200. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State1
516. Reference: Department telegram 317.2 Following is President Chiang’s response to President Eisenhower’s second letter on Outer Mongolian question.GRC has transmitted this response to its Embassy Washington but requested we also transmit via our facilities which are faster.
“December 3, 1955.
“Dear Mr. President:
“Your telegraphic message in reply to mine of November 26 was transmitted to me through your Embassy on November 29. I am happy to note that we are in agreement in not accepting the legality of the enforced detachment of Outer Mongolia from the Republic of China. It is a position of primary importance to my Government and my people.
“Since the receipt of your second message I am sure you will agree that the best possible solution would be one in which we would not have to use the veto against Outer Mongolia’s application. I wonder whether something could be worked out by your representative and ours at the United Nations either to have the application of Outer Mongolia dropped or to have its consideration technically postponed. As I stated in my last message, we are fully prepared to go along with you if Outer Mongolia is dropped or detached from the present list of 18 applicants, even though the admission of the 17 new members would possibly weaken my government’s position in the United Nations. We have taken this conciliatory attitude solely out of our desire to cooperate with you to the best of our ability. You will no doubt understand that even without your friendly advice we are naturally anxious to avoid having to use the veto in view of our present position in the United Nations.
“I well know that to other governments Outer Mongolia may seem just another Soviet satellite. But to us, the consequences of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations would be extremely unfavorable and far-reaching. It would also, I feel seriously damage the prestige of the United Nations as well as the moral leadership of the United States.
“By resorting to the technique of a package deal, it is clearly Soviet Russia’s design to induce all of us to accept Outer Mongolia’s [Page 424] application without any reference to Charter provisions. The acceptance of such a “deal” would set a precedent whereby any applicant state not possessing the necessary qualifications for membership and having committed acts of aggression may be admitted, thus paving the way for the eventual entry of the Peiping Communist regime. That the Soviet insistence on Outer Mongolia’s admission as a condition for not using the veto on 13 of the other applicant states is an act of unadulterated blackmail is clear to all. It is most regrettable that a number of member states of the United Nations should be giving it support and even pressing my Government to accept this deal by threatening to raise again the question of China’s representation. Should this be tolerated, the United Nations would no longer be an instrument for international peace and justice; it would soon become a tool of Soviet Communism. I honestly feel that it is incumbent upon the United States, with all its strength and prestige, to firmly oppose the admission of Outer Mongolia as a condition for the admission of the other applicant states. So far as China is concerned, a mere statement of our opposition to the admission of Outer Mongolia would not be adequate. It would be tantamount to forfeiting our national stand and failing to fulfill our obligations under the Charter.
“I, therefore, once more appeal to you as a friend and hope that you will find it possible to instruct your permanent representative at the United Nations to further explore the possibility of a solution in which the application of Outer Mongolia for membership will not be involved.
“I am greatly cheered by reports of your speedy recovery and trust that this will find you in your best health.
“Sincerely,
“Chiang Kai-shek”3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12–455. Secret; Niact. Passed to USUN.↩
- Document 188.↩
- In telegram 517 from Taipei, December 4, Rankin reported, inter alia, that the reply indicated the Chinese position was “no less firm than ours” and “based upon what we know here” everything that could be said on the matter had been said; that “President Chiang quite evidently is leaving matter almost entirely in hands of Foreign Minister and seemingly is prolonging his stay at Sun-Moon Lake to avoid further direct involvement;” and that “In all of this GRC evidently feels it has been offered no offsetting advantage in return for compliance. Rather it seems to them simply another step along road of appeasement and retreat, pursued past ten years on US and other well meaning advice. With end of road almost in sight they are making stand, however mistakenly.” (Department of State, Central Files, 310.2/12-455)↩