Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Suez Crisis, July 26–December 31, 1956, Volume XVI

547. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 7, 1956—4 p.m.

Delga 21. Eyes only for Hoover from Lodge. Re Palestine—Suez. I met with SYG UN yesterday afternoon and informed him of President Eisenhower’s conversations with Eden, Mollet, Nehru,² and St. Laurent.³ I informed SYG the President had advised Eden not to equivocate or negotiate but to withdraw from Egypt. I told him the President had said if Eden attempted to negotiate, USSR would be right behind Egyptians stiffening them. I also said that in the President’s telephone calls to Mollet, St. Laurent and Nehru, he had urged them to get 100 per cent behind the SYG, as he was.

I referred also to British-French reference to leaving their own technicians for clearing Canal, a proposal which US deplored.

SYG said he would take position he considered UK-French letter simply an offer of their technicians which he could accept or reject. He agreed completely with the President on necessity for complete and unequivocal withdrawal by British and French. He asked me to give the President, officially and personally, a message of his deep appreciation for the full support which the President and US had given throughout this entire undertaking.

SYG said he had telegraphed full text of his final report to UK and French at 3:00 am yesterday morning, and they had therefore had it when the Cabinet decision to agree to cease-fire and withdrawal of troops had been taken. There could be no question they had accepted on basis of principles expressed in his report, which included withdrawal of their forces.

I said question of time of withdrawal was as important as withdrawal itself, and as long as there were any UK or French personnel left, either military or technical, it would give USSR the excuse they wanted. SYG agreed with this. He said that as for clearing Canal, he was getting in touch with the Dutch and Danes who had greatest number of experts available, and he hoped they would agree to provide such experts to him for clearing operation.

On question of US airlift, he was thinking of possibility of our taking two Colombian divisions, which Colombia had now offered, to Rome to have them in readiness to get them into Egypt when possible. This would be an ideal arrangement for first step, Hammarskjold thought.

I told SYG USAF in Germany could lift a battalion and could get its planes to field for lift quicker than Canadian battalion could get there. I said the time from Germany to Cairo would be 12 hours if Cairo fields are open. If US Air Force could not in first stages land in Cairo, we would take troops to Crete and the Navy could take them on from there.

I asked him to let us know at earliest possible moment of needs we would have to meet, the time, place, etc. Hammarskjold said he thought he would have to have Gen Burns here, and that Burns should go back with troops. This would, he felt, take 5 or 6 days, and he did not anticipate requesting us to get underway with airlift much before that time. He said he had asked Loutfi to obtain at once Egypt’s acceptance of having SYG choose the force to come in. He had told Loutfi that a force composed of Indians, Scandinavians and Colombians would in his mind be the ideal composition.

SYG said he had not got to point of dealing with Israeli withdrawal, and thought that would be next big question, of course. He was sure Israelis would not agree until there had already gone into existence, on Egyptian soil, a UN force.

Hammarskjold said he was hoping avoid a meeting of GA last night in order give time for consolidating situation, although he recognized Asian-Africans might well insist upon meeting in view of doubt existing as to UK-French intentions on withdrawal.

Following my meeting with Hammarskjold, Cordier informed us that Egypt had requested meeting, supported by Asian-Africans, because of heavy fighting continuing at Port Said. It seemed unlikely it would have stopped by 7:00 pm, time for cease-fire to take effect.

He said Asian-Africans would put forward a resolution on withdrawal of forces, and SYG would arrange for a resolution to be introduced, probably by Sweden, Ecuador, Ceylon, Burma and some others, approving plan for a UN force as set forth in his final report yesterday morning. Cordier said SYG believed full support for his resolution would require support for a resolution on withdrawal.

I raised with Hammarskjold the question of meeting of SC at ministerial level as proposed by French and British. I questioned whether such meeting at this time would be helpful. Hammarskjold said emphatically he believed it would be unhelpful and should be avoided.

Following is Barco’s report:

“After my telephone conversation with Secretary Hoover and Mr. Phleger,⁴ I called immediately upon SYG. He had just arranged for last evening’s meeting to be postponed until morning. I explained to him our concern that there be least possible delay in establishing UN force and getting it into Egypt. I said Secretary Hoover considered situation perilous and it was of utmost importance we act without any delay whatsoever. We were most hopeful that 4–5 day period for setting up force that he had mentioned could be substantially shortened, and that Gen Burns could set up his command in Egypt at once and that it would not be necessary for him return to New York.

“SYG said he fully appreciated our concern and was moving as fast as he possibly could. He would order Gen Burns to go at once to Cairo and establish his office. He could be there tomorrow. He did feel he needed Gen Burns here to supervise arrangements for sending in UN force and felt he could leave his Depty Chief of Staff (Col Ely) in Egypt and come on to New York.

“I told him it would be of great help for Gen Burns to go to Cairo at once. I then mentioned our anxiety there be no vacuum between time of departure of British-French forces and arrival of UN forces; that we believed UN forces should be in Egypt before British-French forces left.

“Hammarskjold said he had just not been able to get to point of thinking about staging of departure of UK-French forces and arrival of UN forces. He had been concentrating on getting cease-fire and agreement to withdrawal and establishment of a UN force. He understood our problem and would for this purpose need Gen Burns advice. He believed it would be possible to avoid a vacuum that anyone could take advantage of. He said that with Brit-French forces only in Port Said there was only a small area where this problem might arise, but even this he felt could be dealt with. He would keep us informed of developments.

“I also informed SYG of our views on Asian-African draft resolution on withdrawal. SYG agreed points which concerned Secretary Hoover and Mr. Phleger could be dealt with as he himself believed resolution needed further refinement.

“This morning I met with Ambassadors Entezam⁵ and Abdoh (Iran) and Loutfi (Egypt) and explained objectionable features of Asian-African draft resolution which concerned US. I explained to them that a number of delegations would, I felt, share our doubts about these points and I thought Asian-African group would be able get greater support if they made changes we suggested. After considerable discussion they agreed on language which I considered close enough to our suggestions to meet objections. I told them that with these changes we would support resolution. They had not, however, had time for it to be circulated and during debate I suggested the Representative of Ceylon, who preceded Ambassador Lodge, should read text as amended to Assembly, in order that Mr. Lodge could support it in his speech which immediately followed. This was what happened.” (End of Barco report)

This morning, after talk with Hoover,⁶ I spoke to SYG and, stressing our anxiety over Russian activities, urged his speedy action in getting international force into Egypt quickly. I said 4 or 5 days was much too long a delay. He said he would do his utmost. I also conveyed the President’s words of praise to him and he was deeply appreciative.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/11–756. Secret; Priority. Received at 5:12 p.m.
2. On November 6, Eisenhower had written Nehru to enlist his support for the U.N. cease-fire plan. In particular, Eisenhower had urged that Nehru use his influence with the British Government on behalf of the plan and that he accept the Secretary-General’s invitation for India to furnish some part of the U.N. Emergency Force. The following day, Nehru informed Eisenhower that he had agreed in principle that India would participate in UNEF. Copies of these messages are in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.
3. Eisenhower spoke with Canadian Prime Minister St. Laurent on November 6. A transcript of this telephone conversation is ibid., Eisenhower Diaries.
4. No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
5. Head of the Iranian Delegation to the United Nations.
6. No account of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.