203. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Chinese Ambassador (Koo) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Department of State, Washington, December 6, 19551
SUBJECT
- Prospective Chinese Veto of Outer Mongolia’s Application for UN Membership
Ambassador Koo asked about the reaction of the President to the Generalissimo’s reply to the second letter of the President on the UN membership question.
Mr. Robertson said the reaction was very bad. He feared that neither the Generalissimo nor George Yeh realized the full implications of what they were doing. There was no United States-Soviet deal, as they seemed to suspect. The U.S. was trying to save the position of the Chinese Government in the UN. The fact that two personal messages from the President and one from the Secretary were dispatched to President Chiang shows how seriously we view the situation. This was no ordinary procedure. When appeals of such extraordinary character are summarily turned down by the Chinese Government, the effect naturally is unfortunate.
He said that the U.S. does not think any of the five satellite states are qualified for UN membership but the Vandenburg resolution of 1948 recommends against U.S. use of the veto on membership questions to frustrate the will of the majority. The Chinese representation problem is different. China is already a member of the UN and the dispute is one of accreditation.
Ambassador Lodge will state the U.S. position, and will abstain on the vote, but the U.S. will refrain from using the veto so as not to frustrate the will of the majority. It is not correct to assume that the admission of the 18 countries would represent a complete Communist victory. The Soviets do not like a number of the countries that would be admitted: Spain and Ireland, for instance. The U.S. was only asking President Chiang if he would exercise a restraint similar to that of the U.S. as to the veto. He is not being asked to swallow his objections. The U.S. would expect him to voice them freely. But the use of the veto to defeat the majority will, would be likely to arouse widespread indignation in the UN. The free countries involved would say that they were kept out of the UN as a result of the Chinese veto.
[Page 428]Ambassador Koo said his Government had made quite a concession in withholding its objections to the applications of the four European satellites.
Mr. Robertson remarked that Outer Mongolia was no different in principle from the four European satellites.
Ambassador Koo disagreed, so far as the Chinese viewpoint was concerned. He said that the creation of the puppet state of Outer Mongolia was a direct result of Soviet aggression and a violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.
Mr. Robertson recalled that for a long number of years the Chinese Government had never had more than a very tenuous control of Outer Mongolia. For whatever reason, the Chinese Government had agreed to the plebiscite which had resulted in Mongolia’s nominal independence. The Chinese Government had recognized Outer Mongolia independence and in 1946 had voted for Outer Mongolia’s admission to the UN.
Ambassador Koo said that China had acted in this way because of its obligations under the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty. His Government had tried to observe the Treaty in good faith. But the Treaty had been flouted by the Soviet Union. The UN itself had condemned the Soviet Union for breaking the Treaty. The Chinese Government was no longer obligated by the Treaty and had therefore denounced it. Outer Mongolia presented a different situation from the European satellites, so far as China was concerned. This was because of the special relationship of Outer Mongolia to China. He said that the problem was a very difficult one for his Government.
Mr. Robertson said it was also difficult for the U.S. Government which considered none of the five satellites qualified for membership under the Charter. However, the overwhelming majority of the other countries favored admission of the satellites in order to obtain admission of the thirteen deserving candidates. The U.S. Government thinks the Chinese Government is right in principle but does not agree that it is right as to its procedure, if a veto is contemplated. The U.S. position is consistent as to all five satellites. But the U.S. cannot see that the Chinese position is consistent in not exercising the veto as to four, and exercising it as to one. We do not see any logical distinction between the four and the one. As far as the Charter requirements are concerned, there are no differences between Outer Mongolia and the other four.
Ambassador Koo said that his Government had never used the veto on a membership question before. But the present situation had never arisen before.
Mr. Robertson said that if the Chinese vetoed, they would relieve the Soviets of the calumny which should attach to them. He [Page 429] was confident that the Soviets would pay money to get the Chinese to veto. It was more important to them than obtaining UN membership for the satellites.
Ambassador Koo said that he felt that the moral authority and dedication to principle of the UN would be gone once it yielded to blackmail.
Mr. Robertson pointed out that Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania all stood indicted by the UN for nonperformance of treaty obligations and violation of human rights. It did not seem that the Chinese Government was consistent in overlooking the shortcomings of these four while singling out Outer Mongolia for veto.
