Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

116. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 1, 1955¹

Washington, March 1, 1955

SUBJECT

• Lebanon’s Request for Grant Military and Large-Scale Economic Aid; Lebanon’s Role in the Middle East Defense

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Charles Malik, Ambassador of Lebanon
• NEA—Mr. George V. Allen
• NE—Mr. Parker T. Hart
• NE—Mr. Francis O. Allen

Having been ordered home on consultation, Ambassador Malik called on Assistant Secretary Allen to discuss the recent urgent message he had received from Beirut regarding Lebanon’s desire for immediate US military and large-scale economic aid. Ambassador Malik had informed the Department of the contents of the message from his government (which he believed had been drafted by President Chamoun himself) on February 24,² and he wished before his departure to be informed of the Department’s reaction to this message. Prior to his call at the Department on March 1, Ambassador Malik had been informed that current US policies as explained to him (Departmental Memoranda of Conversation dated February 4 and February 22, 1955, and Departmental telegram to Beirut No. 1113, February 14, 1955³) had been determined after careful consideration of all the factors involved, and there was little chance of their being changed in any major way in the near future.

Mr. Allen opened the discussion of the message Ambassador Malik had received from Beirut by stressing that the ties between the US and Lebanon are strong and deep; and that the US has consistently acted in ways most friendly to Lebanon ever since the establishment of its independence in which we had played a not insignificant role. We were therefore puzzled at the reference in the message to the “frigidity and immovability” of US policy toward Lebanon; we could not regard such a description as either justified or accurate.

Mr. Allen also said he was surprised at the reference in the message to “American policy” regarding the organization of Middle East defense. We do not regard the developing defense organization as an expression of American policy. It is rather a result of the mutual interests of the countries of the area and of the United States and other powers concerned with the defense of the area. Such defense arrangements are only effective if the participating countries feel that their own national interests are served by them. The United States is not interested in urging any country which does not want to join collective security organizations to do so. Thus in the case of NATO neither Sweden nor Switzerland found it to their interest to join and we have remained on completely friendly terms with these countries, though we of course do not send them military aid or military missions. Similarly, we have no intention of attempting to induce Lebanon to join collective security arrangements for the defense of the Middle East. This is a matter which is strictly for Lebanon to determine in its own best interests, and the US will remain on friendly terms with Lebanon whether or not it takes such a step. At the same time, we must make it clear in a spirit of deep friendship that if the countries of the Near East remain unaware of the dangers confronting them we can do little to help them. They are not doing us a favor by joining in collective security.

Mr. Allen finally emphasized that he took strong exception to the phrase in the Lebanese message which appeared to threaten “permanent withdrawal of support of the U.S.” if US aid should not -be extended to Lebanon. In our view there is involved here not a question of Lebanon or other Arab states supporting the US or vice versa, but rather a question of Lebanon, the US and others supporting their mutual interests, with each country in doing so acting out of conviction as to its own best interests.

Ambassador Malik replied that he believed the meaning of the phrase concerning the danger of a “withdrawal of Arab support of the United States” was that it is important to take steps at this time to reduce developing anti-Western and anti-American feelings, since these feelings may soon become more rigid and difficult or impossible to change. In other words, the US may lose the support of the Arabs, including Lebanon if it does not act most carefully in the present most delicate situation in the Near East.

Mr. Allen expressed surprise that the Lebanese Government should feel that US relations with the Arabs were as bad as this would imply; that after two years during which the US Government had done everything in its power to be fair to the Arabs and as helpful to them as possible under President Eisenhower’s policy of impartiality, things should somehow have reached the stage of our being in danger of “permanently losing” our friendly relationships with the Arab world. This would indeed be surprising after the numerous steps that had been taken over the past two years to redress the imbalance in US policy said to have previously existed as between the Arab states and Israel.

Ambassador Malik replied that the Arabs believed that the US was trying to put pressure on them to make peace with Israel; and that many resented what they believed was a tendency on the part of the US to try to make them take sides in the “cold war”.

Mr. Allen requested the Ambassador to convey to the authorities in Beirut the continued strong and friendly interest of the United States in Lebanon’s welfare and independence, and at the same time to emphasize that we will be at a loss as to what to do if after two years of our impartial policy with every effort made to do all we possibly can for the Arabs, things are as bad now as was implied in the message from the Lebanese Government. Ambassador Malik replied that he was grateful to Mr. Allen for his frankness, and wished to emphasize that this frankness would not be misinterpreted by him. He agreed that we should all work together for the common good. Mr. Allen concluded by saying that if Lebanon follows what it is convinced is its own national interest, the United States will be entirely satisfied.

Ambassador Malik raised the matter of a possible official visit by President Chamoun to the United States. Mr. Allen replied that when the question of official visits was considered at the highest levels about six weeks ago, the decision was taken not to arrange any additional visits for the time being because of President Eisenhower’s crowded schedule. He stressed, however, that a visit by President Chamoun was high on “NEA’s list” of proposed official visits.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.5/2–2455. Confidential. Drafted by Allen.
2. Compare Departmental Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Malik, Mr. Hart and Mr. Francis Allen dated February 24, 1955. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The memoranda of conversation are not printed. Telegram 1113 summarized a conversation between Malik and Allen of February 9 and instructed the Embassy to take the same line the Department had taken in this conversation if the Lebanese Government put forward similar questions. (Department of State, Central Files, 786.12/2–855)