Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

222. Memorandum of a Conversation, Jidda, April 2, 1956¹

Jidda, April 2, 1956

SUBJECT

• 1) Saudi–American Cooperation
• 2) Buraimi
• 3) Arms
• 4) Yemen
• 5) Syria
• 6) St. John Philby

PARTICIPANTS

• His Majesty King Saud with Royal Counsellor, Yusuf Yasin
• Ambassador Wadsworth with Embassy Arab Consultant, Muhammad
• Massoud, who also acted as interpreter

1) After compliments, I opened the conversation by expressing my appreciation for His Majesty’s message saying he would receive me prior to my departure for Washington on consultation. I believed that my visit could further the common interests of our two countries which His Majesty and I had discussed during recent months. This was the sense of the reply (see copy annexed²) which I had sent him.

His Majesty, I said, had many times assured me and given proof of his friendship for my country. I remembered particularly his remarks to General Tunner and me two years ago in Buraida when he had said that he conceived his duty as a friend was two–fold: first, to continue, as his distinguished father had done, to cooperate with us in the common use of Dhahran Airfield and, second, to have no dealings with our enemies. But, he had added, your country, too, has reciprocal duties of friendship.

It was in this spirit, I concluded, that I wished to present our common problems to my Government. If there were any special messages I could take from His Majesty I should be happy to do so. I had mentioned Dhahran Airfield specifically, because my telegram from Mr. Hoover asking me to return had indicated that he wished me to learn the viewpoint of our Defense Department on that question; but my telegram had, as well, indicated that the State Department would wish to consider with me Near Eastern area problems and all questions of common interest to Saudi Arabia and the United States.

His Majesty answered that what I had said as to cooperative friendship between our two countries was exactly what he had wanted to say. He continued substantially as follows:

I have always been proud of my friendship with America; and I want it to continue if the United States so desires.

I have certain principles. One is that I always keep my word. What I say is from my heart, based on religious faith and on our Arab tradition. This is well known.

No man lives who has not enemies; enemies who will talk against him. But it is by experience that others can know him. I repeat again that I want my friendship with America to continue.

I shall live up fully to my duties as a friend. Whatever be asked of me I shall do, on three conditions: that the independence of my country be maintained; that my Sovereignty be respected; and that there be no interference in our internal affairs.

I believe I have proven this to your Government. I should not have to mention examples. But, even after approving the Polish contract (for survey of the Hejaz Railway) I cancelled it (i.e. the approval) when I found it was contrary to American interest. And I am the only Arab leader who has not taken arms from the Russians or their satellites, because I want to be the friend of America.

If United States Government has understood these things, I will be ever with it. And from it I want, in turn, three things: that it back me as I am backing it; that that part of my country (Buraimi) which has been taken by force be restored; and that United States Government supply my army with the arms it needs, because I don’t want to take them from others—except for those (British) arms which, as I told you, I am taking from Egypt.

When the 18 American tanks arrived last week I asked that one be brought to Riyadh to show the people, so they could see what I could get from America; and I had Americans drive it. It was a symbol of Saudi–American cooperation; and I gave the drivers watches and a month’s pay.

To me the obtaining of arms is vitally important. If it is a question of paying, I can pay. Among the Arabs I am the richest, but my army is the weakest. I can get arms elsewhere, with training mission as well, but I want only American arms. And you may be sure I shall never use them to attack; I want them for defense.

As for Dhahran Airfield, anything which will help reinforce Saudi–American relations I will never hesitate to give. I repeat; if America comes closer by a span, I will come by an arm’s–length and cooperate to the fullest.

I am greatly hopeful your visit will help strengthen relations and realize our hopes, to our common interest. I will wait, with interest, to hear from you the decision of your Government.³

I said, in reply, that I would discuss all these things in Washington. His Majesty’s exposition would be my best help in making them clear to my Government. His Majesty answered, by way of summation, that, in speaking as he had done, he had wished to reassure me as to “the bases of his policy with America.”

2) Buraimi. I asked if His Majesty would wish to elaborate with respect to the two particular questions he had mentioned, Buraimi and arms. With respect to Buraimi, I had already sent him word my Government would be glad to continue to extend its good offices. We hoped that the proposed preliminary talks on ministerial level⁴ would find bases for negotiations which would lead to settlement.

His Majesty asked if I know what attitude the British would take in reply to his proposal that the preliminary talks be held in New York.⁵ I answered that I had heard from our Embassy in London, that, at working level, the Foreign Office was not happy on learning of this suggestion.⁶ My Government’s position was that it had no objection to these talks being held in New York. As one offering good offices to both parties it would hardly say more.

