295. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt1
3510. In view of mounting volume of Canal traffic and mounting political pressure for some public definition by Egyptian Government on conditions of Canal use which it proposes, we feel we cannot [Page 563] refrain from making a report to Security Council.2 We are government which proposed last October that Security Council remain seized of this matter and everyone knows that we have now for several weeks been having discussions with Egyptian Government. We accordingly plan to bring the matter to Security Council this week. We strongly hope that prior to that time the Egyptian Government will have issued best possible Declaration.
If Declaration is along lines we have discussed and particularly if it reflects Hammarskjold’s latest suggestions, then we would merely report the facts and indicate that while we did not consider Declaration reflected full compliance with Security Council six “requirements” or the needs of the situation, we felt that trial should be given to system proposed by Egypt. We believe that most members of Security Council would take a similar position and that there would not be at that stage effort to use Egyptian Declaration as a mere point of beginning for a new negotiation designed at this time to obtain further concessions from Egyptians.
Since there is yet no agreed settlement of claims of Universal Suez Canal Company and it may still assert right to receive tolls, we would, pending such settlement, feel obligated to continue to require US ships to pay under protest.
It seems to us that both from standpoint of users and of Egyptians, critical question is whether arrangement will in fact inspire such confidence in a dependable use of Canal that governments and private concerns will base their economic and business plans on the assumption that they can rely upon free and fair use of Canal. This will be determined by events.
In event that such confidence does not develop, then we assume it would be in interests of Egypt itself to seek to remedy this situation and we would feel free to make friendly suggestions in this sense.
If Egypt under the circumstances should now refuse to make any declaration or revert to the earlier draft statement, then of course we would have to be free to be critical.
We believe Egypt should have 24 hours notice before we give notice to Security Council. We therefore leave it to your discretion to tell Egypt on Monday in which case we would on Tuesday ask for a Wednesday Council meeting. Or if you think an extra 24 hours is [Page 564] important at your end, you could tell Egypt on Tuesday. In that case our notice to Security Council would go on Wednesday with meeting on Thursday.
In talking with Egyptians you may at your discretion speak along foregoing lines.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–2157. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Dulles; cleared by Rountree, Raymond, and Wilcox; and approved by Dulles. Repeated to USUN, London, and Paris.↩
- At the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on April 22, the Secretary “reported a long conversation with Ambassador Lodge who saw no objection to Security Council submission in the spirit presented in our message to Ambassador Hare.” (Tentative Notes by Howe, April 22; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) Dulles telephoned Lodge, who was then in Beverly, Massachusetts, at 6:18 p.m. on April 21. Proctor, however, was able to transcribe only a portion of the conversation. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Proctor, April 21; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)↩
- In telegram 3313 from Cairo, April 22, Hare informed the Department of State that he was delaying seeing Fawzi until Tuesday April 23, because April 22 was an Egyptian holiday. It would not only be difficult to arrange a meeting but also impossible for the Egyptian Government to take any action if it chose to. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–2257)↩