Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, Volume XI

165. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 16, 1955—9 p.m.

Delga 301. Re membership. I informed Kuznetsov today at lunch the substance of our position. I said US would not use veto on new members; we would vote for the thirteen and abstain on their five. I stressed that there is real doubt that the satellites would be able to get seven votes in Security Council, and that the doubt was much greater concerning Outer Mongolia. I said that if they would drop Outer Mongolia, the US would help in two ways: 1) to help get votes for the four European satellites; and 2) vote affirmatively on a Security Council report to GA which would contain SC recommendation for admission of the group of seventeen. I pointed out that we had reached the phase where action was necessary, that there should be an early meeting of SC, and that we were willing to make such a meeting private.

Kuznetsov, after emphasizing the tremendous interest among members in finding a solution to the membership problem, agreed that it was necessary for us to come to an agreement. He emphasized their difficulties on Spain. He said the USSR cannot consider anything but an agreement on the eighteen and asked why, if the US is willing to assist with respect to their four, we could not do the same for Outer Mongolia. He asked US assistance in getting the eighteen in, citing the fact that they had made a count with respect to Outer Mongolia and found forty-three in favor.

I said they overestimated what we can do; that we may be able to help out by finding seven affirmative votes on the four but that Outer Mongolia just did not have support.

Kuznetsov seemed attracted to the idea of merely taking one vote on a SC report to GA when we pointed out that this was a protection for him in the GA. At same time he suggested that another way in which it might be done would be to convene the SC and GA simultaneously taking the applications one by one on a chronological basis. The SC would convene, acting first upon Albania, whose application would then move to GA, and GA would act upon it before SC proceeded to next application. Kuznetsov, however, indicating there might be advantages in a single report requiring one vote only, stopped Malik from pressing this procedure, saying that if we can find agreement, he was sure that we could arrive at a satisfactory procedure to implement it.

I pointed out that it was not at all clear as to what the permanent members would do and that if Kuznetsov did not believe this, he should seek to find out for himself. I expressed my feeling that we are not going to get final position from all the members until we have a SC meeting, preferably a private one.

Kuznetsov suggested a meeting of US, France and UK with a view to ascertaining where the four stand on this matter. I agreed that we could attend such a meeting, but that if such a meeting was called on our initiative I would have to insist on inclusion of the Republic of China. Kuznetsov said he understood, and that there was every intention on their part to speak with China, but he preferred to have a meeting of the four in the first instance and would issue the invitations. This meeting is tentatively scheduled for Saturday at Soviet residence.

In light of expected meeting on Saturday, we asked whether Kuznetsov agreed that we should not press ahead with the membership item in ad hoc committee. We pointed out that there is a move to bring up this item as quickly as possible in committee. Kuznetsov agreed and said that he would speak to Martin along these lines.

I reported to Martin (Canada) about my conversation with the Soviets. I said that my impression is that a Soviet decision not to stick till the bitter end for Outer Mongolia was by no means out of the question. Concerning a discussion of membership in ad hoc committee, Martin said: “I can’t see it being discussed even next week.” I said it was important to keep this whole thing fluid and that there shouldn’t be a commitment of any kind—whether on eighteen or on seventeen. Martin agreed that it is advisable to “keep the matter open” and said “if the end result was seventeen we would be happy”. I also reported to Tsiang and Entezam, President of Council, who agreed to do nothing about a meeting until hearing from me further. I also reported efforts we were making to Erice (Spanish observer).

At subsequent meeting with Dixon (UK) and Alphand (France) I gave them my impression that Soviets will not stick on Outer Mongolia if we continue to take line with Soviets that there is real doubt as to seven votes for their four, that Outer Mongolia just does not have the support, and that we would be willing to help get seven votes on the four satellites if the Soviets are willing to set aside Outer Mongolia. Dixon said his impression is that the Soviets are making a play on Outer Mongolia as a test of strength. Moreover his impression is also that they are frightened about being tricked on this matter. Dixon said that a meeting of the four is desirable in that it would help to reassure the Soviets.

Alphand said that in conversation with Dulles and Macmillan, Pinay had made it clear that France thought a package deal was bad. The addition of seven, eight, or eleven votes upsets the General Assembly balance, Alphand said. He is not at all sure he will be permitted to meet with the Soviets on Saturday since he has no instructions. His Foreign Minister has said that France will not consider membership question before it is back in GA, and Alphand does not know whether France will be able to accept any group of applicants.

Dixon said that they would like to see admission of seventeen, but if that was not possible, UK would be obliged to favor eighteen. Dixon then went on to express grave concern that we may be confronted eventually with a situation whereby Tsiang would veto Outer Mongolia and the entire membership question would fail. A veto by Tsiang would be catastrophic according to Dixon. There would be a violent reaction against the Chinese for frustrating the general desire on membership and this would likely be used to reopen the Chinese representation issue at this session… .

Dixon interrupted our meeting to see Martin (Canada) to ask him to make two changes in the resolution on the understanding, of course, that there would be no implication that the UK was supporting Martin’s initiative. He has suggested the substitution of the phrase “widest possible membership” in the preamble for the word “universality” and the phrase “expanding the membership” for the word “universality” in operative paragraph two.

. . . . . . .

Following is my evaluation of situation:

1. Worst possibility is that the membership deal will get to a point where it is finally wrecked by the veto of Tsiang on Outer Mongolia. Even allowing for some exaggeration by Dixon, this would have a violent effect here with a strong possibility of raising Chinese representation question this session or at least making our position on this question more difficult at subsequent sessions. It therefore should be avoided even if we have to pay the price of not having any membership deal at this session.

2. It may be possible to knock off Outer Mongolia in the SC without China using the veto, by arranging for five abstentions. This would however, put us in opposition to UK as they would feel obliged to vote for Outer Mongolia ….

3. Obviously the best solution is to try to talk the Soviets out of Outer Mongolia, using inducements I expressed to them today. Dixon assures me he will cooperate fully to accomplish this.

4. If we do make the necessary impression on Saturday, I believe we will not know until we have our first meeting of SC when everyone will have to show his hand when the voting begins.

5. …

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/11–1655. Secret; Priority.