Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

45. Message From Robert B. Anderson to the Department of State¹

No. 33

Cairo, January 28, 1956.

1. Thursday night² … and I met with PriMin from 10 P.M. until 1 A.M. They were anxious to hear a report of my visit abroad.

2. I gave a brief reportorial account of my visit to Israel, dwelling on those aspects which served to humanize the Israelis with whom I talked and to point up their sincere desire to arrive at peaceful settlement. The report reflected that the territorial and boundary question was uppermost, with each side taking a firm position for reasons known to you. The question of refugees presented difficulties but there were indications of willingness to consider compromise on both sides. I told Nasr the importance which the Israelis attached to direct negotiations and that I had informed the Israelis that a meeting of heads of Govt was not possible at this time. The Israelis had accepted this situation. They had, however, urged the establishment of some channel of direct communication. I had stated that this was a point which Nasr had been asked to consider. I reported an attitude on both sides which reflected willingness to negotiate on the secondary problems concerning minor border adjustments, division of Jerusalem, etc which seemed to present no difficulties that could not be solved by compromise.

3. Nasr indicated appreciation of my report and my associates feel that he thought my references in Israel to his position did justice to his thinking and that I had been able to explain his difficulties both in Egypt and in the other Arab States in establishing the atmosphere needed for a peaceful settlement.

4. At the conclusion of my report, Nasr said he had two questions of utmost importance:

a. Israel had previously made statements saying they wanted peace. How is the situation now different?

b. Why should we believe that the Israelis are sincere at this time when he believes they were not sincere previously?

5. We answered that there were new elements as follows:

a. A greater interest on the part of the U.S. under the leadership of the President to achieve acceptable solution which would result in peace.

b. A feeling on the part of Israel that new elements make their position less secure and peaceful solution more desirable.

c. A realization by the Israelis that they now faced “crucial” decisions in order to achieve settlement.

d. The fact that both countries were now facing up to the realities of the major points of conflict with determination on both sides to avoid war.

e. A realization by both countries that if they were to achieve their national and area ambitions and aspirations, there must be avoidance of the burdens, risks and damages of war.

6. I pointed out that this first round of conversations had identified and explored the areas of difficulty between the two countries. I expressed my belief that both countries appreciated the severity of the decisions and actions required of them but appeared willing to face up to them. I also indicated that future negotiations and conversations appeared essential and that during this time it was necessary to maintain both a spirit of willingness and a determination to achieve settlement if possible.

7. We pointed out that we believed settlement could be achieved along the lines of phased program suggested by Nasr. We emphasized the urgency of time and the necessity for keeping at the task. We explained that the element of time, being important, should take into consideration time elements concerning the Egyptian position, the Israeli position and the necessity for making important decisions in the U.S.

8. We emphasized that the important thing was to take some first steps in order that we begin moving toward the objective of settlement. These first steps would include among other things the avoidance of border incidents, the abstaining from inflammatory remarks, a gradual change in radio and newspaper statements so as to develop tolerance and understanding. That no exact timetable should be established, but we should work toward our objective, gaining momentum as we made progress.

9. Nasr said he was willing to pursue this program.

10. Nasr raised no objection to considering the reopening of direct commo channels along lines previously arranged ….

11. A final meeting is arranged for 5 P.M. Friday.³

12. I plan to depart Egypt Saturday and arrive Israel Sunday night via Athens.

13. Will appreciate any comments.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson Talks w/BG & Nasser. Incoming Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956. Part I. Secret.
2. January 26.
3. January 27.