198. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
513. Department pass USUN. Embassy’s 511.2 I share Department’s apprehension over repercussions should GRC feel forced veto UNO admission of Outer Mongolia. Natural tendency among sponsors of free world candidates whose hopes thus frustrated would be to censure China, perhaps in intemperate terms already used by some to press. This seems to me neither justified historically nor to our interest.
Furthermore some nations in past have supported GRC in UNO only with reluctance, and above development (if it occurs) would provide excuse and opportunity for more open opposition to GRC. Such trend could greatly facilitate early replacement of GRC by Red China in UNO.
Atmosphere of vexation could lead some delegates, after voting, to indulge in strong criticisms GRC, which could snow-ball as each orator sought new phrases to express his indignation. Since it is in long-run interest of US that GRC retain its position and stature, I suggest that if GRC uses veto, US delegate arise promptly and preferably as first speaker deliver best possible explanation GRC action, recognizing its right exercise veto under Charter regardless our disagreement (in contrast to Red satellites) and hoping thus set calmer tone for any succeeding speaker.
While US delegate need not recapitulate all reasons for China’s decision, he could express sympathy with GRC’s problems, cite its past record (in contrast to USSR’s) and present reluctance use veto, pointing out no free nation’s candidature opposed by China, but that real issue is frequent and persistent efforts USSR (through veto or threat thereof) to impose its candidates UNO in contravention clear wording and intent Charter’s membership provisions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–255. Confidential.↩
- Document 191.↩