232. Editorial Note

On May 26, accompanied by representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, Wadsworth returned to Saudi Arabia to begin preliminary negotiations for the extension of the Dhahran Airfield Agreement. On May 28, the Ambassador had an audience with King Saud during which Wadsworth delivered the President’s letter of May 14, discussed the United States position on Buraimi and arms, presented the draft exchange of notes proposing a 5-year extension of the Dhahran agreement on its present terms, and conveyed to the King the United States offer to defray the cost of the survey of the Hijaz Railway. The King’s response to the Eisenhower letter and to the American position on arms and Buraimi was positive, yet, according to Wadsworth, his initial remarks on the Dhahran Airfield “gave me first warning proposed extension might not be agreed on, if agreed, only for costly quid pro quo.” The King, Wadsworth informed the Department, noted that great pressure had been brought upon him, both inside and outside of his country, against the renewal of the accord. “We would not agree to extend the agreement,” the King continued, “without having certain things (something) to justify our attitude.” (Telegram 254 from Jidda, June 4; Department of State, Central Files, 711.56386A/6–456)

That evening, after dinner at the Royal Palace, Wadsworth resumed discussion with the King. After a review of the situation in Yemen, recent Soviet approaches to Saudi Arabia, and the prospects of a meeting between Faisal of Iraq and Saud, the King concluded the audience by noting: “Our relations are very good. It is my hope they will remain so. Dhahran Airfield is [the] symbol of this. But you must help us. We need some justification, something concrete which our people and others can see and point to, something which will persuade them of the Tightness of my judgment and action.” (Despatch 213 from Jidda, June 13; ibid.,711.56386A/6–1356)

On May 29, 30, 31, and June 2, Wadsworth talked with Faisal, Yasin, and al-Walid. Although discussion covered the subjects of Buraimi and economic and military aid, the main emphasis was on Dhahran. According to Wadsworth, during all of these meetings, Saudi officials continued to insist on “justification” for the renewal of the accord. Despite the Ambassador’s attempts to explain that the airfield was in the mutual interests of both countries, and that the United States could neither rent the airfield nor provide grant aid without a special agreement, the Saudis continued to insist on a form of quid pro quo. In the Ambassador’s final meeting with Yasin and al-Walid, the Royal Counselors proposed that, in return for a renewal of the agreement, the United States provide sufficient military [Page 374] equipment to arm a 13-regiment Saudi army or pay $50 million per year for the renewal. During his subsequent conversations with Faisal, Wadsworth was again informed of the importance to Saudi Arabia of justifying any decision to extend the agreement. According to Wadsworth, Faisal referred to the possibility of obtaining $250 million in arms for the renewal of the accord. Wadsworth concluded his meeting with Faisal with the impression that while Saudi strategy revealed little change from the conduct of the 1951 negotiations, a “stronger surge of Arab nationalism is now increasingly influencing high policy decisions.” (Telegram 254) On June 4 Wadsworth left Jidda for Dhahran. (The complete record of Wadsworth’s conversations was transmitted in despatch 213. A summary of the first phase of the talks was drafted by Newsom in a memorandum of June 20; ibid., 711.56386A/2–856.)