211. Letter From the Ambassador in Saudi Arabia (Wadsworth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen)1
Dear George: I write this enroute to Dhahran by train after a very full two–day visit to Riyadh. I will telegraph you its highlights so soon as Muhammed Effendi and I can put into orderly shape our voluminous notes and the several papers given us by the King’s command.
This letter is to supplement that telegram—yet to be written—by sending you the enclosed memorandum of my private audience with the King on January 25.2 I wrote it up the same (yesterday) evening from notes taken by me at the time. It will, with this letter, go forward to you by the Consulate General’s air pouch tomorrow.
The major themes of all my discussions (except for two hours with Prince Mishaal on MAAG affairs) were very briefly: His Majesty’s desire to build sound foundations for continuing cooperation with the United States; the perfidy of British propaganda and actions against Saudi Arabia and Saudi–American relations; Buraimi, “the test” of future Saudi relations with the West; and His Majesty’s determination to resist Soviet offers and pressures “to the end” and then to yield only if “forced” so to do by our rebuff of his advances.
The skeptic could read all of this, as well as His Majesty’s “secret” messages to us a fortnight ago, as little more than a well conceived and dramatized final plea for our support, at the Eden–Eisenhower meeting, of his claim to Buraimi and the adjacent disputed areas. But to me it is far more than that. I seriously believe it is the truth, as he sees it, if not, as you and I would see it, the whole truth.
In my view, he needs and wants us as a friend now and in the future. He respects us highly despite our support of Israel; our Northern Tier policy despite our support of the Baghdad Pact; and our stand against Communism and our role in world affairs despite his fears that we may be led by “Perfidious Albion” to support its [Page 326] policy of encroachment against his frontier areas. I “buy”, as an understatement, the sentence in Hoover’s outstanding memo of January 19 to Shuckburg: SAG is not irrevocably committed to an anti–Western position.
In a friendly tour d’horizon with Yusuf Yasin—we have again buried the hatchet—I mentioned inter alia press reports that the Secretary would attend the SEATO Council meeting in Karachi March 14–16 and hoped thereafter to visit India and other neighboring countries. If he could visit King Saud, I said, I felt that together they could go far towards finding a solid basis for future Saudi–American relations.
Yusuf’s reply was interesting: “His Majesty would always welcome his visit. The fact is His Majesty would welcome any approach which might help strengthen Saudi–American relations, be it by Mr. Dulles visiting Saudi Arabia or by His Majesty going to America. (Note: Underlining mine. This is the first time this latter possibility, of which you have heard from other sources, has been mentioned here to me.)3
I have rambled intentionally in the foregoing paragraphs while impressions of my Riyadh visit, with its formal and private audiences and other discussions, are fresh in mind.
I will try to send you a memo of the formal audience by first pouch following my return to Jidda January 29. In some ways, as you will see from my telegram, it is more interesting than that of the later private audience sent herewith. His Majesty’s remarks were recorded in Arabic which Muhammad is now translating.
There was no scribe but myself at my second audience; and you will understand why this was so when you read its annex, which His Majesty asked specially be considered Top Secret. It is not unduly long, so I shall not attempt to brief it in this covering letter.
Finally, let me thank you for your recent letter.4 I do not have it with me on this trip but recall well it told me just what I wanted to know of your thinking on my possible return “on consultation”, assured me Buraimi and Dhahran Airfield were very much in your thoughts and warned me that supply of M–47 tanks and F–86 aircraft to Saudi Arabia or any country in this area would require high–level decision.
That warning, though not unexpected, was particularly helpful in my Riyadh discussion of MAAG matters with Prince Mishaal. I gave him no encouragement of early decision, and stressed the need [Page 327] for prompt completion of arrangements for the expected early delivery of M–41 tanks and C–119 aircraft as mentioned in Deptel 348 to Jidda.5
In this general connection, however, I should much appreciate early word as to your agreement, if it can be given, at least in principle, to meet the last large ($30–odd million) SAG request for “non–sensitive” military equipment items made within the framework of its “Five–Year Plan.”
Faithfully yours,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/1–2656. Secret; Personal and Official.↩
- Not printed; Wadsworth’s audience with the King touched on a number of subjects, including Communist and Russian pressure, Buraimi and British pressure, and Yemen–Saudi relations. An annex included the following statement by the King: “Be sure we will fight Communism and Russia like the plague, but don’t force me, by your acts of omissions, to take the plague. All the Arab countries, except Saudi Arabia, have caught it and are already, in varying degree, cooperating with Russia and its allies.”↩
- According to Harry Kern of Newsweek, the Saudi Ambassador and Sheikh Jabbar of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, had indicated that Saud was interested in visiting the United States. See footnote 9, Document 196. The underlining is printed here as italics.↩
- Not printed.↩
- On January 22 the Department notified the Embassy in Jidda that, among other things, the first shipment of M–41 tanks and further action on the C–119 aircraft might be expected “soon”. (Telegram 348; Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/1–2256)↩