the central issue.” (Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–1956)
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