135. Message From Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower1
I feel I must send you my thoughts on the present critical situation. British public opinion is very much concerned over the latest developments. There is a very strong feeling among all parties that the settlement should be a fair one.
You paid tribute to your British and French friends and allies “for the immense contribution which they made to world order” by their action in withdrawing their forces. But you went on to say that “this put other nations of the world under heavy obligation to see to it that these two nations do not suffer by reason of their compliance”.
It is very true that we have taken great risks, both as regards the clearance of the Canal, a proper interim system and a final agreement.
Of course we want the Israeli forces to be withdrawn so that all the efforts of the world can be directed to forcing Nasser to a reasonable settlement of the Canal in the short and in the long term. On the other hand, public opinion here will not allow us to do what they think is inequitable.
In the case of Israel, most people here would think it reasonable that they should withdraw their forces from Gaza and Aqaba if there were a clear understanding that Egypt will not be allowed to continue to break international law or the Armistice Agreements. So far as Gaza is concerned, this can best be guaranteed by the United Nations forces moving in immediately, and it should not be impossible to devise [Page 244] some arrangement for the civil administration. So far as the right of use of the Straits of Aqaba is concerned, which is vital to the life of Israel, it is not unnatural that the Israelis should be hesitant, since Egypt has been in default over the resolution dealing with Israeli shipping in the Canal for many years without any real action being taken against her.
As you suggested, I have strongly advised the Israel Government to make a move and not be intransigeant. Of course I do not yet know the result. But I cannot believe that it is impossible to devise a formula which would enable them to act in accordance with the general interest. Broadly speaking it is simply a question of getting these two operations regarded as part of a single whole—in other words a combined operation.
This can either be done by a suitable resolution of the United Nations or by a strengthening of your guarantee of the Aqaba Straits, to which other countries might well adhere, or perhaps by both methods. We are certainly willing to follow your lead. I hear that efforts are being made by several countries, and notably by Canada, to draft a resolution which would cover all these points. If their efforts are successful we shall give such a resolution all the support in our power, and I sincerely hope that you also will feel able to do so. I am sure that the attitude of the United States will be decisive.