125. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State1

784. Prime Minister-Foreign Minister Ghazzi asked me to see him 5 p.m., February 24. He opened conversation referring to “official assurances” I had given President Quwwatli based on Ben Gurion statement to New York Times2 (Embtels 7593 and 7634) and said reports from Tel Aviv had now cast doubt on validity that statement. I pointed out I had given no official assurances but had [Page 234] merely cited press article. I noted, however, that Embassy had reports of Israeli reaction to statement all based on assumption it authentic. Ghazzi said Syrians now had word Ben Gurion had modified his statement and asked whether I could secure official confirmation that original statement is still valid. I replied I had reported Syrian interest in such confirmation as had British Ambassador (Embtel 7685), but had had no answer. Ghazzi then referred to report he had that Embassy Counselor Hart in Cairo had characterized as ill-omened Israeli disregard for US advice to show restraint. Ghazzi said it was very important that GOS know whether original Ben Gurion statement still stands and asked me to request reassurances through my government. I agreed to do so.

British Ambassador was to call on Ghazzi after my visit, also at Ghazzi’s request.

Comment: It is clear Syrians anxious for US/UK assurance that Israel does not intend resume work immediately on diversion project. Anything along this line which Department can authorize me to say will be helpful.6

Moose
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2456. Confidential; Niact. Received at 3:50 p.m. Repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, London, Ankara, Jidda, and Paris.
  2. See footnote 2, Document 98.
  3. In telegram 759, February 17, Moose reported that he had called on Syrian President Quwwatli on February 16 to express his hope that Quwwatli could calm the atmosphere after the Banat Yacov hostilities. Moose informed Quwwatli that the Israelis had decided to defer work at Banat Yacov and that the U.S. position as set forth in the February 7 aide-mémoire (see Document 73) should be a source of assurance to the Government of Syria. (Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/ 2–1756)
  4. In telegram 763, February 18, Moose reported that Prime Minister Ghazzi agreed that the situation had improved as a result of the U.S. and U.K. positions and Ben Gurion’s statement regarding the situation at Banat Yacov. (Ibid., 684A.85322/2–1856)
  5. In telegram 768, February 20, Moose reported on a conversation between Gardner, the British Ambassador, and Quwwatli on February 18. Quwwatli noted that it would be easier to calm the Syrian public if Syria received official assurances from the United States and the United Kingdom confirming Ben Gurion’s statement that Israel was delaying work at Jisr Banat Yacub. (Ibid., 684A.85322/2–2056)
  6. See Document 145.