153. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Intelligence (Cumming) to the Acting Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Intelligence Note: Saudi Involvement in Omani Uprisings of 1955 and 1957
During the uprising in Inner Oman in 1955 which culminated in the ouster of the Imam of Oman by the forces of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman aided by the British, there were allegations from the British side that the uprising had been instigated by Saudi Arabia. Such allegations were made by the British Foreign Office to the US Embassy in London in December 1955 and in February 1956 the Foreign Minister of the Sultan, who is British, charged to an officer of the US Consulate General in Dhahran that “foreign intrigue and instigation” were behind the rising and that letters implicating the Saudis had been found in the Imam’s capital of Nazwa. There can be little doubt that the Saudis were sympathetic to the uprising because of their conflict with the UK and the Sultan over the Buraimi oasis. However, while they gave diplomatic and political support to the Imam and while there was gun-running, there is no information available on large-scale Saudi arms deliveries to Omani forces at that time.
After the ouster of the Imam, Talib, the Imam’s brother, fled to Saudi Arabia from where he paid visits to Egypt. From July 1956 to May 1957 up to 500 Omani refugees were trained near Dammam as a battalion … Saudi officers and … NCO’s served as instructors…. Talib was reported present nearly every day and the group may have developed a personal loyalty to Talib. The Omanis were armed with carbines and Beretta pistols. They were trained in infantry weapons through rocket launchers and were instructed in guerrilla tactics. The last group of Omanis … left Saudi Arabia between May 13–15, 1957; they reportedly landed on the Omani coast unarmed from dhows and infiltrated into the interior.
In October 1956 the British Foreign Office informed US Embassy London that the British Consul in Muscat had reported the landing of several shipments of small arms by the Saudis at the Omani port of Sur during September. Sur is located southeast of Muscat on the Gulf of Oman. It lies on a narrow channel in which small craft can anchor. The British report apparently refers to the [Page 235] same incidents mentioned in London’s telegram No. 809 of July 30, 1957,2 point 2, where it was stated that launches from the al-Khobar area in Saudi Arabia (al-Khobar is close to Dammam) had been carrying arms to Sur.
… two surplus seagoing launches of the type formerly used on the Bahrein-al-Khobar run had been sold in good faith to a Dammam merchant, who resold them to Talib ibn Ali in August 1956. The launches are no longer in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia and are believed in use on the Muscat-Oman coast. It is possible that these launches could have been used to ship arms to Oman in the fall as alleged by the British sources. … in January 1957 Talib bought from the Dhahran Airfield NCO Club a two-engine fishing boat that was out of commission and half sunk. It did not have Air Force markings. The boat was raised, had new engines installed and has likewise disappeared from the Eastern Province coast. It is presumed to be used in the same area as the two launches.
Saudi Arabia has so far shown no great concern about the latest developments in Oman. However, King Saud has been absent in Ethiopia and the influential governor of the Eastern Province likewise was absent from his post, having gone on a pilgrimage. Strong pro-Imam propaganda picturing the uprising as a nationalist liberation movement has come from Egypt, Syria, and the USSR.
Conclusions:
Evidence … indicates that the Saudis supported the Imam’s cause both before and after the 1955 uprising. There is no evidence of official support of the present uprising, and arms smuggling into Oman may have been done by Talib and his group rather than by the Saudis directly. However, there is circumstantial evidence that such smuggling took place from a Saudi port and probably with Saudi knowledge, although the King himself may not have been aware of individual instances. It is conceivable that the Saudi Government would want to stay aloof officially from the present rebellion in order to minimize disturbances in the Peninsula and avoid extension of Egyptian knowledge. However, King Saud has in the past frequently been emotional on such matters and it is not impossible that he may yet be goaded by Egypt, by his feelings over Buraimi, by tribal ties, or by court pressures into taking a strong line against the Sultan and the British in order to preserve his stature as an Arab leader.