296. Editorial Note

On October 3, the Israeli Foreign Ministry conveyed to Ambassador Lawson an oral message from Prime Minister Ben-Gurion containing his “additional views” on the proposed Iraqi troop movements. In the message, Ben Gurion sought to make clear that his previous comments on Iraqi troop movements (contained in telegram 91 from Jerusalem; see Document 289) referred only to the possibility of a token Iraqi force being sent to Jordan to help stabilize that country. The Prime Minister also sought assurances from the Department of State that this token force would be of a temporary character and bear no heavy armor; and he sought information concerning the size of the force and where it would be stationed. Ben Gurion emphasized that under no circumstances should the force come near Israel. Other points made by the Prime Minister, according to Lawson’s report, were as follows:

  • “(A) He feels that there may be a definite plan on part of Washington, London, Baghdad to block any Egyptian penetration and possible take-over Jordan. He would like in strict confidence any details and comments on this and would like to discuss how Israel might fit into such a situation… .
  • “(B) Ben Gurion has heard with concern rumors of an intention to unite Jordan and Iraq and to grant political independence to west [Page 632] bank. Such a development would create new situation prejudicial to Israel and GOI has right to be consulted.” (Telegram 310 from Tel Aviv, October 3; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/10–356)

Also on October 3, Foreign Minister Eban called at the Department of State and made similar points in a conversation with Rountree. The latter responded that the United States would advise Iraq not to send large forces into Jordan nor to put troops west of the Jordan River. Rountree added that the United States had the impression that the Iraqis had no intentions to do either or to equip their troops with heavy matériel. Eban also asked Rountree’s views regarding an independent Arab state on the West bank of the Jordan River. Eban said that the present status quo in the Near East depended on the existence of the Armistice Agreements and the four Arab states which had signed them. If this situation were altered, and Jordan dismembered, Eban noted, “everybody, not only Arabs, would dream dreams.” (Telegram 268 to Tel Aviv, October 4; ibid., 684A.85/10–456)