Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

54. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.¹

ETW MC–1

Washington, January 30, 1956, 2:15–4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • Under Secretary Hoover
  • Ambassador Aldrich
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. MacArthur
  • Mr. Bowie
  • Mr. Allen
  • Mr. Rountree
  • Mr. Hagerty
  • Mr. Cottman
• UK
  • Prime Minister Eden
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Ambassador Makins
  • Sir Harold Caccia
  • Sir Leslie Rowan
  • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Ian Samuel
  • Mr. Willie Morris

[Here follow a list of subjects discussed and discussion of unrelated matters.]

Middle East—Arab-Israel Conflict

Turning to the Middle East, the Secretary said there were two elements of the problem which should be discussed: First, the Arab-Israeli conflict which might flare up at any moment and which posed grave difficulties for us, and second, broader aspects relating to Saudi Arabia, the Baghdad Pact, etc. These elements were so intertwined, however, it would not be possible wholly to segregate them. Luncheon conversations with the British Delegation² had indicated a willingness on both sides to find a way to convince the Arabs and Israeli alike that there would be no profit in resorting to war and, if either side should bring about hostilities, it would suffer penalties which we might inflict. The basis for action in the event of hostilities might be the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, and the United States and British officials should, perhaps, bring the French into discussions of ways of implementing that Declaration.

The Secretary, continuing, said he had pointed out during the luncheon discussion some of the problems which the United States had in the matter of acting pursuant to the Tripartite Declaration. It would be difficult for the President to implement any commitment involving the use of armed forces without some form of Congressional resolution (such as the Formosa resolution)³ or pursuant to a treaty. He said that steps which might be taken in the event of hostilities should be studied now, as should the problem of establishing a sound moral and legal basis for any action we subsequently might agree to take. Israel and many supporters of that country in the United States would like for the United States to enter into a treaty which would protect Israel against an attack. In making this suggestion, the Israeli and their supporters undoubtedly had in mind that the existence of such a treaty would put Israel in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the Arabs. The Secretary questioned, however, whether any such commitment would be ratified by the Senate, and said that indications in talks with Congressional leaders here raised considerable doubt on this score, although he felt that we probably could get support for “putting teeth” into the 1950 Declaration. In the latter connection, the Secretary commented upon the danger that this action might cause the Arabs to fear that we were preparing to protect Israel alone.

Mr. Eden agreed generally with the Secretary’s observations and commented that no one in the Middle East now thought the United States and Great Britain were prepared to do anything should hostilities in fact break out. There was a strong feeling we had done nothing beyond making a declaration and if this opinion continued to be held it might lead to trouble. For example, Israel might resort to a preventive war. He commented that Nasser would not in his opinion, “be keen to be attacked by Israel at this time.” Both sides stood to lose by early hostilities. It would be extremely helpful if we could give consideration as to how to put teeth into the Declaration.

Mr. Lloyd emphasized we should give effect to the idea that some military action on the part of the Tripartite Powers would be involved in case of an attack by either the Arabs or the Israeli. Some people estimated Israeli forces could be in Cairo within a matter of a few days, and the Egyptians might fear we would drag out action in the Security Council until they were faced with a fait accompli. If we should fail to move quickly in case of aggression, our stock would be gone forever in the Arab world. We must, therefore, give the impression we were prepared to undertake extremely quick action or our statement of intention to act in case of hostilities would be no substantial deterrent.

The Secretary said he had asked American officials dealing with the United Nations to look into the question of what might be done through that organization to prevent aggression. He asked Mr. Allen to outline possible things which might be done.

Mr. Allen outlined a number of possibilities including the assignment of observers with, perhaps, civilians included, and reactivation of the Palestine Conciliation Commission,⁴ which consisted of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey and which had been in abeyance for some time.

The Secretary commented that if we should go forward with well selected steps in the United Nations, and combine this with talks with Congressional leaders designed to attain adequate flexibility for the United States Government to move quickly in a crisis, this might convince everyone we meant business. Doing less than that might leave doubt we were determined to act forcibly in case of aggression. Even if the Soviets should veto any United Nations resolution which might be sought, the effect of general Free World support for this measure would demonstrate the seriousness of the matter and would provide a good moral basis for subsequent action. The Secretary then commented that Mr. Hoover had met with officials of the Defense Department⁵ and asked him to talk about the military aspects of the situation.

