62. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
452. Subject: Pakistan’s request for “Phase Two” military aid to “offset India’s military build-up.”
Deptel 166 of July 82 reports Pakistani representatives as stating they [that?] they wish plan for second phase in Pakistan’s military development, “necessitated by India’s military build-up”, arguing that Pakistan would be unable contribute to area’s defense against Communist aggression unless also able defend themselves against India. They made it clear that Phase Two military items would be separate and distinct from their requirements deriving from their responsibility under the Baghdad Pact.
I have refrained from commenting on this telegram pending receipt of memorandum of conversation, which has now come.
It seems to me that the situation disclosed by this talk, when put together with attitudes here, presents a very serious situation. Pakistan is planning a build-up to counter Indian strength. The Indians appear almost pathologically afraid of Pakistan, despite their superior numerical strength, and are building up their air and naval strength to offset our aid to Pakistan.
So what we are now facing is an arms race between these two countries, contributed to in fact, though not in intent, by our military aid to Pakistan. I fully agree that our military aid to Pakistan is necessary and right in terms of equipping her to discharge her responsibilities under the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. But it is quite another matter for us even to consider providing her with military aid specifically designed for use as an offset to Indian strength. This would inevitably become known.
I was glad to see from the memo of conversation dated July 12 that the Secretary had implied disapproval of this type of arms race.
[Page 144]The greatest single liability that the US has in its relationship with India is the fact of arms aid to Pakistan. We have been able thus far to convince Indian leaders that this aid is not directed against India, though they believe that the Pakistanis want to use it against them. They do, I believe, accept the fact we would strongly disapprove and try to prevent any such use. However if we do give military aid to Pakistan in response to a specific request for its use as a counter to India and in amounts admitted to be in excess of Pakistan’s needs to meet her collective security obligations, our whole case with India will fall to the ground, their worst fears will be realized, and our influence here will be greatly lessened.
I therefore hope most sincerely that the Department will make it clear to the Pakistanis that while we will give aid to help Pakistan discharge her collective security obligations, we will not consider military aid when requested purely as a counter to India, nor will we either speed up or extend our current MDAP to them beyond collective security requirements.
At the same time, I believe we should be justified in cautioning the GOI that its build-up in bombers and navy is bringing us under increasing pressure to extend our aid to the GOP, since the Pakistanis feel that Indian military superiority is thereby increasing too much. We might say that the extent of this Indian build-up seems to us to have the Pakistanis genuinely worried, on the ground it is going beyond purely defensive needs.