Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

233. Instruction From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

CA–1323

Washington, August 16, 1955

SUBJECT

• US Policy Towards the Sudan

The Department has completed a review of the current situation in the Sudan with special attention to the following factors:

1. The probable time table for completion of the self-determination process. The Sudanese Parliament is expected to pass a resolution about August 16 asking that arrangements for self-determination be started. Within three months Egyptian and British troops should be withdrawn and in succession a draft law for election of the Constituent Assembly would be drawn up; the Assembly would be elected; the Assembly would choose between some link with Egypt or complete independence; a Constitution for the Sudan and the electoral laws for the first Parliament would be drawn up; and the Parliament would be elected. The entire procedure would be supervised by an International Commission and should be completed during he first months of 1956.

2. The preponderant strength of pro-independence sentiment in the Sudan. Intelligence Brief #1806, “Implications for Egyptian-Sudanese Relations of an Independent Sudan”,² recently has been sent to the field. The brief concludes there is every indication the Sudan will choose independence, an assessment confirmed by reporting from USLO Khartoum.³

3. The legitimate Egyptian concern over Nile water. Dependent as it is upon the Nile, Egypt is naturally concerned over the security of her present supply of water and that she receive an equitable amount of water now unused. Furthermore, IBRD assistance in financing the high dam at Aswan is contingent, among other factors, upon an Egyptian-Sudanese agreement on division of the waters of the Nile.

4. The intensified Egyptian campaign to bring about some type of link between Egypt and the Sudan. The tactics employed include efforts to bribe southern Sudanese and a strong press and radio campaign against Prime Minister Azhari who has come out in favor of independence.

5. The difficulties currently being experienced in the Anglo-Egyptian talks in Cairo over the composition and terms of reference of the International Commission to supervise the self-determination process. Saleh Salim⁴ has proposed the USSR and a satellite as members of the Commission.

6. Accusations by Egypt that the United States is working in cooperation with the United Kingdom to assure a vote for independence. The Egyptian Ambassador acting on instructions has stressed to the Department Prime Minister Nasser’s conviction that the United States is intervening and the Egyptian press and radio have carried articles to this effect.

7. The Egyptian request that the United States assist in improving Egyptian-Sudanese relations and in bringing about a Nile waters agreement.⁵ The Secretary agreed to look into the matter and see what could be done.

8. The Sudanese requests for United States assistance of a technical nature and the desirability of providing the new country with appropriate guidance and modest assistance during its first years.⁶

The Department considers that the basic objectives of the United States are stability in the area, the orderly development of the Sudan in accordance with the wishes of its people, and the maintenance of friendly relations with the West and the Sudan’s immediate neighbors. The United States at this time has no specific strategic requirements in the Sudan.

As a consequence of this review the Department has come to the conclusion that the United States should be guided in the immediate future by the policies given below:

1. During the process of self-determination the United States should scrupulously refrain from any actions which might be construed as affecting the “free and neutral atmosphere” and the choice of the Sudanese with respect to their future. To do otherwise would expose the United States to charges of interference by both sides to the detriment of its position in both Egypt and the Sudan.

2. The United States should endeavor as quickly as possible to facilitate an Egyptian-Sudanese agreement on the division of the Nile waters. The possibility of working through the IBRD should be explored and the complications which might result from direct involvement by the United States should be borne in mind. Additional instructions on this matter will be forwarded shortly.⁷

3. After self-determination the United States should encourage closer Egyptian-Sudanese relations, recognizing that the dependence of both countries on the Nile makes cooperation essential if there is to be stability.

4. The United States should not undertake a technical assistance program or an economic assistance program prior to self-determination. No decision has been made on whether such programs should be undertaken afterwards. No ICA personnel should be assigned at this time.

5. After self-determination the United States should undertake a small USIA program. No USIA personnel should be assigned prior to self-determination.

In the administrative sphere advantages are seen in retaining the small size of the office pending resolution of the self-determination issue, thus allaying suspicions of United States intervention. However, the Department is starting administrative preparations now to the extent limited funds permit for the establishment of a modest mission in Khartoum in the spring of 1956 on the assumption that the Sudan will opt for independence. FBO is being requested to begin promptly arrangements for suitable office quarters and for additional living quarters. Since the present lease expires on December 30, 1955, and the quarters are admittedly temporary, USLO Khartoum can explain plausibly, if necessary, that new quarters are necessary regardless of the outcome of self-determination. To avoid charges of pre-judging the issue, care should be exercised to prevent any public intimation of these plans.⁸

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.45W/8–1655. Confidential. Sent to Khartoum, Cairo, and London. Repeated to Addis Ababa, Paris, Athens, Rome, Nairobi, and Asmara.
2. Not printed.
3. Arthur E. Beach, Liaison Officer in Khartoum, reported in despatch 42, August 15, that a decision for independence could be anticipated. (Department of State, Central Files, 745W.00/8–1555)
4. Major Salah Salem, Egyptian Minister of State for Sudanese Affairs, Minister of National Guidance, and a member of the Revolution Command Council.
5. The Egyptian Ambassador, Dr. Ahmed Hussein, took up these matters with Secretary Dulles on July 29. The memorandum of conversation by Allen, July 29, is in Department of State, Central Files, 774.5/7–2955.
6. The Sudanese had requested a ground water geologist and a hydroelectric expert. Due to the Egyptian-Sudanese controversy over control of the Nile waters, the latter request was turned down. Beach suggested a possible offer of technical assistance in noncontroversial fields. (Despatch 251 from Khartoum, June 20; ibid., 845W.2614A/6–2055)
7. In CA–1631 to Khartoum, August 25, the Department informed the Liaison Office (and London and Cairo) of the chief obstacles to the IBRD arriving at a final decision on the Aswan Dam. It indicated that the United States, in concert with the United Kingdom, should make a strong effort to bring about an Egyptian-Sudanese Nile waters accord, thereby eliminating one of the major impediments to a resolution of the matter. (Ibid., 645W.74322/8–2555)
8. In his response to this instruction, Beach commented that paragraph 1 appeared to provide the basic key to U.S. actions. In regard to paragraph 2, he acknowledged the need for caution and noted that developments in Egypt would in part dictate the possibility of implementing paragraph 3. He saw the wisdom of not immediately initiating technical or economic assistance programs, but hoped each request would be considered on its merits. He saw paragraph 5 as presenting no problems. (Despatch 67 from Khartoum, October 7; ibid., 611.45W/10–755)