Office of the Historian

283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1

Washington, April 12, 1957—8:05 p.m.

3403. Following information extremely sensitive and for your information only.

British Ambassador has stated UKG urgently desires reference Suez matter Security Council.2 While British wish continuation your discussions with GOE and anxious avoid damaging their prospects, they believe immediate SC consideration essential in order provide proper forum for certain interim arrangements. Although they do not envisage substantive resolution, they would like have it stated in Council that since discussions looking to final settlement will take considerable time, there should be interim arrangement permitting users to pay dues to Egyptian authority without prejudice to existing legal rights or terms of future settlement. Following this (which will presumably overcome domestic political problem), UKG plans approach GOE on or before April 17 re plan for payment of tolls. Contact understood to be planned between Bank of England and National Bank of Egypt. Arrangements envisaged would be establishment special account in Bank of England to which would be deposited transferable sterling. Toll payments would be put into this account thus making possible their current use by GOE. Urgency in matter attributed to pressure upon UKG from shippers to expedite arrangements whereby Canal can be used. We under impression French not informed these British intentions. End FYI.

French Govt indicated it supports UK desire to have problem discussed in SC soonest.

Department recognizes that SC consideration of matter present time may not advance settlement. Moreover it realizes reference to SC might immediately precipitate issuance by GOE of unilateral statement or declaration, far from satisfactory from users viewpoint. On other hand Department believes US should not oppose reference to SC [Page 540] if that desired by UK and France (Australia also advises prompt reference to SC), particularly since US cannot claim that current discussions with Nasser give substantial hope that they will lead to arrangements satisfactory to major users. We must recognize possibility that Egyptians deliberately employing delaying tactics and that early full opening Suez Canal renders necessary immediate decisions re circumstances in which UK, France and others will use, or will be permitted to use Canal.

Consequently US will not oppose reference to SC and in circumstances believes it best take initiative in bringing matter there. In so doing every effort should be made prevent action from jeopardizing US discussions with GOE. Though of limited success thus far, we have not yet been able to think of any better means of progress.

With this in mind you should seek prompt meeting with Nasser. Suggest you take following line:

(a)
With appropriate introductory remarks along lines numbered paragraphs of Deptel 33413 state that Department has received and is considering revised Egyptian draft handed to you April 11 by Fawzi. Although draft reflects some progress in several respects there obviously remain important points which have not been resolved. It is hoped that discussions can be continued with objective of resolving these points.
(b)
It is of course understood that US, in carrying out discussions with GOE, has had no mandate to represent other users of the Canal and, while the US has general appreciation of points of view of those who largely use Canal, it has been able to speak with authority only for itself. Obviously it has not been in position to commit other users.
(c)
As these bilateral talks proceed, time rapidly approaching when Canal will be fully opened, and other users naturally concerned re arrangements and are pressing us for information on status of our discussions in Cairo. We believe we should act now to present in proper forum report of present status of matter.
(d)
GOE will recall that at conclusion of SC consideration of Suez matter in October 1956, hope was expressed that negotiations leading toward settlement would be continued and it was agreed that SC would remain seized of issue. Since settlement not yet reached US believes that Council should now be informed of current status.
(e)
In view fact US initiated proposal that SC remain seized of problem, US believes it should take initiative in asking that matter be returned to Council for purpose of reporting status. US would be prepared to make joint request with GOE for SC meeting. If GOE should not feel that it could join in such request, US plans ask for early SC meeting.
(f)
It is our thought that bilateral US-GOE talks would not be suspended and we hope GOE will not meanwhile issue unilateral declaration.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1257. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Rountree; cleared in draft by Herter, Raymond, Walmsley, and Jones; and approved by Dillon who signed for Herter. Repeated Priority to London, Paris, and USUN.↩
  2. Earlier on April 12, Caccia told Dillon that the London press was likely to carry a story on April 13 indicating that a decision had been made to go to the Security Council with the Suez Canal problem and that British ships would be allowed to go through the Canal and pay dues to Nasser. (Memorandum of conversation by Shaw, April 12; ibid.)

    On April 11, Caccia spoke with Dillon concerning the British desire to pay tolls to Egypt under protest. (Memorandum of conversation by Shaw, April 11; ibid., 974.7301/4–1157)

    ↩
  3. Document 276.↩