11. Editorial Note
On July 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) to prepare a study detailing the arguments for and against the following courses of action: (1) participation by U.S. forces with British forces in direct military action to seize control of the Suez Canal; (2) United States support of British military action without direct participation by U.S. forces; and (3) United States support of British military action limited to diplomatic and economic measures. The study, which was submitted the following day, offered no recommendations but concluded that the United States should take only diplomatic and economic measures in support of any British military action. The JSPC study found the first and second courses of action undesirable in that they would alienate the Arab states and involve the risk of limiting U.S. ability to meet commitments in other theaters. (Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Director of the Joint Staff Vice Admiral B.L. Austin with enclosure, DM–33–56, July 28; JCS Records, CCS 092 Egypt (7–28–56)) The staff study, however, generated strong criticism from Admiral Burke, General Twining, and General Taylor, who in separate memoranda on July 29 and 30 argued that the study did not sufficiently emphasize how militarily unacceptable the Egyptian action was to the United States. (Memorandum from General Twining to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CSAFM 236–56, July 29; [Page 22] memorandum from Admiral Burke to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 30; memorandum from General Taylor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 30; all ibid.) Consequently, on July 31 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a revised study on “Nationalization of the Suez Maritime Canal Company by the Egyptian Government” and a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, printed as the Enclosure to Document 50. (J.C.S. 2105/38, July 31; ibid.)