Mr. Hoover reported he had talked with the military about a possible show of force if it should be decided that this should be done. Among the possibilities were (1) sending the Sixth Fleet on maneuvers in the Eastern Mediterranean; (2) moving the present minesweeper assigned to the Persian Gulf to Massawa, Eritrea, and reinforcing it with a flotilla of destroyers to be dispatched to the Red Sea; (3) redeploying two marine brigades to the area; and (4) other steps such as deploying small aircraft from carriers.

Mr. Eden said he did not visualize that it would be necessary for either side to say publicly precisely what it would do in case of hostilities, although we should tell each other. It was more important to show the public we were taking certain steps in concert which would make it possible for us to act if need be.

Mr. Lloyd inquired whether the Secretary thought a public statement should be made to the effect that we were prepared to take military action.

The Secretary replied that we should not put out what might appear to be a bluff, and unless we had some Constitutional foundation for military action, such as a treaty, a United Nations call for the employment of military force, a Congressional resolution, or at least preparatory talks with Congressional leaders to assure their support for such action, a public statement would have little effect beyond perhaps an initial period of a few days. He doubted, therefore, that a public statement would suffice as a deterrent unless accompanied by some of the measures he had mentioned. One problem was that if trouble started it might take years to ascertain who was at fault. We must make it clear that it made no difference who started it, we would move in to stop hostilities.

Mr. Lloyd stated a Congressional resolution in advance seemed to him to be a good idea but asked whether the Secretary thought it would be passed. He observed that the resolution should be drafted in such a way as to make sure it would not be objectionable to either side. He referred to the Uniting for Peace resolution⁶ as a good example.

The Secretary said the Uniting for Peace resolution called on members to hold certain contingents available if they were required by action of the Security Council or the General Assembly. However, he thought we should not get the General Assembly into the present issue for several reasons, including the fact that there were a number of new United Nations members which might complicate matters.

Mr. Eden summarized British comments upon this subject by saying the suggestions thus far made involved a firm statement of intention, some action in the United Nations, and respective United States and United Kingdom governmental authority to act in an emergency. He thought the combination of these three approaches might be a very good thing.

The Secretary inquired of Mr. Eden whether British military authorities had thought through what might be done.

Mr. Eden said that thus far their consideration of military possibilities had been largely related to the problem of looking after British subjects in the area. They were now undertaking a study of military possibilities deriving from British Forces in Libya, Jordan, and Cyprus. Regarding the latter, there were some 15,000 troops present, all of whom were not needed for the maintenance of security on Cyprus itself. These forces included a brigade of paratroopers, which would be highly effective. The Navy was also considering the possibility of providing more marines in the Eastern Mediterranean. Air Force potentialities were primarily in the equipment which they now had in Jordan and Iraq. Between the Americans and British, a great deal could be done. The important thing was that the people in the area should think we would do something.

The Secretary agreed and stated we must arrive at something along the lines which had been discussed. On the American side we would think through the legal basis and be sure we would know what we would be getting into before making a definite decision on a line of action.

Mr. Hoover observed that if it should be decided a show of military force would be desirable, that should be related to something demonstrating the force would, if needed, be used; otherwise the gesture would be taken as a bluff. Our best estimate was that economic sanctions alone would not be an effective deterrent to hostilities and large-scale fighting could be undertaken by either side long before any pinch would be felt from the imposition of such sanctions.

Mr. Eden said he thought we should follow up with studies of what might be done on the military side and also examine more carefully possible courses of United Nations action.

Mr. Lloyd proposed to ask some of the British experts in United Nations affairs to come down to Washington from New York to meet with American experts, perhaps at 10:00 a.m. on Tuesday, January 31, to begin work on this aspect of the problem.⁷

To this the Secretary agreed, and raised the question of bringing the French into the matter.

