11. Editorial Note
In his February 15 letter to Secretary Dulles cited in footnote 1, supra, Ambassador Lodge expressed his concern about the domestic political repercussions of the segregated celebrations described by Sears in his first paragraph of recommendations. Lodge indicated that the Democrats “would certainly jump on the Fourth of July business if they knew about it. Per contra, we could get some credit at home if we ended this practice. I can’t help wondering whether our people are pushing the issue as hard as the traffic will bear, or merely following the line of least resistance.”
When Lodge raised the issue again with the Secretary on March 23, Dulles responded on April 3 that he entirely agreed “that invitations should not be issued on a basis of caste, color or creed at any of our public functions, either here or abroad. This is a good American principle that should guide all of us, all the time. As regards the applicability of this principle to specific posts abroad, I believe our people should apply it to the extent the traffic will bear. The equally American characteristic of good common horse sense should also apply.” (Department of State, AF/AFE Files, Lot 62 D 417, Mason Sears Report: Union of S. Africa–2)
Subsequently, on June 7, Sears met with Officer in Charge of Southern Africa Affairs Donald Dumont, and a number of desk officers. Sears expressed his desire that Dulles issue an order mandating integrated July 4th celebrations in South Africa. He maintained [Page 40] that it would prove beneficial throughout Africa and not redound negatively against the United States in the Union. If Ambassador Wailes was declared persona non grata then Sears considered that a small sacrifice to pay for the many advantages to be gained. In rebuttal, Sears was told that this indeed would be a serious loss without comparable benefits and without consideration of the issues of defense and strategic materials. United States officials were alleged to have gone farther than most in developing contacts with non-Whites who were not even invited to Egyptian diplomatic functions. Were the United States to provoke the Union Government then it was likely that all access to non-Whites would be cut off. Moreover, Strijdom’s government was described as having demonstrated, since September 1955, “a strong and dramatic desire to accommodate itself to the emergence of new African states to the north.” Foreign Service officers in the Union had as their principal objective the perpetuation of stable, orderly development which included, Sears was informed, “whenever possible and practicable, the persuasion of responsible South African Whites to moderate their restrictive racial policies.” (Memorandum of conversation by Johnson, June 7; ibid., Central Files, 811.424/6–756) As a result of this meeting, Sears called Dumont the next day to indicate that he had abandoned his plan to pursue the matter with the Secretary. He indicated that he had been convinced that what he proposed was not in the best interest of the United States. (Memorandum of conversation by Dumont, June 8; ibid., 811.424/6–856)