The King answered, “Your position is reasonable”; then added: “We do not want to be disappointed again. We will talk. We will seek a basis for settlement. If the British show good will, we will show it.”

Shaikh Yusuf commented that he had already explained to me that His Majesty’s acceptance of the British proposal had been based on his desire to effect peaceful settlement of the dispute, but that it was the United States Government offer of good offices which had in large measure encouraged him to do so. Now, he feared, the British might say: We have agreed with the Saudis, so you Americans should withdraw. His Majesty would not wish that to happen. He wants United States Government to continue “in the picture.”

I answered that, personally, I believed we would wish to do so and to be of all possible help in finding a basis for settlement. Personally, too, I had been thinking much as to what such basis might be. I had asked Yusuf to explain to me just what was meant by the formula “One–half undivided interest,” as applied to the Saudi–Iraqi Neutral Zone, because in that formula, I had gathered, might lie a possible basis for settlement of the question of sovereignty in Buraimi and the Disputed Territory.

Yusuf, I added, had read me some two months ago a telegram from Ambassador Al–Khayal reporting that he had discussed this possibility with Mr. Allen; but I had heard nothing further of it except one report that Mr. Duce, too, thought it might open one way to settlement. I had, therefore, been happy to hear from Yusuf that he also saw in this suggestion a possible formula for the recognition of His Majesty’s sovereignty, i.e. in the sense of tribal ligeance to His Majesty as liege–lord. Could I say His Majesty would have no objection to this idea as a possible basis for settlement?

The King commented in substance: It is a thorny problem. In the old days this area was not known as the Disputed Area. What shall we do with those now homeless, living here as refugees in tents, who want to go back to their homes? We have trouble now with Iraq and Quwait in the northern Neutral Zones where there are only nomads and no villages. In the Disputed Area, all the tribes give allegiance to Saudi Arabia, but there there are villages as well.

Why, His Majesty then asked, cannot the British be satisfied with the old boundaries of the last 100’s of years? I answered: “Because, perhaps, there were no lines.”

The King replied, in substance: Yes, there were. We have never interfered in the coastal areas or with the affairs of the coastal Shaikhs of Sharja, Dubai and Ras al–Khaima. Now it is they (the British) who are pushing into the hinterland. For our part, even if there be tribes in Ras al–Khaima who want to come to us, we will not interfere.

His Majesty concluded: The fact is that, if the British have good will and wish to reach an understanding with us, they will find us ready. We are depending on God, our legitimate rights and the assistance of USG. And, if we do not reach an agreement, we must go to the Security Council where, we are confident, we will have the support of USG.

(Or: we will, as USG promised, have its support.)

I limited my reply to recalling that I had already assured His Majesty my Government will be happy to continue to exercise its good offices.

3) Arms. I opened discussion on this point by saying, in substance, that, as I saw it, Washington had two policies. One, which was of immediate concern because of the threatening Palestine situation, was to prevent, in the interests of peace, an arms race between Arabs and Jews. The other was based on our long–time, often repeated desire to contribute towards strengthening the Saudi army to the end that it be able effectively to maintain internal security and, in the event of war, defend itself and contribute to the defense of the area.

It was, I said, in the second connection that I hoped my visit to Washington would be helpful. Saudi Arabia had already bought between $20 million and $30 million worth of arms from USG. Today it had asked to buy another $30 million to $40 million worth of arms and equipment needed to supply its army under the Five–Year Plan which had been elaborated by our Military Mission in collaboration with His Majesty’s officers. Another like amount would be needed to complete the Plan. I would, in Washington, hope to obtain assurance that these arms would be delivered in accordance with the annual scheduling of that Plan.

I asked if I might say in Washington that this would be agreeable to His Majesty.

In reply, the King at first expressed displeasure with my exposition. Was there, he asked, a change in our policy? Were we not ready to send the arms needed for his army? Whenever he had referred to the promises made by Ambassador Hare and others, I had said “Let us forget the past and build for the future.” He wished to do that, with our help. But, was Saudi Arabia alone to be subjected to such conditions? Why were they not applied in the cases of Greece, Turkey, Iraq and Iran? I answered Saudi Arabia was not alone. We neither gave nor sold any arms to any country which was not ready for them.

The King continued: We want to be treated like these countries. But with one difference: I don’t want these arms free of charge. If USG is ready to sell them to me without conditions, I will buy them.

