270. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
891. Following is summary conversation with Nasser following presentation credentials (Embtel 878):2
He said realized this not occasion for substantive discussion but wanted give general idea his thinking. Burden of what followed was largely to effect that he had endeavored follow policy of frankness but apparently his efforts had only resulted in misunderstanding. [Page 587] However, impossible for him to operate in any other way since he did not have technique of politics and diplomacy at his command. Also his knowledge of English did not permit of nuances in expression.
One misunderstanding, he said, had been erroneous idea that he had ambition build up Egyptian empire over surrounding area. True he was interested in promoting cooperation and solidarity of area but that was far cry from seeking Egyptian domination. Thus, his ambassadors in Libya and Syria had been accused of improper activity but he had checked and found charges largely without foundation. He had been accused of stirring up trouble in Aden but first he knew of it was in press. Similarly groundless were charges of his causing difficulty in Bahrein.
However, such importance as he attached to Arab cooperation was in any event secondary to his principal purpose which was promoting welfare of Egyptian people. Here followed account of how he had struggled for and gained popular support which unnecessary repeat.
Second misunderstanding, Nasser maintained, was that he had tried play off Soviet against West. True that he had dealt with both but he had made no secret of it as evidenced by way he had kept Embassy informed regarding Soviet overtures on Aswan.
He felt there was also mutual misunderstanding by Egypt and United States regarding each others motives and actions. Egypt had impression United States sought reduce Egyptian position in Arab countries and was implementing this policy by certain lines of action, which led Egypt in turn to take counter-action. Trouble was this sort of thing led to a tit-for-tat sequence of events of which difficult see real purpose (what were we really driving at anyway?) or eventual outcome. Also he feared both we and they might sometimes be acting on basis of imperfect or erroneous information and this seemed compound difficulty.
Nasser then got on subject of nationalism in Near East which he maintained real driving and dominant force and necessary understand in assessing area problems. This in turn led to discussion Baghdad Pact which he felt had been major error. Reason was that weakness of Near East is internal and consequently building up of strength and stability should be from within not from without. He believed actually little danger Soviet military aggression in Near East for simple reason such action would touch off world war and great powers apparently in agreement rule that out. Consequently Baghdad Pact had earmarks of foreign intrusion which completely contrary to trend of indigenous nationalism. Egypt had considered carefully before deciding not to join and now in looking back he felt [Page 588] deterioration in Egyptian relations with United States traceable back to that event.
Regarding future, Nasser said he had no clear-cut plans but was largely acting on ad hoc basis. He hoped however misunderstandings could be removed and return made to normal relations with United States.
I said glad receive his views. We too had some serious misgivings which I looked forward to discussing when time and occasion permitted and I hoped in so doing it would be understood if I followed Nasser’s example and spoke with complete frankness. It was also our desire to get back to traditionally friendly relations but there were serious problems to be resolved in order do so.
Realize foregoing is largely repetitive of conversations of others with Nasser and that it probably represents little more than preliminary warming up before real game begins. In circumstances, I feel would be premature attempt draw conclusions except to note that, in repeating previously expressed views, Nasser did not seem exactly exude confidence regarding road ahead. Also he gave no indication of animosity despite seriousness of problems which he outlined.
Incidentally, interesting no specific mention made either Canal question or Israel.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.00/9–2656. Secret. Received at 1:17 a.m., September 27. Repeated to London, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, and Jidda.↩
- In telegram 878 from Cairo, September 25, Hare reported that he had presented his letters of credence to Nasser at noon and that a summary of their conversation, which lasted one-half hour, would follow. (Ibid., 123–Hare, Raymond A.)↩