Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

391. Memorandum of a Conversation, Geneva, November 9, 1955, 10 a.m.¹

USDel/MC/32

Geneva, November 9, 1955, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Russell
• United Kingdom
  • The Foreign Minister
  • Sir Ivan Kirkpatrick
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Hancock

SUBJECT

• The Middle East

Mr.Macmillan said he thought it would be a good idea for the US and the UK to agree on the general line we would take in the Middle East during the next few months. Mr.Dulles agreed and said he thought Mr.Macmillan would be interested in a statement which he was suggesting that the President make from Denver. He read the proposed statement.² He said that Mr.Sharett is leaving for the United States in a day or two to make a popular appeal over the head of the U.S. Government against the decision on Mr.Sharett’s request for a special security treaty and for U.S. support in making available to Israel arms to balance those given to Egypt by the Soviet Union. The proposed statement by the President would put him on record against Sharett’s appeal. Mr.Macmillan said that Prime Minister Eden is making a speech tonight³ in which he will refer to the Secretary’s August 26 speech and renew Britain’s appeal for a settlement and its offer of a formal guarantee in the context of a settlement. It will say that the Arabs take their stand on the 1947 Resolutions and the Israelis take theirs on the armistice agreement and the present situation.Eden will ask whether these positions are so wide apart that no negotiation is possible and will say that if the people of the area want peace there must be some form of compromise. The Secretary commented first that Mr.Eden might want to say something about the offer of economic aid; and secondly, that the Arabs do not want the 1947 Resolutions boundaries so much as they wish to base their negotiations upon them. The ‘47 Resolutions give the Negev to Israel. What Nasser suggests therefore is that Israel be given some of the Galilee which the ’47 Resolutions would have denied to Israel, and that Israel give the Negev to Egypt.

Mr.Macmillan raised the question as to the extent to which Molotov’s speech of the previous day, stating bluntly that the Soviets would not agree to all-German elections, affected our appraisal of Soviet intentions in the Middle East. The Secretary said it is clear that the Soviets are reverting to a tough line. The soft line which the Kremlin has been taking has resulted in problems and weaknesses among the Satellite countries. It must have appeared therefore to the Kremlin that the soft line had disadvantages for it in Europe while the tough line had proven to have advantages for the Soviets in the Middle East and they had therefore decided to forgo the Geneva spirit. Mr.Macmillan said he had not come to Geneva expecting agreement by the Soviets on Germany but he had thought the Soviets would permit the illusion of a possible agreement to continue.

Mr.Macmillan said he thought that with respect to the Middle East there were two immediate questions: (1) the Northern Tier and (2) Egypt. The Secretary said that with respect to the Northern Tier it was obvious that there was tremendous sensitivity on the part of the Soviet Union about Iran. They were fearful that Western air bases in Iran might threaten the Baku oil fields and other important installations in that vicinity. The Secretary said that he had had some doubts about the advisability of Iran adhering to the Baghdad Pact at this time but considerable momentum had developed around it and it had appeared to be a question of now or never. We have got to recognize that if we are to have military relations with Iran we must expect the Russians to react. Half way measures will be no good. We should either handle the Northern Tier as a nominal matter or make a really big effort, somewhat comparable to NATO. The Secretary said that he was not prepared to say at this time that the United States can put substantial resources into it. There are military considerations which of course involve our Department of Defense and there are budgetary questions which involve Treasury and Congress. Mr.Macmillan said that he thought we should move ahead vigorously. The Secretary said he thought he should point out that the United States would not in any event be able to foot the whole bill. There would have to be substantial contributions by the UK. The Secretary went on to say that it was obviously impossible to work out a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union in this area at this time. They would merely think we were pleading with them. We should not, however, discard completely the possibility that ultimately, after we have some firm policies and a position of strength, we might come to an understanding with the Soviet Union concerning the area. Mr.Macmillan suggested that it might possibly take a couple of years or so. In the meantime we should do what we can with the Baghdad Pact. One of the first things was to bring in Jordan. The Secretary said that in his opinion there was a serious question about our urging any of the countries which border upon Israel to join the Pact unless they were prepared to make peace with Israel, which he regarded as doubtful. If we gave substantial military assistance to the Pact countries bordering on Israel, we would have no guarantee in the absence of a settlement that they would not use the arms against Israel. The Secretary expressed his doubt that Jordan, Syria or Lebanon would be willing to take the initiative in making a settlement with Israel. The two leaders of the Arab world are Iraq, which does not border on Israel, and Egypt. We are therefore pretty much dependent upon Egypt for initiative on the Arab side in moving toward a settlement. The Secretary said that Sharett has taken the line that Israel would agree to the United States joining the Baghdad Pact if we simultaneously gave Israel a security treaty. The Secretary said, however, that he did not see how we could do the latter until the borders had been agreed upon. The key to the whole problem is a settlement. If Sharett fails in his efforts to go over the head of the U.S. Government, Israel might agree to a settlement. On the other hand, Israel might wait until after the U.S. elections next year. It would hope to secure the support of the Democratic Party and hope for a Democratic victory. Mr.Macmillan said that every year Israel waits before making a settlement its situation will get worse as the imbalance of arms becomes greater.

