Office of the Historian

39. Message From the Secretary of State to Robert B. Anderson, at Cairo1

Washington, January 26, 1956.
1.
In view of points made in … message to you January 26,2 I believe that at this stage we should not press Nasser for early direct meetings but should concentrate on discussions with both sides to ascertain areas of agreement and extent of differences, which Nasser has assented to as reported paragraph B … message Washington January 24.3 After that stage has been completed, we could determine whether we wish to press for direct meeting or find some other means of arriving at final settlement.
2.
As means of reconciling IG’s urgent desire to ascertain as soon as possible whether settlement can be achieved, and Nasser’s feeling that no public announcement possible earlier than six months, we might take position that every effort be made to ascertain now through these secret negotiations whether settlement possible with understanding that no public announcement for period thereafter necessary to prepare Arab public opinion.
3.
You should point out to Nasser I will probably be able to take position with Israel Government that I did in my meeting with Eban yesterday,4 which has been reported to you,5 only so long as I feel confident that Israel will not be attacked by Arab states who are rapidly increasing their armaments. Also, our withholding of arms to Israel increases our moral responsibility to Israel. The situation needs to be clarified if possible by acts demonstrating real purpose to effect peaceful settlement or other firm evidences that Israel not facing Arab aggression.
4.
In order make most of this next period of discussions, I suggest as a check-list of topics on which rather full and detailed [Page 78] explanation would be useful following main elements on which it will ultimately be essential to obtain agreement:
a.
Refugees: What is number that should realistically be expected to be repatriated, by whatever formula of determination? Assuming for purpose of discussion that not more than 100,000 should, or would wish to, return to Israel, what plans should be made for resettlement of others? Would Nasser agree that, besides Jordan Valley Plan and Sinai project, best opportunities lie in Syria and Iraq? Would he use influence with Syria to agree to staged resettlement there, especially if Western powers assisted in projects for creating new arable land? What figure does he believe would constitute reasonable compensation or what means does he suggest for arriving at figure? What suggestions does he have for assuming that amounts paid for compensation will help to provide new satisfactory life for refugees and not be wasted?
b.
Jerusalem: If, as Nasser has suggested, Israel’s and Jordan’s claims to sovereignty of portions of Jerusalem are to be recognized, will he use influence to obtain agreement of other Arab states and what suggestions does he have for supervision of Holy Places?
c.
Boycott: What formulation does Nasser suggest with respect cessation of secondary boycott and restrictions on shipping, including those on vessels transiting Suez Canal or Gulf of Aqaba, and with respect position of Arab states on trade between Arab states and Israel?
d.
Termination of State of Belligerency: What formula does Nasser suggest to effect termination of state of belligerency: amendment of armistice agreements, U.N. resolution, or what?
e.
Communications arrangements: Does Nasser believe that Jordan would be interested in free port facilities at Haifa and free access to port? Would Egypt be interested in right to use roads through Israel to other Arab states? Question of overflight rights, telecommunications, etc.
f.
Unified Development Jordan Valley: As concrete measure toward creating Arab attitudes that will make possible Arab public acceptance of overall settlement within period suggested by Nasser, will it not be possible for him to take steps now, in accordance his conversations with Ambassador Johnston, to secure agreement of other Arab states on early commencement Jordan Valley Plan?
g.
Territorial: Besides problem of Negev, what other boundary questions does Nasser see and what solution or method of arriving at solution does he recommend?
h.
Territorial guarantees: What are Nasser’s views with respect to the territorial guarantees suggested by Secretary in August 26 speech?
5.
It is most important that we have explicit statements by Nasser of his best position on these and not permit him merely take general position they will present no difficulty if Negev question settled.
6.
What are Nasser’s reactions to points made in my message to you January 20?6
7.
It would seem to me that process of ascertaining best possible position of Nasser and Ben Gurion on above points may require more than one more round as indicated your message January 25.7 Would appreciate your views on this.
  1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Top Secret. Drafted by Russell; cleared with Allen, Rountree, and Byroade; and approved by Dulles.↩
  2. Message 30 from Cairo to Anderson in Jerusalem, January 26, stated the belief that Nasser’s position, as outlined in Document 32, was final, but added that the question of secret meetings would be taken up again, “but we have no arguments which will make sense to the Egyptians as to why they are essential. The holding of secret meetings at this time would seem to be irrelevant to overcoming what Nasr sees as most serious obstacle ultimate solution this problem, i.e., bringing other Arab States into line behind Nasr position.” The message also noted that “Mere fact that Israelis attaching so much importance to these meetings causing gravest suspicions on part of Nasr.” (Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I)↩
  3. Document 32.↩
  4. See supra.↩
  5. See footnote 2, supra.↩
  6. Document 24.↩
  7. Document 35.↩