Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

353. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 19, 1956¹

Washington, October 19, 1956

SUBJECT

• SCUA

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Anwar Niazi, Chargé, Egyptian Embassy
• NEA—William M. Rountree
• NE—Fraser Wilkins

Mr. Niazi called to say that the Egyptian Ambassador and the Egyptian Foreign Minister had both called him this morning regarding Drew Middleton’s article in the New York Times of October 19, which stated that the United States was prepared to announce new measures of support for SCUA which would make it an instrument of pressure. Mr. Niazi said that the Egyptian Foreign Minister was quite concerned and that to turn SCUA into owners of the Suez Canal was morally, legally and technically wrong. Mr. Niazi also noted that the members of the Security Council during the recent discussions had requested that no step be taken to upset negotiations. He felt that the measures to which Drew Middleton referred would poison the atmosphere and torpedo the work which had thus far been accomplished. He was certain that the Secretary would appreciate these points and would agree that the chance of negotiations would be ruined. He said that Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi was in touch with the Secretary-General Hammarskjold regarding the talks scheduled to commence on October 29.²

Mr. Rountree said that he would convey the Egyptian Foreign Minister’s message to the Secretary. Meanwhile, he wished to make several comments of his own. He said that he did not know what the origin of the New York Times’ account had been, but wished to make clear that the position of the United States remained as stated by the Secretary on October 16.³ He added that there were a number of misleading elements in the story. It mentioned reference to the American Embassy. Mr. Rountree said that he had checked with the Embassy in London and had ascertained that, in a discussion with Drew Middleton, they had only quoted from the Secretary’s remarks to the press on October 16; therefore there obviously was nothing new in what they said. Mr. Rountree added that it had not been envisaged that SCUA was to engage in economic warfare against Egypt. It was our concept that SCUA, pursuant to its charter, was to become a means of cooperation among the member countries in relation to their common interests in the Suez, and in this connection it would endeavor to make arrangements with the Government of Egypt. Mr. Rountree recalled the Egyptian Foreign Minister himself had not excluded the possibility of a relationship between Egypt and the Users’ Association even on a permanent basis. He hoped Mr. Niazi would reassure the Egyptian Foreign Minister that there had been no change in United States policy and that it remained as stated on October 16 by the Secretary.

Mr. Rountree further observed that it was the earnest desire of the United States that conversations between the British, the French and the Egyptians would be resumed and carried out in a favorable atmosphere. We urged that within the context of the six principles, on which there had already been agreement, the Egyptian Foreign Minister would make concrete proposals and suggestions. It was our hope that through this process we would see progress toward an agreement.

Mr. Rountree added that in making his observations regarding the article in the New York Times, he did not wish to imply in any way that we do not fully support SCUA. His point was that we did [not] envisage SCUA operating as had been stated in the press, but that we did support SCUA as stated, for example, by the Secretary in his press conference on October 16.

Mr. Niazi subsequently telephoned to say that he had been in touch with Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi who was leaving New York today by plane and had conveyed to him the assurances given by Mr. Rountree. He said that Dr. Fawzi was glad to have the account of the conversation. Mr. Niazi also said that, in response to Mr. Rountree’s suggestion regarding concrete proposals, it would not be possible to make them available prior to the talks now scheduled to begin on October 29, but that Dr. Fawzi would be ready with the proposals for negotiation at that time. Mr. Niazi implied that the Egyptians were looking forward to these talks during which they would present proposals for negotiation under each of the principles and wished to present them one by one. Mr. Niazi’s main point seemed to be that the Egyptians did not wish to present their proposals in written form as a plan beforehand.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–1956. Confidential. A marginal notation on the source text in an unidentified hand reads: “Sec Saw”.
2. During a telephone conversation which began at 10:30 a.m. on October 19, Dulles informed Lodge that there was no basis whatsoever for the Middleton story and asked that Lodge inform Hammarskjold. Lodge repeated the U.S. position as being that dues paid into SCUA would be transmitted to Egypt but would not be used as a pressure device. Lodge asked Dulles if the British understood this; the Secretary answered yes and added, according to Bernau’s transcript, that “they [the British] use Middleton to put out what they would like our policy to be etc. etc.” Dulles also told Lodge that he wanted Hammarskjöld to make clear the U.S. position to Fawzi. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)
3. On October 16 during a news conference, Dulles stated: “we believe that the organization [SCUA] should be set up to act as agent for the ships; that it should collect the dues from them as their agent, and be prepared to pay an appropriate share of those dues over to Egypt in order to recompense Egypt for its contribution to the passage through the Canal.” For transcript of the press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, October 29, 1956, pp. 655–662. Excerpts relating to the Suez situation are printed in United States Policy in the Middle East, September 1956–June 1957, pp. 122–127.
4. Information from the last three paragraphs was included in the Report prepared in the Executive Secretariat, October 23 (Summary No. 36, not printed). President Eisenhower initialed the copy of the report in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.