370. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of Defense, Washington, November 13, 19571
SUBJECT
- Negotiations for the Communications Facility at Maceió & Loran Stations
PARTICIPANTS
- Colonel Thomas B. Hanford, Department of Defense
- Mr. James Wilson, Department of Defense
- OSA—Mr. Siracusa
- OSA/B—Mr. Briggs
Mr. Siracusa said that he and Mr. Briggs had come to the Defense Department to confer with Colonel Hanford and Mr. Wilson regarding the current thinking in the Department of Defense concerning the negotiations for the communications facility at Maceió and the three Loran stations. He pointed out that the Brazilians, in their consideration of the amounts and types of military material which they might expect to obtain through the current negotiations growing out of the Guided Missiles Agreement, would very probably be influenced by United States intentions with respect to Maceió and the Loran stations. He recalled the Army’s recent decision to locate the communications facility in Puerto Rico rather than in Brazil and the recent telegram from Embassy Rio recommending that the Brazilians be informed of this decision as soon as possible.2 He said that he wished to support the Embassy’s recommendation by pointing out that if the Brazilians could be informed that the United States no longer requires rights at Maceió, the result would be to strengthen our bargaining position in the present negotiations. He added that the Department of State understands that there is a requirement of Congressional action before the Maceió project can be abandoned and the funds allocated thereto be used in another location, and he questioned whether this Congressional action is of such a nature as to require long delay in informing the Brazilians of the prospective change in program.
Colonel Hanford said that the action called for is relatively routine, inasmuch as it does not require appropriation of additional funds, but rather authorization to use in Puerto Rico funds already appropriated for a similar purpose in Brazil. He expressed the opinion that Congress therefore would probably approve the change as a procedural rather than a substantive matter. Mr. Wilson volunteered to ask that the Department of Army sound out the appropriate [Page 769] committee of the Congress on the possibility of going ahead and informing the Brazilians of the proposed change prior to formal Congressional action. He said that it should be possible on this basis to give the Department a definite answer within a day or so.
Mr. Siracusa then asked whether a decision had been reached on the possibility of offering the Loran stations to the Brazilians as a form of military grant aid. He said that if this could be done there would be less likelihood of the United States having to resist additional pressures by the Brazilian negotiators for more equipment as quid pro quo for the Loran station rights and pointed out that such an offer of the Loran stations might even be used to reduce the total amount which the Brazilians might expect to receive in the current negotiations. United States objectives would be equally well served by this arrangement, inasmuch as United States technicians would train the Brazilians to operate the Loran stations and we would receive the benefits derived from their existence, he continued.
Mr. Wilson replied that it now appears that this whole matter may be academic, inasmuch as the Loran requirements are being reviewed at the staff level and it seems probable that it will be decided not to go ahead with the three stations in Brazil. He added, however, that should the requirement be maintained, it is highly doubtful that the Loran stations could be treated as a part of the military grant aid package. This is because of a procedural requirement that, in cases where the United States needs these facilities, it must—originally at least—have administrative control of them at the outset, even though subsequently the facilities may eventually be turned over to the host country.
Mr. Siracusa said that the Department would not be displeased if Defense should decide that the Loran station rights are no longer needed, inasmuch as this would make our negotiating tasks easier.
Mr. Siracusa then referred to indications which he had received that the Air Force may now consider that the Fernando de Noronha Missile Tracking Station is now less important than formerly, due to progress in missile development and the acquisition of other sites. Both Defense representatives categorically denied such reports, and stated emphatically that the importance of the Fernando de Noronha station has not declined and that it still has the same high priority in Defense planning that it had a year ago.