Office of the Historian

508. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, November 5, 1956, 4 p.m.1

Washington, November 5, 1956, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Landing Rights at Adana Base in Turkey
  • UN Airlift to the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
  • Admiral Radford, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • Mr. Murphy, G
  • Mr. MacArthur, C
  • Mr. Wilkins, NEA
  • Mr. Bennett, G

Mr. Gray and Admiral Radford came in to discuss the JCS desire for an approach to the Turkish government regarding landing rights at the Adana Base for use in the possible transit of troops to the Middle East. Admiral Radford stressed the strong feeling of the JCS that we must have authority for such use in the case of need. The approach to the Turks would not be a request for immediate deployment, but the JCS considers that we must have standby authority in order to be in a position to act quickly in case of need.

The request would cover two objectives. Authority would be requested on a contingent basis for:

1.
The right to station Air Force units at the Adana Base, to be there for use in any operations which might be undertaken in connection with the situation in the Middle East. Admiral Radford assumed that we would approach the Turks on the basis that any operations we would undertake would be under a United Nations directive.
2.
The right to fly … through Adana enroute to the base at Dhahran for protection of the oil installations there. Admiral Radford stressed that at present King Saud does not want production stopped and Americans are in high favor, but the JCS wants to be ready … .

In further discussion Admiral Radford stated that we now have a force of only 1200 at the Dhahran base, equipped only with small arms. We must be prepared to move in case something happens fast. In answer to Mr. Murphy’s question as to how long the movement would take, the Admiral said that it might go on for some time if a follow-up air supply were necessary until we could get things in by surface vessel.

[Page 999]

The Admiral asked the Department’s opinion as to the Turkish reaction to an approach of the kind he envisaged. Mr. Wilkins explained that the Turkish stand on recent Middle East developments is still unclear. Mr. MacArthur expressed the opinion that it would be difficult to get an advance, open-ended clearance such as Admiral Radford envisaged without telling the Turks of our plans. If we discussed our contingent planning with them, there might very well be a leak and, he was gravely concerned over an impression getting out at this time that the U.S. was planning military moves in the Middle East. Mr. Gray asked whether it would not be possible to have exploratory conversations with the Turks which would sound them out in a general way without having to go into future plans. Mr. Wilkins suggested that, in connection with our readiness to assist the contemplated UN force with an air lift, it might be possible to approach the Turks on the UN air lift and develop JCS needs simultaneously. Mr. Murphy thought Mr. Wilkins’ idea had merit and went on to emphasize that U.S. stock in Saudi Arabia is very high at the present time.

Mr. MacArthur raised the question as to whether we would as a national decision decide to move troops into Dhahran in any event unless it were with the consent of the King of Saudi Arabia. Admiral Radford expressed the view that … we are going to have to take a decision within the next three or four days on supplying oil to Europe. When that decision is taken, assuming it will be affirmative, the U.S. will in the Admiral’s view be tarred in Arab eyes with the same brush as the UK and France. Mr. Robert Anderson had told him today that the decision on oil could not be put off much longer. Mr. Murphy stated that Mr. Hoover is opposed to taking the decision just now, and he expressed the view that, by the same token, we should avoid putting the question of special use of the Adana base to the Turks at this time. Admiral Radford repeated that, if we take an affirmative decision on oil for Europe, opinion might move very fast in Saudi Arabia.

With respect to an air lift with the UN, Admiral Radford said that we had sufficient air lift in West Germany to take a Canadian force to the Suez Canal Zone and then follow up with transport of a Norwegian force. An alternative might be to take them to Suda Bay and carry them on from there by naval vessels. The Admiral said that the President would also like to make a gesture of moving the Colombian force, but he commented that it would be a very expensive proposition to move a battalion from Bogota by air. It was suggested that a token force might be moved from Colombia as well as from other countries, with the main body to follow by surface transport. Mr. Murphy mentioned reports that all the Scandinavian countries are coming forward with offers of troops for the UN force. [Page 1000] In connection with the cease-fire and entry of UN troops, Mr. MacArthur expressed the view that we can anticipate real trouble in getting the Israelis to pull their forces back, since it would mean their moving back across the Sinai Peninsula which they have so recently taken by force of arms.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.56382/11–556. Top Secret. Drafted by Bennett.↩