Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

146. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, December 15, 1955—4 p.m.

2474. Paris for SecDel.² Kirkpatrick called me to Foreign Office today and in half-hour conversation vigorously and somewhat emotionally professed British failure comprehend United States policy toward Saudi Arabia relation Buraimi and Muscat.

Expressing bewilderment at Department request British restrain Sultan Muscat (Deptel 3320³ and Embtel 2463⁴) Kirkpatrick embarked barked lengthy review developments and British attitude regarding Saudi Arabia over last 18 months and said felt basic misunderstanding exists United States–United Kingdom objectives area. On assumption United States and United Kingdom had agreed at Geneva that further encroachment Soviets into Arabian Peninsula contrary United States–United Kingdom interests and in further conviction that Saudis playing Soviet game British think United States efforts restrain local Sheikhs resisting Saudi pressures and subversion are playing into Soviet hand. He asked bluntly whether we desired Saudis achieve complete hegemony over Peninsula or if not where we would be prepared to draw line to stop their encroachments. Noting Saudi adherence Egyptian-Syrian Pact in direct opposition to United States–United Kingdom concept Baghdad Pact, Saudi willingness accept Soviet assistance and Department’s statement that Soviets have offered Saudis full support Buraimi case Kirkpatrick attempted draw analogy Buraimi–Muscat situation to position if Chinese Communists seized Formosan territory and British should urge US restrain Chinese Nationalists from using force restore possession. Particular reference Muscat also attempted analogy supposing insurrection in Philippines and British request United States restrain Magsaysay from restoring internal order. When I protested these analogies on various grounds particularly non-Communist nature Saudi Arabs and conviction United States Government that settlement disputes by force is not in broad interests United States–United Kingdom posture with Soviets in which our major effort is to deter Soviets from starting brush fires, he essayed further analogy of conceivable border dispute between Guatemala and Honduras and opined we would be unlikely restrain Guatemalans from resisting Honduran invasion.

I took issue with his exposition along lines various previous Deptels but he maintained claim of mystification over United States attitude. I asked whether in circumstances British are finally rejecting resumption arbitration Buraimi (Deptel 3315⁵). He protested we have never informed Saudis their action in arbitration constituted breach arbitration agreement. Having entered on arbitration as peaceful method settlement dispute Britain obligated insure just solution and impossible to do so unless Saudis can be restrained from sabotage in which they previously engaged. However he said in event United States could give Britain assurance it would inform Saudis as above, would not countenance continuance Saudis’ previous tactics and would draw line beyond which further Saudi encroachments would be met with force, i.e., a United States guarantee, he unsure what Foreign Secretary’s final position would be. I opined that his efforts draw blueprint future action in this manner seemed highly unrealistic to me in light of evolving situation Middle East and importance of issues at stake there. In reply he launched into exposition moral principles at stake for British in relation to Sheikhdoms with which British have closest ties and obligation.

In summarizing Kirkpatrick reiterated British in dark as to where United States policy is headed in Arabian Peninsula in light vast resources available Saudis for subversion etc and said would particularly like clarification whether we intend base our policy on assumption Saudis’ staunch Western adherents and can be relied upon to resist Soviet encroachments. In his view while Saudis not now in Communist camp their attitude bears considerable resemblance to that of Nehru.

Kirkpatrick concluded he had given this lengthy exposition to me for Department since he felt such discussion Buraimi and Muscat as Secretaries of State would have time for today in Paris might necessarily be limited.

Barbour

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/12–1555. Secret; Priority. Also sent to Aden. Repeated to Paris, Jidda, and Dhahran.
2. Dulles was in Paris attending the Fourth Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.
3. Supra.
4. See footnote 4, supra.
5. Document 197.