Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Volume V

89. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 1, 1955¹

Washington, April 1, 1955

SUBJECT

• British Proposals for Preparations for Talks with the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. J.H.A. Watson, Counselor, British Embassy
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, EUR
• Mr. Jacob D. Beam, EE
• Mr. William R. Tyler, WE

Mr. Watson was told that the Department had considered the British proposals and timetable for preparations for talks with the Soviets,² and that we had decided that it would not be advisable to establish a working group until at least France and Germany had deposited instruments of ratification along with the UK and the US. Mr. Elbrick said that we had made a great effort all together to achieve a position of strength from which negotiations with the Soviet Union might be profitably attempted. There must be no suggestion that such a position of strength could be compromised, and this required that final irreversible action be taken with respect to the instruments of ratification and exchange of letters between France and Germany on the Saar. We had noted a Foreign Office statement the previous day on plans for preparatory talks which implied, if it did not explicitly state, that a tripartite working group would be set up in early April. This was not in accordance with our understanding of our respective positions and we felt that the deposit of instruments must be proceeded with as far as the four Western powers are concerned, before discussions could be officially held. Pending this time, consultation would, of course, go on through diplomatic channels. We, on our side, had to cover a considerable amount of ground and make careful preparations. Mr. Elbrick added that the above should not be construed as meaning that there was any reluctance on our part to meet, and we are prepared to do so just as soon as the deposit of instruments has taken place.

Mr. Watson, speaking informally and personally, observed that the pressure from London was undoubtedly due to the prospect of elections perhaps in June, and to Eden’s awareness that “he would be fighting for his political life” in order to become Prime Minister. He observed also that Eden would wish to get the elections out of the way before there was any chance of a meeting with the Soviets, as otherwise he would be under very great pressure at such a meeting.

Mr. Watson said he would convey the Department’s position at once to London. He asked whether we had anything to say with regard to location of the working group meeting in London. Mr. Elbrick said that we had not taken any firm position on this but that we felt Paris had certain advantages with respect to consultation with our other NATO allies, since we would be close to the Permanent Representatives there.

Mr. Watson then asked whether we had any views about informing Chancellor Adenauer of the plans and timing for setting up those discussions. He suggested that it would be good to inform Adenauer very soon and that this might be followed by a US and UK démarche to him and to Pinay urging Germany and France to proceed with deposit of instruments and exchange of letters. Mr. Elbrick agreed that Adenauer should be informed shortly and said that we would consider the advisability of a formal démarche as suggested by Mr. Watson. Mr. Watson said he would cable London at once to get their views and would be in touch with the Department again when he had received an answer.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–155. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
2. Regarding these proposals, see telegram 4949, supra.
3. Barbour and Tyler also discussed this topic with de Juniac on April 1 indicating the U.S. position along these lines. De Juniac stated that his government shared the U.S. view and raised the subject of German participation in the talks. (Memorandum of conversation by Tyler, April 1; Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/4–155)