The Secretary said that whether to let the Baghdad Pact simmer or to go ahead with it in a big way is a difficult question. It does not have a solid foundation. Neither Iran nor Iraq has great political stability. Of course it is true that giving military aid may help create political strength but then it becomes necessary to give economic aid too. Iran is economically badly off and so is Pakistan. Mr.Macmillan said that Britain might go ahead then with the Pact and the United States will decide on its position.

With respect to Israel, Mr.Macmillan said that he believed our policy should be to give arms on the basis that we would have given them before the Soviet-Egypt arms deal. The Secretary said that the United States may wish to give them a little more since actually they have been buying very little indeed from us. He said we should have some consultation on any arms which any of the Tripartite Powers propose to send, not merely continue an ex post facto adding machine operation. Mr.Macmillan said he thought the problem should be handled in Washington at an ambassadorial level. The Secretary expressed his strong belief that Italy should be brought into the discussions. It would help Italian morale and strengthen the government there. It would also help to strengthen the arms controls. Mr.Macmillan suggested that the Ambassadors of the four countries draft an agreement about the policy to be followed and then consult with the other NATO countries. We would not give them a veto over any particular arms shipments but we would give them information and give them a right to comment. This should make it possible to achieve some overall coordination of arms shipments to the area.

Mr.Macmillan then inquired what policy we should pursue with respect to Egypt. He said that Nasser is presently riding high and would be difficult to reach an agreement with. At the end of a few months he may have sobered down and we might at that time go to him with a package deal. In the meantime, we should be working out between us what the nature of that package would be. We wish from him an undertaking to turn away from the Soviets and to cooperate in preventing further Communist penetration in the area; and also to cooperate on working out an Israel-Arab settlement. In return we would agree to help in the construction of the Aswan Dam both financially and in securing Sudanese agreement on the Nile waters. We would also bring pressure on Israel to agree to a reasonable settlement. The Secretary commented that the Sudan might be the key to the situation. He assumed that the Aswan Dam could not go forward without Sudanese concurrence and that it would be impossible for Nasser to get the latter without Britain’s cooperation. He thought that even during the period immediately ahead talks with Nasser on the Aswan Dam should continue. Mr.Macmillan said that the British Government had concluded that it would be impossible to build the dam other than through the IBRD. The Secretary said that he did not believe that anyone, including the Soviets, would find it feasible to begin work on the dam until there had been an agreement with the Sudan and a settlement of the Israel-Arab problem.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 60 D 627, CF580. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Russell on November 12.
2. The draft is not attached to the source text.Tedul 71 to Geneva, November 8, transmitted the Department’s draft statement. (Ibid., Central Files, 674.84A/11–855)Dulles suggested several revisions in Dulte 63 from Geneva, November 9. (Ibid., 684A.86/11–955)
3. For text of Eden’s Guildhall speech on November 9 at the Mansion House, London, see Frankland (ed.),Documents on International Affairs, 1955, pp. 382–385.