Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

92. Telegram From the Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, at Geneva¹

Washington, November 5, 1955—4:19 p.m.

1136. Your 1048.² Consider redraft too wordy, opening door to variety of undesirable possible interpretations and implications. Also question wisdom of abandoning original concept of separate, unilateral declarations in favor joint declaration. Specific comments by paragraph follow:

2) Undesirable because places U.S. in position of publicly acquiescing in PRC’s right to hold any policy objective, even though we might consider such objective inimical to survival of free world. It seems to us we cannot, even implicitly, accept the PRC’s right to hold such policy objectives as, for example, subversion of free governments.

3) Statement that renunciation of force does not involve interests of third parties could be construed as leaving Communists free to attack offshore islands, which not specifically covered by Mutual Defense Treaty.

4) Provides loophole for Communists to insist this does not apply to Taiwan, which domestic matter.

5) Contains too strong an implication that U.S. willing enter upon far-reaching negotiations if Communists renounce force.

6)and 7) Inclusion phrase “when this would threaten international peace” again provides loophole for Communists to argue Taiwan domestic matter and only threat to international peace arises from U.S. “use of armed force” against it.

Believe we should strive for simple wording which pins Communists down clearly and unmistakably not to use force in Taiwan area. They obviously seeking meaningless wording which would not tie their hands. We would rather, if necessary, face up to Communist refusal to agree to clearcut statement, provided latter appeared reasonable to most of world, than get their agreement to ambiguous document which they would then proceed to evade.

For reasons set forth paragraph 3 Tedul 42³ as well as above considerations believe draft contained Deptel 915⁴ most satisfactory produced to date. If considered too bare, it might be prefaced by reference to general principles to which all civilized nations subscribe, without using exact UN Charter language in Wang’s draft. Would be interested in Phleger’s comments this telegram. Repeat to Secretary.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/11–355. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted in CA, cleared by McConaughy, cleared in draft by Sebald, and approved by Robertson.

2. In telegram 1048 from Geneva, November 3, Johnson transmitted the text of a suggested redraft of a statement on renunciation of force which had been shown to the Secretary and Phleger and had their general concurrence. The draft statement reads as follows:

   • “1. The Ambassadors of the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China in the discussion of the practical matters at issue between the two sides have recognized that the two countries confront each other with policies which are in certain respects incompatible. Their governments are determined, however, that their first objective will be to see that these differences do not lead to armed conflict.
   • “2. Their determination not to resort to war does not mean that either government must renounce any policy objectives which it considers it is legitimately entitled to achieve or renounce the right of individual or collective self-defense. It does mean that neither will initiate the use of force to implement its policies.
   • “3. Their determination not to resort to the use of force to make the policies of either party prevail over those of the other does not involve the interests of third parties nor does it involve the justice or injustice of conflicting claims.
   • “4. They recognize the basic principle that the use of force to achieve national objectives does not accord with accepted standards of conduct under international law if it constitutes a threat to international peace and security and justice.
   • “5. Furthermore, they recognize that the determination not to resort to the threat or use of force is essential to the just settlement of disputes by peaceful means, for negotiations cannot achieve fair and equitable solutions if conducted under the overhanging threat that force may be resorted to when one party does not agree with the other.
   • “6. Accordingly, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson informed Ambassador Wang Ping-nan that: in general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the USA renounces the use of force to achieve its national policy objectives when this would threaten international peace, except in individual and collective self-defense.
   • “7. Ambassador Wang Ping-nan informed Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson that: in general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area, the PRC renounces the use of force to achieve its national policy objectives when this would threaten international peace, except in individual and collective self-defense.” (Ibid.)

3. See footnote 13, Document 87. Paragraph 3 states that the U.S. draft’s “leanness” compared with the Chinese draft’s “fatness” would provide the necessary latitude for negotiation in that some concessions could be made by accepting statements of general principle.
4. See footnote 4, Document 86.