Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

349. Memorandum of a Conversation, New York, October 17, 1956¹

New York, October 17, 1956

SUBJECT

• Suez

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • Mr. Lodge
  • Mr. Barco
• UN
  • Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary-General

At lunch today, Mr. Lodge told Mr. Hammarskjold that he had wanted to discuss with him as soon as possible the present situation on the Suez negotiations, and had asked him to lunch immediately upon Mr. Lodge’s return from Detroit. Secretary Dulles was particularly anxious to have Mr. Hammarskjold’s appraisal of the situation.

Mr. Hammarskjold said that the outlook for negotiations was very favorable. He said that Dr. Fawzi, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, was ready and eager to begin discussions and had already gone over with Hammarskjold a draft paper setting forth the Egyptian position for the negotiations.

Hammarskjold said that, on the basis of their discussion, Fawzi was preparing a redraft. Fawzi planned to remain in New York until Friday² of this week and to have further discussions with Hammarskjold before his departure. He would take the paper which emerged from his discussions with Hammarskjold to Cairo and get it approved.

Fawzi had proposed that the talks begin on October 29th in Geneva, with Hammarskjold to issue an invitation to the French, British and Egyptians and to participate in the talks as he had done in New York. Hammarskjold would go to Geneva himself. Hammarskjold said that Lloyd, the U.K. Foreign Minister, was ready to enter into the talks, and he believed that Mr. Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, was ready likewise. Lloyd “would be happy with reasonable guarantees”. Hammarskjold intended to arrange the specific date for the renewed discussions with the parties.³

In Hammarskjold’s discussion with Lloyd, prior to Lloyd’s departure for London, Lloyd had shown no particular enthusiasm for the idea of obtaining the agreement of the U.S. and other Users to begin at once paying tolls to SCUA. Hammarskjold said Lloyd had given the impression that this was something that was being urged upon Lloyd by his SCUA advisers, who believed that such pressure on Egypt would make them more amenable in negotiations. Hammarskjold had pointed out to Lloyd the dangers of creating a new set of circumstances at a time when negotiations were about to begin on the basis of the principles adopted by the SC, such circumstances being the existence of additional countries which would not pay tolls to Egypt. If “too much muddy water” was stirred up, none of the Foreign Ministers might come. Hammarskjold felt that Lloyd agreed with this. Pineau had told Hammarskjold that he thought things had gone very well in the SC, and appeared quite pleased with the outcome. Pineau had indicated that, before beginning new discussions, he wanted to get behind him the French Parliamentary debate.

Hammarskjold said that the story by Tom Hamilton published in the New York Times on Monday⁴ was Hamilton’s own interpretation of events. Hammarskjold had asked Lloyd about it, who denied having said anything to Hamilton about using force if British ships were stopped by the Egyptians. Hammarskjold also said that Fawzi’s letter to the President of the SC⁵ complaining of Sir Anthony Eden’s statement about using force as a last resort was Fawzi’s way of avoiding a sharper reaction from Egypt. He did not feel that Fawzi was very concerned personally about Eden’s statement but understood it in the context of British politics.

Hammarskjold said that, while he believed that the outlook for negotiations was good, he was still concerned that nothing should be done which would change the status of the Canal question from what it was when the SC passed its six principles. He believed that any steps to bring pressure upon Egypt by a shift in payment of tolls, for example, would be inconsistent with an honest desire to negotiate on the basis of the six principles, and would make it difficult—if not impossible—for the Egyptians to participate in negotiations. Hammarskjold said that this did not mean that he believed pressure should never be brought upon the Egyptians, but simply that this was not the time to do it. The situation might change and pressures might then become advisable, but this should be looked at in the light of the results of the next series of negotiations.

The gist of the above was telephoned to Mr. Dulles by Lodge.⁶

1. Source: Department of state, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 788. Secret. Drafted by Lodge and Barco. At 11:21 a.m., October 17, Dulles telephoned Barco to express his concern that there was “some evidence to suggest they [the British and French] are swinging to a tough, belligerent policy”. He noted that he “would like to get what we can from Hammarskjold. When etc. The Sec. asked Barco to ask Lodge to let him know as soon as possible.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, October 17; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) Lodge was meeting with Hammarskjöld later that day; see infra.
2. October 19.
3. On October 19, Hammarskjöld suggested to the British, French, and Egyptian Governments that talks among representatives of the three resume in Geneva on October 29. He would issue invitations if all three governments were willing to continue the talks. Hammarskjöld gave Lodge a copy of this “confidential” message on October 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–1956)
4. October 15.
5. Dated October 15. (U.N. doc. S/3679) Fawzi referred to remarks made by Eden on October 13.
6. See infra.