Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

81. Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, February 7, 1956—4 p.m.

1525. ReEmbtel 1480.² In response our inquiry British Embassy official expressed following views regarding possible consequences resumption work at Banat Yaqub:

1. Syrians would probably open fire on workers.

2. Israelis would seek interdict fire.

3. Egyptians would certainly respond to appeal for help from Syria as would Iraq.

4. Doubtful Jordan could stay out.

Regarding point four HMG carefully studying situation view treaty obligation.³ No decision yet made but thinking tending towards view that British should support Jordan whether attacker or attacked. Alternative might be disappearance such British influence as still remains especially if Israelis occupied West Bank.

Regarding point one some thought being given by HMG to economic off set which they would hope might persuade Syrians and Jordanians not respond militarily to resumption work. Yarmuk works might encourage Jordan in acquiescence but not clear to British what could be offered Syria which chief danger point. If HMG thinking crystalizes British Embassy assumes Department will be informed in course current Washington talks. British Embassy officials here personally dubious economic aid offer would be efficacious since problem essentially political involving national prestige and “honor”.

Meantime … reliable report that Nasser has addressed letter to Syrians advising in strongest terms that in event work at Banat Yaqub is resumed Syrians should exhaust all available peaceful measures through UNTSO and UN itself before under taking military action. GOE would give fullest support to Syria in such course. Nasser reiterated to informant however that he was pessimistic as to Syrians capabilities of restraint. Although he did not wish be “trapped” into war with Israel over Banat Yaqub he would have no alternative to extending full military support to Syria if latter so required.

Hart

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/2–756. Secret. Received at 7:59 p.m. Repeated to Damascus, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Ankara, Tehran, Jerusalem, and USUN.
2. The Embassy in Cairo, in telegram 1480, February 3, informed the Department that Nasser was convinced that Syria would initiate military action against Israel if the latter resumed work at Banat Yaqub “and GOE has decided support Syria militarily although GOE would initially insist Syrians give UN and US chance persuade Israel not to do so. Nasser believes Israeli tactic is to provoke preventive war by inviting Syrian and Egyptian military response to resumption project and estimates March 1 as critical date.” The Embassy concurred in this assessment. (Ibid., 683.84A/ 2–356)
3. Reference is to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance, signed at Amman on March 15, 1948, by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Transjordan. (77 UNTS 77)