Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

151. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, July 25, 1957—8:13 p.m.

800. London’s 443,² 582,³ 618.⁴ Embassy requested discuss Muscat-Oman situation with FonOff along lines below. Department making similar approach to UK Embassy here:

1. Reports provided Department by UK regarding disturbances Inner Oman are cause for considerable concern that events may develop in such way as to adversely affect British position in Persian Gulf and lead to serious difficulties with Saudi Arabia. We hope situation can be headed off which would only provide opportunities for anti-Western elements in Middle East. It would be particularly unfortunate if matter should result in reestablishment of Saudi-Egyptian unity. Differences with Saudi Arabia over Aqaba are existing aggravating factor which needs to be taken into account.

2. As UK knows we fully support maintenance of “substantial British position in Persian Gulf”. We aware British views re obligation to respond to request from Sultan for assistance and recognize British apprehensions that failure to respond effectively could lead to undermining British stand throughout Sheikhdoms. We have no desire whatsoever to condone activities which aim at altering Sultan of Muscat’s suzerainty over his territory.

3. We realize some participants in present disturbances came from Saudi Arabia, but we have no firm information re degree of Saudi Arabian or Egyptian participation. In any Saudi action failure to make any progress re Buraimi and related matters would undoubtedly be factor. We also know that Sultan has seldom exercised firm control over Inner Oman which is tribal area subject to periodic revolts.

4. We think current difficulty underscores necessity attempting to work out an accommodation with Saudi Arabia and Muscat and other border areas on broad range of border problems. Satisfactory understanding, perhaps underwritten by US as suggested by Henderson in London, offers only real prospect of relative stability over any period of time. Such an accommodation we believe would be best possible assurance for continued maintenance of stable British position in Persian Gulf. In its absence we must anticipate continued challenge to UK presence throughout area.

5. Therefore, our thinking is that renewed efforts should be made to start on admittedly long road toward such an accommodation. First step might be meeting between Sultan and King Saud as discussed in London. If British see merit in this general approach we are prepared to discuss with King Saud.

6. In any event we hope British will extend their support to the Sultan in such a way as to minimize repercussions in wider theatre.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786E.00/7–2257. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved and signed by Dulles. Repeated to Jidda and Dhahran.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 786E.00/7–1957)
3. Telegram 582, July 20, conveyed the texts of press reports on the uprising in Oman. (Ibid., 786E.00/7–2057)
4. Telegram 618, July 22, forwarded the text of Lloyd’s July 22 statement on Oman in the House of Commons. (Ibid., 786E.00/7–2257)
5. On July 26, the Embassy in the United Kingdom reported that it had discussed the substance of telegram 800 with Beeley. According to the Embassy, Beeley found the Department’s position “highly satisfactory” from the British point of view. (Telegram 729; ibid., 786E.00/7–2657)