Mr. Robertson then read excerpts from a telegram sent to Ambassador Rankin the preceding day which set forth the serious situation created by the Chinese position. It seemed to us that the position of the Chinese Government indicated that it was out of touch with the realities of the situation. The Chinese Government was not being asked to express approval. We expected and wanted the Chinese Government to express disapproval, as the U.S. representative would do.
Ambassador Koo said that failure to exercise the veto would allow the Russians to have their way.
Mr. Robertson pointed out that it would be the “way” of the majority and that the Soviets by no means would have their way completely. It was a compromise.
The Chinese were about to walk into a Soviet trap. A veto would transfer all the onus from the Soviet Government to the Chinese Government.
Ambassador Koo thought it was still a question of moral principle.
Mr. Robertson said T.F. Tsiang’s recent interview in New York amounted almost to a slap at the President, since it seemed to be in the nature of a rejection of the second appeal of President Eisenhower to the Generalissimo. T.F. Tsiang had called in the press before a reply was sent by President Chiang to the President.
Ambassador Koo said he felt that Tsiang had been trapped by N.Y.Times correspondent Thomas J. Hamilton, who had telephoned Tsiang and pressed him for a statement of his intentions. T.F. Tsiang was not actually replying to the President’s message.
Mr. Robertson said it was interpreted in some quarters as a reply, although he felt certain it was not intended to be.
Ambassador Koo assured Mr. Robertson that nothing said by T.F. Tsiang was intended as a reply to the President.
Ambassador Koo asked if there would be a third message from the President. Mr. Robertson answered negatively. The President had already been turned down twice.
[Page 430]Ambassador Koo mentioned T.F. Tsiang’s suggestion that a special committee be appointed to study the qualifications of Outer Mongolia for membership. This would delay matters and afford an opportunity to work things out.
Mr. Robertson said he did not know whether there was any hope in such a suggestion. The situation was desperate. Many of the enemies of China were working to get the Chinese in the very position its representatives seemed determined to take.
Ambassador Koo mentioned that Cuba had proposed that the Republics of South Korea and South Vietnam be added to the list of candidates.
Mr. Robertson said this would be fine if it could be limited to these Governments. But the Soviets would then put up the puppet regimes of North Korea and the Viet Minh for membership. So this would merely compound the problem. The ratio would be two against two which was not as favorable as 13 against five.
Ambassador Koo asked if we felt that there was any chance of a delay.
Mr. Robertson said it was doubtful. The question might come up at any moment. The U.S. was terribly concerned. It was an issue of the utmost gravity to the vital interests of China. Yet we had the impression that the matter had been left largely in the hands of Foreign Minister Yeh while the Generalissimo was off at Sun Moon Lake.
Ambassador Koo said that his Government attached great importance to the messages from the President. It was for this reason that some time had been taken for the replies.
Ambassador Koo said that the Generalissimo had raised a question as to the possibility of a compromise. This might open the way for a further exchange of messages. He felt it would be very desirable for the President or the Secretary to send another message replying to the specific question raised by the Generalissimo as to whether every possibility had been fully explored. If we informed the Generalissimo that every channel had already been explored and there was no possibility of any new approach, the Generalissimo might have something more to say.
Mr. Robertson remarked that Ambassador Rankin had been discouraged by the Chinese from going to Sun Moon Lake to present the President’s second letter in person.
Ambassador Koo said that the Generalissimo sometimes wanted to be alone when he was considering weighty issues. Furthermore, the inn at Sun Moon Lake was often crowded. This would certainly be the case with six visiting Congressmen at Sun Moon Lake with the Generalissimo.
[Page 431]Mr. Robertson said the fact remained that Ambassador Rankin never got to present the second message personally. It appeared that George Yeh had drafted the reply. We felt that we were at the end of our rope. We had exhausted every possibility.
Ambassador Koo reiterated that he felt the second reply from President Chiang left the door open a little. It invited some reply. Another message through Ambassador Rankin might help.
Mr. Robertson said we have already made every effort imaginable to have the Outer Mongolian application dropped. We have made this clear to Taipei but there is no evidence that our points have ever been appreciated. But if it might help, we would be willing to send one more message from the Secretary pointing out that no stone has been left unturned; that we have explored every possibility open to us; and that we urge once more that the Generalissimo reconsider his proposed course of action.
(See separate memos on two other topics covered in same conversation: “Geneva Ambassadorial Talks”; and “Chinese Membership on Administrative Council of International Court of Arbitration”.2)