Mr. Lloyd suggested this be discussed with the French Ambassador⁸ when the latter meets with Secretary Dulles and the Foreign Secretary on Wednesday, February 1.⁹

The Secretary suggested the matter of military discussions be taken up with the President when he later joined the meeting.¹⁰ He observed we had a difficult public relations problem regarding possible military action since the American people were not accustomed to looking upon the Middle East as a vital area. The United Kingdom had always played an important part in that area and security matters were usually identified as a British responsibility. There might be some suspicion that any military plans developed might be related to Zionists’ efforts to involve the United States in fighting to support Israel, and there was substantial opposition to the U.S. being drawn into such an affair. Also, we had always played down American oil interests, and it would certainly not be popular if the impression should be given that we were risking military action to protect investments of American oil companies. Unless, therefore, military preparations were represented in their proper light—of reacting to a Soviet threat—it would not be easy to obtain support for the prospect of sending United States troops to the area.

Mr. Eden observed that our purpose really was to prevent a war.

The Secretary suggested we proceed as indicated and try to come up with concrete ideas within the next twenty-four hours as to the best way to proceed.

The Secretary stated that current efforts to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute itself had not as yet produced any real hopes for an early settlement. It appeared that the Egyptians were dragging their feet. They claimed it would take six months to pave the way for acceptance by the other Arab states of any agreed plan. We might soon know whether the Egyptians were employing dilatory tactics. Mr. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, was now in Egypt to discuss the High Aswan Dam project¹¹ and the Egyptian decision regarding that project might be indicative of the Egypt attitude generally.

Mr. Eden commented upon the difficulties which existed between Nuri Said of Iraq and Nasser.

Mr. Allen, at the Secretary’s request, summarized a statement made by Nasser on January 29 on the question of the Baghdad Pact and the recent arrest of an Egyptian messenger attached to the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdad who had been charged with activities detrimental to Iraq. Nasser had said the Baghdad Pact was a new form of imperialism, in which Nuri Said was involved, designed to imprison all of the Arab people, but that the prison was bare except for the Egyptian messenger; that the messenger would willingly serve his time in contented knowledge of the great sacrifice which he was making on behalf of his Arab brothers.

Mr. Eden observed this was another example of the difficulties being created by Nasser and said he did not know how long we could go along with Nasser.

The Secretary repeated we might soon know whether our whole attitude toward Nasser would have to be changed.

Mr. Eden said if Egypt should succeed in undermining the Baghdad Pact the Western Powers would be in terrific trouble in the Middle East, and the Egyptians seemed to be doing all they could to accomplish this.

Mr. Allen observed Nuri Said had been in and out as Prime Minister of Iraq so many times that it might be possible he would again leave the Premiership for a period. If his successor as Prime Minister should favor the Baghdad Pact the change might in fact be a good thing since Nasser had attributed to Nuri personally the responsibility for Iraqi adherence to the treaty. The change would, in these circumstances show that other Iraqi leaders favored the Pact concept.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 648. Secret. Drafted on February 7. No other drafting information is given on the source text. A note on the source text reads: “The attached memorandum of conversation, cleared at the Assistant Secretary of State level only, is now being given restricted circulation to appropriate officials of the U.S. Government on a need to know basis.”

   Prime Minister Eden visited Washington January 30–February 3.

2. According to the Chronology of the Eden Talks, President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Eden, Secretary Dulles, and Foreign Secretary Lloyd discussed Arab-Israeli issues at a luncheon hosted by the President at the White House, beginning at 1 p.m. on January 30. Neither the President nor Dulles prepared a record of the discussion. (Ibid.)
3. Reference is to House Joint Resolution 159 (84th Cong., 1st sess.), January 29, 1955. For text, see 69 Stat. 7.
4. On December 11, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, at its 186th plenary meeting, General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), which established the Palestine Conciliation Commission. For text, see U.N. doc. A/810.
5. No record of such a meeting has been found in Department of State files.
6. Reference is to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), adopted at the 302d plenary meeting on November 3, 1950. For text, see U.N. doc. A/1775.
7. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
8. Maurice Couve de Murville.
9. See Document 65.
10. See infra.
11. See Documents 50–52.