Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

130. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, June 3, 1955.

Mr. Secretary: Yesterday we had a two-hour meeting with Makins,² and today we had a second meeting³ with him, pursuant to the agreement you and Mr. Macmillan reached in Paris.⁴

In these two meetings, Makins set forth tentative British thinking and points that were going through their minds. On our side, we simply asked questions to clarify what he stated. Makins stressed that he was not presenting UK positions, but rather was laying out for us an indication of what they were thinking about so that we could give him our reactions. We undertook to meet with him again Monday morning at 11 o’clock to give our reactions.

I attach two memos of these conversations. The first, covering yesterday’s two-hour session, is quite long and detailed, whereas the second is just a page and is a brief summary of the new salient points that came out of today’s meeting. It seems very important that if at all possible you read both of these memos before our meeting with you at 11 a.m. tomorrow, since we will need your guidance before we meet with Sir Roger again on Monday morning.

D MacA

[Attachment 1]

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)⁵

Washington, June 3, 1955.

The British Ambassador has given us a report of the lines along which the Foreign Office is thinking with respect to the meeting of the four Chiefs of Government. He emphasized that these were not firm positions, but rather ideas for consideration.

The British expected that the conference would be led off by a general statement of views by each participant. The British spokesman might comment on such Soviet contributions to international tensions as (a) limitations on access to the Soviet people; (b) Soviet subversion abroad; (c) the impossibility of normal trade relations because of Soviet emphasis on heavy industry and defense, and the tendency to economic autarchy; and (d) persistent Soviet abuse of other states, particularly the United States, and breaches of the Satellite Treaties.

The British did not wish to be negative. They would also suggest the need for greater mutual confidence, which might be based on cooperative development of resources or other cooperative East-West undertakings—for instance, in atomic energy.

They thought the next step would be for the Chiefs of Government to survey specific problems in order to decide where and how they might best be further considered.

On disarmament, the British thought of taking into account that the West does not know enough about Soviet policies and intentions; the need for effective controls; and the extraneous considerations in the recent Soviet proposals (of May 10: foreign bases, Germany).

They thought that the principal European questions were:

a. Unification of Germany and Germany’s place in Europe;

b. Independence of the satellites;

c. Mutual security arrangements.

On the Far East, they proposed to leave the initiative to the Soviets in the Conference.

The Ambassador said that Mr. Macmillan wondered if the time had not come to adopt a general over-all strategy rather than trying to deal with our problems separately and one at a time. The basic Soviet objectives were unchanged, but it seemed useful now to probe the new flexibility in their tactics. Following the coming into effect of the Paris Agreements, we could not expect further major steps to increase our strength in the next two or three years. At the same time, our position might be made less strong by the Soviets pressing their atomic development. It seemed useful, therefore, to consider reduction of tensions by a general limitation of arms at this time.

Within the framework of a global limitation-of-arms plan, the British suggested that there were prospects for a settlement of the German question on the basis of a unified Germany in NATO. Speaking from the diagram below, the Ambassador outlined the following possible alternatives:

a. In what is now the Soviet Zone of Germany, there would be only German troops. In West Germany there could be both German and other NATO forces. To the east of the present Soviet Zone, there could be Soviet and satellite forces.

b. There would be no foreign troops in Germany east of the Rhine. NATO forces would be only west of the Rhine. Soviet troops would be withdrawn to “a line in Poland”, to be agreed.

c. Non-German forces would be withdrawn from all of Germany. Soviet troops would all be withdrawn from Poland.

d. Total demilitarization (no troops of any kind) of the present Soviet Zone with or without restrictions on foreign troops in the West Zone of Germany.

The British noted the importance of German public opinion and of close consultation with the German Government in all questions relating to Germany.

We raised with the British the risk that any proposal for such mutual withdrawal from part of Europe might lead the Soviets to suggest withdrawal of American forces to the U.S. in return for the withdrawal of their forces to the U.S.S.R. We also questioned how inviting the British proposals might be to the Soviets, since the proposals involved a weakening of the satellites, withdrawal of Soviet troops, and assurances that the new all-German Government would be in NATO.

The Ambassador said the British Government was very familiar with and shared our views with respect to the status quo in the satellite states. They doubted that the Soviets intended to lessen their control. They would probably, in fact, seek Western recognition of their right to such control. The Foreign Office thought of our objectives in the satellites as:

a. to liquidate all forms of Soviet penetration and control;

b. to hold general free elections;

c. to achieve withdrawal of Soviet forces from West Germany.

(a) and (b) seemed impossible at present, although there might be some advantage in putting forward the proposal for free elections. Withdrawal of forces was not worth much in itself unless we also had the first two points in mind.

The Ambassador warned against discussion of the Polish-German frontier (the Oder-Neisse line), which would only upset the Germans and Poles and which should be dealt with in the German Peace Treaty.

We shall be meeting further with the British to discuss European security arrangements, and to explore further the ideas which they have presented.

[Attachment 2]

Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)⁶

Washington, June 3, 1955.

In a further meeting with the British Ambassador today, he set forth the Foreign Office thinking on European security.

The British consider European security an integral part of world security. They also feel sure that the Soviets will put forward overall European Security plans at the Summit meeting and that we should have a position of our own. Their basic premise is that NATO is indispensable, as is the right of a free Germany to join NATO. At the same time, they think it will be necessary to take into account Soviet fears of a remilitarized Germany. They believe that unilateral declarations of peaceful intent by the Western powers would carry no weight with the Russians. A five-power pact (US, UK, USSR, France, Germany) for mutual assistance in the event of an attack in Europe by any signatory would not take account of the satellites. They had then considered a five-power pact calling for immediate consultation in the event of hostilities involving a non-signatory power. This would limit NATO’s freedom of action in the event of a satellite attack on Germany. While none of the suggested arrangements seemed entirely satisfactory, the British thought something along these lines would have to be done to take care of genuine Soviet fears.

The British thought that it was important not to let the question of foreign bases, raised in the Soviet proposals of May 10, be separated from the basic questions of disarmament. The Ambassador suggested that the Soviet May 10 disarmament proposals be probed at the Summit meeting in order to determine whether they were in earnest. If they were, we could then decide about the usefulness of discussing the German problem in the context of an over-all disarmament program. If they were not, the question of German unification would have to be considered separately.

We will meet to discuss these British views further next Monday.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 515. Top Secret. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that Secretary Dulles saw it.
2. A nine-page memorandum of this conversation, PMCG MC–13, dated June 3, is ibid., Central File 396.1–GE/6–355.
3. A five-page memorandum of this conversation, PMCG MC–14, dated June 6, is ibid., 396.1–GE/6–655.
4. See footnote 2, Document 115.
5. Top Secret.
6. Top Secret.