Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, South Asia, Volume VIII

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 19, 1955—5 p.m.

632. Foreign Minister Naim said this morning that reply to President’s most recent letter had been telegraphed to Ludin four days ago. His own translation, of which he did not provide copy, indicated brief text:

a. Thanking President for his letter of December 12;

b. Stating GOA welcomes any effort which will help Pakistan–Afghan settlement; and

c. Wishing President prosperity and good health.²

In accordance Department telegram 410,³ Naim was reminded of previous warnings that wrong moves by GOA during Bulganin visit would make President’s assistance most difficult and news of $100 million deal with Soviets would most certainly have adverse repercussions, but matter was one for Washington decision. For obvious reasons, no mention was made of our urging Pakistanis to undertake high-level Pakistan–Afghan meeting.

Almost as though completely surprised that USG should be concerned over Soviet-Afghan deal, Naim declared at least half-dozen times that deal was “absolutely without any political conditions or implications”. It was purely long-term credit arrangement, he said, similar to Export Import Bank loans, and imposed no unreasonable terms. As usual, he protested vigorously against mere thought that Afghanistan could ever be Soviet satellite, and said whole world will be wrong in assuming Afghanistan is now on side of Soviets. GOA’s policy, he said, is clearly and firmly one of neutrality. At same time, he said unless USG stands by Afghanistan, there is little, if any, hope of preventing this country from being brought into Soviet sphere. He pleaded “earnestly” that USG would continue its aid and particularly its efforts to facilitate Pakistan–Afghan rapprochement. Upon questioning, he said no arms agreement was made but he reiterated that GOA is definitely going to purchase arms.

Comment: One would think that Naim was deliberately prevaricating, but like other top government officials he appeared to have naive conviction that GOA fully capable of completely controlling its destiny despite this huge long-term mortgage which Soviets have obtained.

Ward

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12–1955. Confidential. Repeated to Karachi, London, Ankara, and Tehran; passed to Defense.
2. A signed copy of this letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. The text of the letter, dated December 17, was sent to Ward in telegram 429 to Kabul, December 21. (Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/12–2155)
3. Dated December 16, not printed. (Ibid., 689.90D/12–1455)