I asked: “Is it a condition to ask that purchases be made as provided by the Five–Year Plan?” I could say there was no change in our policy. I had told him, on instructions from Washington, that USG wished to continue to assist in strengthening his army.

His Majesty answered that he feared we might now be “giving him a runaround.” That was what he feared for the future. Besides, I spoke only of the Five–Year Plan. Prince Mishaal spoke of five phases. The question—of getting all the arms needed—was urgent. He wanted the phases realized more quickly.

In reply, I endeavored to explain: His Majesty had sent word to me in Washington over two years ago by Shaikh Asad that he wanted me to work on a Five–Year Plan. I had been doing so. It was a plan designed to build the best possible army in five years, within what we conceived to be the country’s capabilities.

Prince Mishaal, on the other hand, I continued, saw things on a larger plane. I had said his five “phases”—of which our Five–Year Plan was but the first phase—could be realized but it would take more time. I would say, too, that, if the Five–Year Plan could be realized more quickly we would be as happy as would be His Majesty. I must add, however, that I believed, on the basis of my own experience in Turkey, that the officers of our Military Mission were more competent to judge these things than is Prince Mishaal.

The King answered that he understood my position, but he wanted to make three important points. He said:

a) I don’t see that my army is progressing as fast as the armies in the other Arab states.

b) Must I say I will hold to the Five–Year Plan if I can go faster?

c) If we are going to renew the Dhahran Airfield Agreement and if I ask in return for renewal the giving of arms, would you give them?

I said in reply that I had already answered His Majesty’s second question; the answer was, “No, and we would be the first to take satisfaction in faster realization of the Five–Year Plan.” As to his second question (point C), I would take pleasure in asking for an answer during my discussions in Washington.

At this point His Majesty consulted with Shaikh Yusuf, following which I was asked and replied to three questions Yusuf had drafted, as follows:

a) Are you ready to offer all arms and equipment called for by the Five–Year Plan? I answered that that, in principle, had always been our policy and that I hoped the Plan could be realized in less than five years.

b) Are you ready to offer all arms and equipment called for by the five phases? I replied that I believed the answer would be “Yes, as soon as Saudi Arabia is ready for them.”

c) If Saudi Arabia needs more arms than are included in the Five–Year Plan, are you ready to sell them to Saudi Arabia?

I had begun to reply to Yusuf’s third question something to the effect that “if Saudi Arabia needed such arms for its own use…. “⁷ when His Majesty interrupted to say, “I want to say two things: 1) I want the arms called for by the Five–Year Plan; and 2) I guarantee I will not give or sell them to anyone else.” He added, “How can you even think I would give away arms when I am getting them from you and from Egypt”.

His Majesty then left for sunset prayers, asking me to await his return. Upon his return, I asked if Muhammad Effendi might recapitulate what I had said on the question of arms. His Majesty concurring Muhammad did so. We then passed to other subjects.

[Here follows a brief discussion of Yemen, Syria, and St. John Philby.]

George Wadsworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86A/4–256. Secret. Drafted by Wadsworth.
2. Not printed.
3. According to a memorandum from Wilkins to Allen of April 9, the King’s message was approved on April 3 by the Royal Saudi Diwan. That evening Saud informed Wadsworth that he planned to write a personal letter to the President, conveying this message to Eisenhower. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.86a/ 4–956) In a letter dated April 3, the King expressed his gratitude for U.S. efforts to facilitate the reopening of discussions between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom and noted that he had asked Wadsworth to convey to the President Saudi desire to solidify the friendship existing between Saudi Arabia and the United States, on the basis of cordial cooperation which would maintain Saudi independence and sovereignty and assist the reinforcement of the Saudi army as an effective element for peace. The text of the Saud letter is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.
4. The British and Saudi Governments had agreed in a series of aides–mémoire and notes to undertake direct discussions to improve relations. (Despatch 124 from Jidda, February 23, telegram 394 from Jidda, March 1, and despatch 148 from Jidda, March 27; Department of State, Central Files, 641.86a/2–2356, 780.022/3–156, and 641.86a/ 3–2756, respectively)
5. The proposal was made in a Saudi aide–mémoire of March 24. The text was transmitted in despatch 148 from Jidda, cited in footnote 4 above.
6. In telegram 4122 from London, March 21, repeated to Jidda, the Embassy informed the Department that working–level Foreign Office officials believed that New York City would not be an appropriate place for discussions as this might imply pressure to bring the Buraimi matter to the Security Council. According to the Foreign Office, the British preferred Riyadh over London or Jidda because they wanted more direct access to the King. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.022/3–2156)
7. Ellipsis in the source text.