Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

206. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover)¹

Washington, January 17, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Buraimi

Most of our discussion yesterday with Evelyn Shuckburgh and his colleagues² concerned British action on the Persian Gulf, with particular reference to Buraimi.³ The British were unable to understand that their position on the Gulf has elements of imperialism, they constantly repeated that their advice and support were earnestly desired by the Sheikhdoms and the Sultan of Muscat, that there was no agitation against them throughout these territories, and that King Saud and his clique were “corrupt, medieval, playing the Communist game, and completely anti–Western”. Shuckburgh referred at some length to the preferable position of British and American oil personnel in Kuwait and the Sheikhdoms as compared with the “thoroughly unsatisfactory and miserable conditions” under which Aramco and its people must work in Saudi Arabia. His solution is a tough policy against Saudi Arabia in which the British hope very much we will join.

I and my associates (notably, Doug MacArthur, Bill Rountree and Francis Russell) questioned both the British premise and their suggested policy. I pointed out that Arab nationalists do regard the British position in the Gulf (and in Jordan) as imperialistic and we must all face this fact realistically if we are to devise a solution. I said that in many of the princely states of India, the rulers had preferred for Britain to remain in control since British departure would mean that the rulers would have to come under the domination of Indian politicians in New Delhi. Conditions of life were undoubtedly more pleasant for both American and British residents of India under the British regime. Nevertheless, we had to face the facts of life and realize that the 19th Century was no more. I did not wish to imply that we wanted the British to leave the Persian Gulf either today or tomorrow, but there was no use pretending that the Arab Sheikhs who welcomed British support were angels and that all those who opposed it were devils.

The crux of the problem is whether a tough line with Saudi Arabia is the solution. I pointed out that the American oil people in Saudi Arabia have not requested the United States Government to take a tough line, despite their many difficulties with the local authorities. I did not imply that we are ready to accept the Saudi position without question, but in the Buraimi dispute we were not persuaded that the British had ample justification for breaking off the arbitration.

We explored every possibility of resuming peaceful negotiations, including direct talks between the British and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Shuckburgh did not rule out this last suggestion but said quite definitely, under instructions, that the British Cabinet had made a firm decision that it would not resume arbitration.

We pointed out to the British that the Saudi Arabs had agreed with considerable reluctance to delay in bringing the matter to the Security Council pending knowledge of the outcome of the Washington talks; that the King claimed to be under heavy pressure from the tribes to take immediate action and, if some agreement regarding talks could not be reached, this might take the form of making a big case in the Security Council or of military action in the disputed area. It seemed to us improbable that the British expressed desire to avoid either of these courses could be avoided unless agreement to resume arbitration was reached or unless some other device was employed, such as to undertake direct talks between the British and the Saudi Arabs. We told them that if the Saudi case should be brought to the Security Council the Soviets would be able to outbid us in supporting the Arabs just as they have outbid us in the current Arab–Israeli dispute. Undoubtedly, the minimum demand which would be made in the Security Council would be for the resumption of arbitration, and we said that we frankly felt it would be extraordinarily difficult for the US, at least, to take a position against this since to do so might cause irreparable damage to the Western position in the area. We did not see how the US could, for example, oppose arbitration on the basis that we had made a juridical determination on the merits of the case and had found that [sic] the British (or the Sheikhs’) position to be unarguable. There is a difference of opinion as to who was right and who was wrong, and disputes of that nature are normally settled in some manner other than by a unilateral determination enforced by arms. We expressed misgivings regarding the British contention that, while they considered their position in the matter as completely sound, any arbitration would nevertheless go against them; we said that it seemed to us that it should be possible to devise procedures and mechanics for arbitration which would assure that responsible neutrals would render an equitable judgment without being influenced by what the British term “Saudi corruption and bribery”.

I believe we made some impression yesterday on Mr. Shuckburgh and his colleagues, but their hands are tied by their instructions. We believe that every possible effort should be made to persuade Mr. Eden to take action which will avoid the necessity of bringing the case before the Council. The matter is still under discussion with Shuckburgh and his colleagues and as soon as our respective positions have become more clarified,⁴ a position paper for the Eden talks will be prepared for Departmental clearance.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/1–1756. Confidential.
2. British Foreign Office representatives led by Evelyn Shuckburgh met with Department of State officials between January 13 and 19 for discussions on Anglo–American interests and objectives in the Middle East in preparation for the Eden visit to Washington. Records of the discussions and related materials are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 647, and ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers).
3. On January 16, in a memorandum to Allen, Hoover noted that, at the suggestion of Allen’s office, he had informed Azzam Pasha that the United States would attempt to convince the British to return to arbitration. Hoover wondered, however, whether the Department should not try to impress the British with the seriousness of the situation, and concluded: “I am fearful that if positive action is not taken we will have a serious problem on our hands. What plans do you have on how we should proceed?” (Ibid., Central Files, 780.022/1–1756)

4. During the afternoon discussions, after confirming Shuckburgh’s view of the importance of Middle East oil to Western Europe and the United States, Allen presented the Department’s view of the difference between the American and British approach to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf as follows:

   “The difference in the British and American position, to the extent that there is any difference, turns on the best means to assure our objective. The British desire to show firmness is probably shared by many people. Our view is that we should be careful not to exert more pressure than the traffic will bear. We differ somewhat about the Saudis. The picture as painted by the British is more black and white than in our conception. The British have described Saudi Arabian activities in terms of … evil, whereas we attribute many of the Saudi actions to Arab nationalism. The British have pointed out that the Saudis have voted with the Communist satellites. Our best judgment is that this is so not because the Saudis have an affinity for Communism, but because of their extreme nationalism. Instead of being motivated by Marxist idealism, we believe the Saudis are chiefly moved by: (1) their irritation against the U.S. for the preservation of Israel; (2) their fear of British domination of the Persian Gulf.” (Memorandum of Conversation by Geren; ibid., NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Eden Talks, Washington, Jan. 28–Feb. 1, 1956 (Background Papers))