Office of the Historian

345. Memorandum for the Record by the President1

Washington, October 15, 1956.

The Secretary of State, accompanied by Mr. Hoover and Mr. Rountree of his office, came to see me about the deteriorating situation in the Israel-Jordan area.2

It seems to be taken internationally as a foregone conclusion that Jordan is breaking up, and of course all the surrounding countries will be anxious to get their share of the wreckage, including Israel. In fact, there is some suspicion that the recent savage blows of the Israel border armies against the strong points within Jordan territory are intended to hasten this process of dissolution.

On the other side of the picture, there is some indication that Britain is really serious in her announced intention of honoring her Pact with Jordan,3 which requires her to help defend Jordan in the case of outside invasion.

Should this occur, we would have Britain in the curious position of helping to defend one of the Arab countries, while at the same time she is engaged in a quarrel—which sometimes threatens to break out into war—with Egypt over the Suez question.

[Page 725]

All this brings to the fore one particular thing we must bear in mind. It is this: As of this moment we are dealing with the existing situation—that is, with Jordan enjoying the rights of a sovereign country. At the same time, in view of the possible disintegration of the Jordanian government, we must be ready to deal with the situation in which the people and territory of that country would be absorbed by others.

For the moment we can deal only with the first problem.

The Secretary of State is having a long conference with the Israeli Ambassador to this country, Mr. Eban.4 The Ambassador is about to return to his own country and is visiting Foster to discuss some of the factors in the above problem.

I have told the Secretary of State that he should make very clear to the Israelis that they must stop these attacks against the borders of Jordan. If they continue them, and particularly if they carry them on to the point of trying to take over and hold the territory west of the Jordan River, they will certainly be condemned by the United Nations, and not only Arab opinion but all world opinion will be brought to bear against this little country. Moreover, should there be a United Nations Resolution condemning Israel, there will be no brake or deterrent possible against any Soviet move into the area to help the Arab countries. They could bring considerable forces in under the guise that they were carrying out a United Nations mandate, the ultimate effect of which would be to Sovietize the whole region, including Israel.

There has been some disposition to believe that Ben Gurion’s obviously aggressive attitude is inspired, at this moment, by three things:

(a)
His desire to take advantage of the gradual deterioration in Jordan and to be ready to occupy and lay claim to a goodly portion of the area of that nation;
(b)
The preoccupation of Egypt and the Western powers in the Suez question, which would tend both to minimize the possibility that Egypt would enter a war against him promptly, while at the same time it would impede Britain’s capability of reinforcing Jordan.
(c)
His belief that the current political campaign in the United States will keep this government from taking a strong stand against any aggressive move he might make.

Secretary Dulles will warn the Ambassador that while, of course, we would hate to create misunderstandings and needless passion in this country over this question, at this moment he should inform his government that no considerations of partisan politics will keep this government from pursuing a course dictated by justice [Page 726] and international decency in the circumstances, and that it will remain true to its pledges under the United Nations.

Ben Gurion should not make any grave mistakes based upon his belief that winning a domestic election is as important to us as preserving and protecting the interests of the United Nations and other nations of the free world in that region. The Secretary is to point out, moreover, that even if Ben Gurion, in an aggressive move, should get an immediate advantage in the region, that on a long term basis aggression on his part cannot fail to bring catastrophe and such friends as he would have left in the world, no matter how powerful, could not do anything about it.

Foster will make this attitude clear and unmistakeable to Mr. Eban.

At the same time I have Foster’s promise to have ready a policy or plan that would guide our action in the event that the dissolution of Jordan would actually take place and thus create a new situation in the world.5

D.D.E.6

Appendix:

It is believed that one of the recent Israeli raids against Jordan involved two or three battalions of infantry, artillery, and jet airplanes. Incidentally, our high-flying reconnaissance planes have shown that Israel has obtained some 60 of the French Mystere pursuit planes, when there had been reported the transfer of only 24. Jordan has no aviation.

D.D.E.6
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Also printed in Waging Peace, pp. 676–677.↩
  2. See supra.↩
  3. Reference is to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of 1948.↩
  4. See infra.↩
  5. No document corresponding to this description has been found in Department of State files.↩
  6. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩
  7. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