Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, March 9, 1956—6:12 p.m.

434. Nuri Said has on several occasions raised with Ambassador Gallman question of Saudi support of opposition elements in Iraq and anti–Western elements other Arab countries. Ambassador Gallman replied these approaches on March 2 indicating Department believes Saudi influence can best be lessened through effort reduce King Saud’s suspicions toward Iraq and Iraq’s friends.²

Department also requested Ambassador explore with Nuri possibilities achieving better understanding between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Department acting on assumption Saud not entirely happy with growing Egyptian influence in Saudi Arabia and might be amenable to overtures from Iraq. U.S. indicated willingness support alignment if rapprochement possible.

In reply Nuri stated three main questions troubled Iraq–Saudi relations: the Hejaz, Iraq’s special relations with Syria and position Iraq and Saudi Arabia in Persian Gulf area. Nuri felt Saudi royal family should stop agitating Hejaz problem since Iraq was remaining quiet about it. With regard to Syria Nuri believed Saudi Arabia should recognize Iraq’s special relationships and importance of Syrian outlet for Iraqi oil but emphasized he wanted an independent Syria. Nuri stressed his belief Baghdad Pact which is designed block Soviet penetration serves as much for protection of Saudi Arabia as it does for protection of Iraq. He suggested Saudi Arabia stop its agitation against the Pact.

Nuri believes key man in Saudi Arabia today is Prince Faisal and any approach must be first to Faisal. Nuri believes Saudi Arabia should take initiative in view its recent activities despite fact Iraq failed return satisfactorily Saud’s visit to Faisal coronation.

Other possibilities Department proposed in connection with rapprochement were:

1. Expression by King Faisal in letter or through special emissary to Saud of his concern over current Arab problems. Such approach might be based on deference to King Saud as elder and guardian holy places.

2. Pilgrimage by Faisal, possibly in company of Hussain of Jordan in June of this year when Haj takes place.

3. Governmental talks on common problems.

4. Royal meeting on Iraqi and Saudi yachts in Persian Gulf as Faisal met Ibn Saud on HMS Lupin in 1930.

5. Meeting on border in desert, possibly in neutral zone.

We are keeping British generally informed steps being taken in this matter but have not discussed approach to Saudis. Nuri was cautioned to use utmost discretion in discussing matter since it is of course important that U.S. not be identified in any way with any proposal accepted. Purely indigenous development could not with justification be criticized by Egypt or Syria.

For present, foregoing is sent on purely FYI basis. Department would appreciate your comments and suggestions regarding possibilities of approach to Faisal or King on this subject.³ Department considers Iraqi–Saudi rapprochement is one key to efforts improve Western position in area.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786.00/3–956. Top Secret. Drafted by Newsom and approved by Rountree. Repeated to Baghdad and London.
2. The substance of Gallman’s conversation with Nuri was transmitted in telegram 881 from Baghdad, March 1. (Ibid., 786.00/3–156) The Department’s views on an Iraqi–Saudi rapprochement were transmitted in telegram 636 to Baghdad, February 27. (Ibid., 786.00/2–2756)
3. In response, Wadsworth reported on March 29 that King Saud, not Prince Faisal, was the “key man” in Saudi Arabia; that the initiative for the approach should be taken by King Faisal; and that King Hussein would be the best possible intermediary. Wadsworth added that of all the possible approaches mentioned in the reference telegram, the most suitable to Saud’s present temper would be a state visit by Faisal during the Pilgrimage in mid–July. (Telegram 434 from Jidda; ibid., 786.00/3–2956) On May 1, the Department informed the Embassy in Baghdad that King Saud had suggested in a top secret message to Wadsworth that he would be happy to have Faisal of Iraq visit Saudi Arabia. According to the Department, Saud approved of the idea of Hussein of Jordan acting as an intermediary. (Telegram 897 to Baghdad; ibid., 786.00/5–156)