Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

344. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, October 15, 1956, 11 a.m.¹

Washington, October 15, 1956, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli Reaction to Iraqi Troops in Jordan

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Secretary
• The Under Secretary
• William M. Rountree

The Secretary told the President that he was seeing the Israel Ambassador at 12:00 prior to the latter’s departure for Tel Aviv where he and the Israeli Ambassadors to certain other countries had been called for discussions, presumably of the situation in Jordan. The Jordan situation had been deteriorating in recent weeks, in part as a result of Israel raids, three of which were on a large scale involving up to three battalions.²

The Secretary reviewed the chronology of our talks with Israel and other developments relating to the plan whereby Iraq would send limited numbers of troops in response to an appeal by Jordan. Whereas the Israeli had first agreed that it would be advisable for the Iraqi forces to come in under certain conditions, they had now taken a strong position in opposition to the move. The reasons given for this change were reviewed by the Secretary. He feared that Israel may use the matter as a pretext to move into Jordan themselves [sic]. In this connection, the U.K. was bound by a mutual defense treaty with Jordan, and British officials had pointed out the existence of this treaty in conversations which they had had with the Israel Government.

The Secretary said that Israel, in considering whether or not to move into Jordan, might consider that they should take advantage of the concatenation of several circumstances: (1) the virtual collapse of Jordan; (2) the fact that Egypt had not sufficiently disengaged in the Suez matter to permit the movement of its troops into a position to help Jordan or to attack Israel; and (3) the elections in the United States, which Israel officials might calculate would prevent any American reaction against Israel. These factors might have been in the mind of Ben Gurion in undergoing what Eban described as “an evolution in his thinking” between the time he gave provisional approval to the Iraqi move and a few days ago when he declared his opposition to it.

In addition to the British-Jordan treaty which would presumably come into play if Israel should attack Jordan, we had, the Secretary said, the 1950 Tripartite Declaration³ and the President’s statement of last April⁴ concerning the United States’ attitude toward aggression in the area. We also were confronted with the fact that the United States had been instrumental in arranging for the provision to Israel by other countries of jet aircraft. There was some indication that Israel had in fact a good many more Mysteres than those which we had been informed had been delivered. There was some report, as yet unconfirmed, that Israel had used jet aircraft in the latest large scale attack on Jordan despite categorical assurances that planes provided would be used entirely for defensive purposes.

The Secretary observed that the Israel Government may be feeling “cockey” as a result of having acquired aircraft which at the present time placed them in a position of superiority to Egypt. Jordan and Iraq possessed limited air power.

The Secretary said he had wanted to review this question with the President in order to get the latter’s views as to how strong he should be in his talk with the Israel Ambassador.

The President felt that Ambassador Eban should be told that while Israel might gain certain short-term advantages by attacking Jordan, we firmly believed that in the long run they stood to lose a great deal. In the face of such an Israeli aggression, the force of world opinion would be against them and in favor of the Arabs. It was possible under those circumstances that the Russians would provide large-scale assistance to the other side, and in so doing would be placed in the light of acting within the United Nations Charter. The United States’ hands would be tied regarding assistance to Israel if the latter should be responsible for bringing about an unjust war; for us to help it would place us in the position of violating the Charter ourselves.

The President emphasized that our position in this matter could not and should not be influenced by domestic political considerations. It would be a shame, he said, if the American leadership should make its decisions on any basis other than what was right and what was in our overall national interest. He would not under any circumstances permit the fact of the forthcoming elections to influence his judgment. If any votes were lost as a result of this attitude, that was a situation which would have to be confronted, but any other attitude would not permit us to live with our conscience.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Rountree. Attached to the source text is a chit for Rountree dated 4:45 p.m., October 15, which reads: “Mr. Bergus just got a call from the Israel Embassy, pointing out how deeply they were impressed with the Secretary today. D[onald] B[ergus] asked that the message be passed along to you.” For the memorandum of conversation between Dulles and Eban, see Document 346.
2. On October 10, Israel launched a reprisal raid into Jordan, which the Embassy in Tel Aviv described as appearing to be the “heaviest Israel-Jordan military engagement since war of independence.” The Embassy also reported that the Israelis were making use of their biggest artillery, mortars, machine guns, and, for the first time, tanks. (Telegram 352 from Tel Aviv, October 10; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85/10–1056) The Embassy later reported that, according to Israeli sources, Israeli casualties included 9 dead and 12 wounded, and Jordanian dead and wounded numbered over 100. (Telegram 355 from Tel Aviv, October 11; ibid.)
3. Under the Tripartite Declaration, which was made public on May 25, 1950, the United States, Great Britain, and France declared, among other points, their “unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area.” For text, Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1950, p. 886.
4. In his April 9 statement, President Eisenhower affirmed U.S. support of Hammarskjöld’s peace efforts in the Middle East, reiterated the U.S. commitment within constitutional means to oppose any aggression in the area, and expressed U.S. determination to support and assist any nation that might be subjected to such aggression. For text, see ibid., April 23, 1956, p. 668.