351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
2786. Eyes only Aldrich and Dillon. Deptel 2785 to London 1411 to Paris contains text Lloyd’s letter to Secretary October 152 which crossed Secretary’s letter to Lloyd same date delivered New York.3 (Text latter contained Deptel 2753 London, Deptel 1394 Paris.) These communications point up substantial difference in view between UK and ourselves not only re tolls question per se but also re general concept SCUA. Recent conversations with French in New York and Washington disclosed similar differences. Following our provisional views on Lloyd’s letter:
We are particularly disturbed at implication Lloyd’s letter that original purposes SCUA have had to be abandoned, in lieu of which he conceives organization as an instrument of coercion. We had thought British and French resolution, which all of us supported at UN and which called upon SCUA and competent Egyptian authorities to cooperate to insure satisfactory operation of Canal, was necessarily based upon assumption that SCUA would operate earnestly as instrument to bring about de facto relationship with Egypt which would permit passage of ships through Canal pending final settlement. Obviously, no such satisfactory interim arrangement would succeed if purpose of SCUA was to impound tolls and deprive Egypt of reasonable portion thereof, thus giving no inducement on latter’s part to provide “cooperation” called for. As Secretary stated his October 15 letter to Lloyd, he has consistently taken position that appropriate compensation should be paid by SCUA to Egypt but we have no preconceived idea what this should be in terms of percentage.
It is of course highly doubtful that many present members of SCUA would be willing participate in circumstances advocated by Lloyd. In any event, any such change in scope and purpose of SCUA should be dealt with at meeting SCUA members. New concept would have to be thought through carefully before presented as it very apt to face us with alternative of war or economic burdens which British have indicated would be unacceptable. Also thought must be given to impact of a significant change in the status quo upon pending negotiations. Under our concept SCUA would presumably [Page 745] negotiate an acceptable provisional arrangement with Egypt for partition of tolls, but under the Lloyd concept an increasing amount of tolls would be arbitrarily denied Egypt pending final settlement.
Particularly disturbing in Lloyd’s letter is statement that unless we accept his concept SCUA this will create divergencies between us which would have serious consequences on US–UK relations. Those relations have always been marked by an earnest desire to come to an agreement and willingness subordinate many considerations to achieve such agreement; but never has it been suggested that US would be expected to go along blindly with concept to which it has never agreed and import of which never explained but which seems involve danger of leading us into war or at least supporting a war which has been judged by President to be morally unjustifiable and practically imprudent.
Please let me know promptest your feeling as to a reply to Lloyd along foregoing lines. Also let me have your reaction as to what Government to which you accredited really wants. Is it trying to promote or collapse negotiations? What do you now guess to be its immediate and ultimate objectives?
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–1856. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Rountree, cleared in draft by Dulles, and approved by Rountree who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Paris.↩
- Document 347.↩
- Document 348.↩