Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

34. Telegram From the Office of the High Commissioner for Austria to the Department of State¹

Vienna, April 22, 1955—10 a.m.

2410. I had long and satisfactory talk with Raab last night. I gave him survey of American postwar policy in Europe and toward Austria in particular stressing importance of American public and Congressional opinion and my preoccupations of effect on it of Austrian actions and declarations. I found him fully aware of possibility Austrian action might affect opinion in European countries and he informed me he had already told German representative here that Germany must continue to arm as that is only language Soviets understand. He expressed gratitude for Secretary Dulles’ statement that we would not allow any concern over effect upon Germany to delay conclusion of Austrian treaty.²

In course of discussion Raab said he did not consider that Austria would be obliged to ship strategic material to Soviet Union and that she could maintain right of asylum for Iron Curtain escapees. It was clear that Raab did not consider that addition of word neutrality added anything material to undertaking not to join military alliances or allow bases. When I suggested that it might be easier to charge that Austria’s joining Coal and Steel Community was a violation of neutrality than to charge that this was a military alliance, he replied that he saw no reason why Austria could not accept membership. He considers that Austria has full freedom to determine text of neutrality declaration so long as it is along lines of Swiss model. He would welcome any suggestion or collaboration from us. Pointing out that his agreement at Moscow left matter to Austrian Parliament he asked what Russia could do if declaration did not mention neutrality but referred only to alliances and bases. He thought it would be quite possible to include in declaration of neutrality a statement that recognition of such neutrality did not carry any right of intervention.

I stated I had no knowledge of my government’s position on question of guarantees other than that Ambassador Gruber by Secretary Dulles.³ I could imagine however this would be most serious problem for us. He pointed out that his intention was to seek such guarantee but later admitted that it was possible that Soviet Union would insist upon four power agreement before signing treaty although this was not covered in Moscow memorandum.⁴ He said this whole question would have to be clarified at Ambassador’s conference. He seemed to consider that statement in memorandum was all that Soviet Union would do on this question. When I pointed out possibility of unilateral guarantee extended by Soviet Union he at first failed or pretended to fail to understand what risk was involved. He mentioned that Austria would welcome guarantees from anyone including Czechoslovakia and Hungary and at first seemed unaware that this might carry any implication of guardianship but later recognized that this matter involved some risk.

In discussing possible revisions of draft treaty I inquired whether he thought we could eliminate or raise limitation of size of Austrian Army. He thought we could certainly raise matters particularly on basis Swiss example but thought unlikely Soviets would agree.

Raab referred to fact that of all countries of Europe Austria had been in forefront in dealing with internal Communist menace and said that such infection as there was would be cleaned up when Austrian freedom was restored. He was happy that Austria had refused conclude treaty at Berlin since treaty now in prospect would mean actual retreat of Soviet forces in Europe which should have beneficial effect elsewhere. He said he and his colleagues considered maintenance of friendship with US their primary task and said that in his speech on April 27 he intended give full recognition American assistance. He expressed his gratitude for my frank talk with him and said that if ever lightest suspicion should develop he hoped we could immediately take steps to remove it. He stated several times that Austria was tied culturally and ideologically with West and would remain so.

Thompson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 663.001/4–2255. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Bonn.
2. See footnote 3, Document 31.
3. Presumably a reference to Secretary Dulles’ conversation with Ambassador Gruber on March 25; see Document 12.
4. See Document 26.