357. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
1839. Eyes only Secretary. Eyes only Ambassador Aldrich. I had luncheon alone today with Chaban-Delmas and during 90 minute conversation obtained clearest expression of official French views on Suez to date. I have been on a basis of personal friendship with Chaban-Delmas for over 3 years and as a result he talked freely and [Page 754] with great frankness. Chaban is a Minister of State in French Government ranking above Pineau, and as such, has been privy to closest held thinking in French Governmental circles.
Chaban-Delmas said that as he understood the problem the only difference between the French and United States position was one of time table… . as he understood the matter, the United States was prepared to view this as a rather long term operation which might take a number of years. For the United Kingdom Chaban said the time table was a question of months as the British could not allow the menace to their oil supplies represented by Nasser to continue over a period of years. For France the matter was a question of weeks because of the Algerian problem.
Chaban said that situation in Algeria was now greatly improved and it should be possible to move toward a settlement in the near future except for one thing. This one problem was the belief among Moslem masses that Nasser was winning his contest with Great Britain and France over Suez. Chaban said that in order to make possible a solution in Algeria it was absolutely necessary that Nasser lose face or go in the coming weeks. In this connection he mentioned Christmas as an outside date. In answer to my question regarding what would be a loss of face, Chaban said that we should remember that Nasser had seized the Suez Canal for express purpose of obtaining extra funds with which to build the Aswan Dam. If it could be clearly shown that he would not receive any excess funds from his seizure of the Canal this would be a loss of face such as Chaban had in mind.
In order to proceed Chaban said that we should now set up SCUA very rapidly and that practically all shipping should agree to pay dues to SCUA, in particular, all American controlled shipping, whether American flag or operating under Liberian and Panamanian registry. SCUA should also pay only a minimum percentage of its receipts to Egypt. This minimum percentage should be calculated to just cover the cost of operation and maintenance of the Canal. Chaban pointed out that these figures were readily available from the records of the Universal Suez Canal Company. In arriving at a percentage figure for SCUA payments to Egypt, account must be taken of those dues which are being paid directly to Egypt. The total receipts of Egypt, including both dues paid directly and payments from SCUA, should not be more than necessary to cover the operation and upkeep of the Canal. (I did not question Chaban regarding the profits which Egypt received from the Canal under the Suez Canal Company concession and it might be that French would agree that payments should be large enough to cover not only cost of maintenance and operation but also profits no larger than those received during the past years.) Chaban said that if this arrangement [Page 755] should prove acceptable to Egypt it would be possible for SCUA to allocate additional sums from time to time for specific improvement projects on the Canal. The fundamental point of this whole operation is that no extra funds would be available to Egypt for her own internal uses as a result of Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal. This situation would continue in effect until such time as a permanent settlement had been negotiated in accordance with the principles approved by Security Council and by the 18 nations in London. Chaban made clear that there should be no negotiations with Egypt regarding these payments by SCUA but that SCUA should make a clear public explanation of the basis on which payments to Egypt were being made, i.e., payments would be adequate to cover operation and maintenance of the Canal and additional payments might be negotiated for specific improvement projects.
Chaban said that the institution of such a regime promptly seemed to him the only possible method of avoiding war. In this connection he felt the role of the United States was vital. He said that recently some members of French Government had become disturbed over the United States position and felt that differences between France and the United States might be more than a question of time table for replacement of Nasser. Some French had begun to feel that the United States might be succumbing anew to the temptation to give in to Nasser’s blackmail, in other words to feel that United States should support Nasser in attempt to prevent domination of Egypt by Soviets. Chaban also mentioned at this time rumors that Egyptians were negotiating with Gulf Oil Company to in effect finance the Canal for them. While Pineau had mentioned this matter lightly in his speech to the National Assembly, Chaban said he wished to emphasize that any such action would be simply catastrophic as far as Franco-American relations were concerned.
I asked Chaban what would happen should Nasser decide that the percentage of dues to be offered him by SCUA was too small, and that therefore he would not let ships operating under SCUA use the Canal. He replied that in this event United States ships would go around the Cape, and France and the United Kingdom would take whatever action might be necessary to keep the Canal open.
In conclusion, Chaban said that he well understood that it was vital for the United States Government under the present circumstances to be absolutely sure that peace would be maintained through early November. France, on the other hand, could not allow the problem of Nasser to remain unsolved beyond Christmas at the latest. He said that France was fully prepared to meet the United States requirements for peace prior to early November but felt that the United States should then understand why France and the United Kingdom would be required to act after that date. He [Page 756] suggested that an announcement that SCUA would go into effect should be made around November 1 stating that payments to SCUA would actually begin on November 10. Chaban said that he had told Pineau to talk to you along these lines when he saw you in New York. He said that Pineau had raised some objection, saying he did not feel it was quite diplomatic to talk so frankly but Chaban said he had urged him to be fully frank.
Mindful of the fact that according to British Embassy sources here, as well as information received by our Embassy in London, Eden had been highly impressed by his talk with Chaban during his September visit to Paris, I asked Chaban what he thought of United Kingdom position as a result of his talks with British. Chaban answered that he had had a very frank talk alone with Eden in which he had told Eden it was obvious that Eden’s whole future rested on the Suez problem. He had told Eden that there were two alternatives: first, that the United Kingdom Government would continue with its firm policy and achieve a victory in the Suez question which would thoroughly discredit the Labor opposition. The second alternative would be that nothing would be done and Nasser would in effect remain victorious. The result of this would inevitably be that Eden would be swept from power not only by the Labor Party but also as a result of dissatisfaction in Conservative circles. Chaban further told Eden that while he expressed this thought in personal terms it was more important than that because if Eden sincerely believed that his policy was the only one that was vital for the U.K. to follow, he would have to stay in power, as only in that way could his policy be carried out. According to Chaban, Eden told him he had no cause to worry and that it was Eden’s intention to continue his firm policy no matter what the cost or how difficult. Chaban, incidentally, expressed a very poor personal opinion of Lloyd whom he felt had nowhere near the same clarity of views on the overall problem as Eden.
I told Chaban that I felt that his description of French position was exactly what I had assumed French position to be since August but I also told him that it had never been expressed with such clarity to U.S. officials. Chaban seemed surprised at this. He said that he assumed that Pineau had long ago made the same sort of exposition to the Secretary.
Comment: This information tallies closely with my earlier thinking except for the additional assurance that French do not contemplate any military action prior to approximately Nov. 10. Chaban insisted that French do not want military action and hope to avoid it. However, only means of avoiding it would be by successful operation of SCUA which would deprive Nasser of any benefits from nationalization. If this not acceptable to Nasser French are prepared [Page 757] to take military action. On other hand, from point of view of U.S. Chaban felt that we should give full support to SCUA as it would be only possible means of avoiding military action. If we did not give such support and SCUA operation such as he envisaged could not go into effect, Chaban indicated that there would be likelihood of disturbances taking place in Egypt of the sort that would necessitate military intervention by France and the UK. I feel that Chaban’s views are accurate description of French Government policy in Suez affair as of today.
Next following telegram of lower classification gives Chaban’s views of political effects in France of possible failure on Suez.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/10–1956. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 9:13 p.m. Repeated to London.↩
- Telegram 1840, October 20, reported Chaban’s prediction that a prestige victory for Nasser would make it impossible for France to hold Algeria and would lead to a “Popular Front” government in France’s and eventual French withdrawal from NATO. (Ibid.)↩