36. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Jerusalem1

Following comments and suggestions based on your message of January 24 to Secretary,2 your message January 253 … , and first section your message January 25 to Secretary4 (last section delayed in receipt):

1.
I believe it is important that you take position both with Ben Gurion and Nasser that, while you have desired and benefited from exposition of their concerns and views on broadest basis, your specific task is to ascertain specifically what agreement exists or could likely be achieved on the eight or ten principal issues between two sides. Problems of cease-fire and arms shipments are, of course, important but they are so involved with UN and Tripartite policies and procedures that it is not feasible to attempt to deal with them through your discussions. Suggest, therefore, you take position that you will report fully in your telegrams and after your return all statements they make to you in respect those matters but that they are not the subject of your mission, which is to make direct contribution to helping parties work out terms of settlement. Upon our appraisal of that much else will depend.
2.
The Israel Government, as anticipated, is laying heavy stress on early direct meeting. In view of Nasser’s position on this, I doubt whether much hope can be placed on direct talks as means of achieving settlement at this time. Therefore, believe we should assure IB [IG] that we will continue to work toward direct meeting but inform them we believe that as practical matter if settlement is to be achieved at this time a considerable amount of ground work will have to be done in lining up the issues, ascertaining extent of agreement and areas and nature of disagreement in preparation for direct meetings which could then deal with specific matters.

  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell, cleared with Rountree and Byroade, and approved by Dulles.
  2. Presumably a reference to Document 31.
  3. According to Message 28, January 25, the Israelis emphasized to Anderson that they understood the need to ease tensions. Anderson stated that they were “preoccupied” with a direct, secret, high-level meeting with the Egyptians which would deal with both important and secondary problems. Anderson considered the Israelis to be determined to make the most of such a meeting with Egypt and asked that the U.S. officials in Egypt try to sell Nasser on the idea. (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 58 D 5189, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams— Jan.–March 1956, Part I)
  4. Supra.