Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, Volume XIII

284. Telegram From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State¹

Beirut, October 16, 1957—4 p.m.

1158. Had long conversation with King Saud last evening. Only other person present was Husseini, who acted as interpreter. King received me in friendly fashion.

First discussed the significance of sending Egyptian troops to Syria.² King was obviously as displeased as he was perplexed by this development. He remarked that according to his information less than 2,000 troops had been sent, a number ridiculously inadequate to contribute to any defense of Syria. He only hoped, but had no information to that effect, that the Egyptian troops had been sent for at the instance of moderate elements in Syria and would support those elements against extremist sections in Syrian Army.

He asked me to assure the President and the Secretary that their friend (himself) was the same man who talked with them last winter in Washington and that he would continue his unremitting opposition to international communism.³ He avoided stating however that declaration to that effect would be contained in any communiqué. He merely said that on the next day he was having a long personal conference with President Chamoun and the day after with members of his government. The question of communism would be thoroughly explored in those conversations.

King said western powers must accept the fact of Arab nationalism. The King said it was his firm policy (and his visits to Beirut and Damascus served that policy) to guide and restrain this nationalism within reasonable limits and to bring all Arab states to friendly cooperation with the west.

To succeed in this policy however he needed all the prestige possible among his own and other Arab peoples. This prestige had been gravely affected by Israeli operations in the Gulf of Aqaba, which endangered and disturbed his country. If the US could force Israel to turn back its invasion of Egyptian territory and the Gaza Strip to help Egypt, which under its present government was scarcely a friend to the US, then America should prevent Israeli use of Aqaba to help Saudi Arabia, which was a true friend of the US. Husseini did not translate this but I understood the King also to say that Haifa or Jaffa were of course of true importance to Israel but Eliath could not be important to that country.

With Senator Hickenlooper I saw President Chamoun this morning. I told President of my conversation with Saud with Husseini as interpreter. The President observed that Husseini was “an old fox of the same school as Yusuf Yasin”. Husseini yesterday had brought over a draft communiqué to acting Foreign Minister Mikkawi which contained no mention of communism. Mikkawi refused to accept the Husseini draft, saying that a communiqué must be in all essentials the same as the communiqué issued during Chamoun’s visit to Riyadh, which declared opposition to communism.

Heath

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786A.11/10–1657. Confidential; Priority.
2. Documentation on Saudi interest in the situation in Syria is ibid., 786A.11 and 683.86A.
3. On October 2, in a major speech before the General Assembly, Ahmed Shuqairi, chief Saudi delegate to the United Nations, was extremely critical of Western policy in the Middle East. In the course of his speech Shuqairi stated that Western policy, rather than Soviet incitement of Arab nationalism, was responsible for deteriorating Arab relations with the West. (Circular telegram 309, October 3; ibid., 611.80/10–357)