91. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, August 31, 19571
SUBJECT
- Algeria
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
- Mr. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
- Mr. William R. Tyler, WE
Ambassador Alphand asked me to lunch on his return from Paris. The only other person present was Mr. Lucet. The conversation was almost entirely about Algeria and the forthcoming UNGA session. Essentially, the Ambassador had nothing new to say. He went over the main points of the proposed “Loi-Cadre” for Algeria. He emphasized that this proposal constituted a new French liberal measure which France had decided to take, since the Nationalists had not yet accepted the Mollet proposals of January 9, 1957. In answer to a question, he said that the Mollet proposals remained valid and that France was prepared to undertake negotiations with the Nationalists at anytime on the basis of these proposals. He said that it was not possible, however, to wait indefinitely and to allow the present situation to continue, and that the French Government was therefore making an all-out effort to propose a series of measures which would be acceptable to the majority of Algerians and to world opinion, and which would confer an increasing degree of self-government on Algeria.
I pointed out to the Ambassador that if the new measures were presented as a substitute for the Mollet proposals, they might well be considered to mark a step backward rather than forward, particularly if, as had been reported to us, the preamble were to contain the assertion that Algeria was, and would remain, a part of France. The Ambassador said that every effort would be made by the French Government to make it clear that the new measures were not in conflict with the Mollet proposals, but represented a unilateral French effort in the absence of Nationalist acceptance of the Mollet proposals, which however remain open. He said that there was no doubt that there would be a substantial majority in the French National Assembly for the new proposals, with opposition coming only from the extreme left and the extreme right. This affirmation of a united French national will, he said, would emphasize the vital importance that France receive support in the United Nations.
At this point the Ambassador discussed the extremely adverse consequences not only to Franco-U.S. relations, but to France’s whole attitude and role within the Western camp, if she were pilloried in the General Assembly and abandoned by her Allies, particularly the U.S. I said to the Ambassador that we certainly were aware of the difficulty of the situation in Algeria, not only with regard to the problem itself but also because of its repercussions on French domestic politics. I said we had heard reports that it was felt [Page 281] in some quarters in France that the “Loi-Cadre” had been prepared principally in deference to United States views, and that France in reality did not need to take any political measures in Algeria because the military situation was said to be improving rapidly. I said that if these reports were true, I thought that this was a dangerous theory. The Ambassador said this was not so at all and that the French Government believed strongly in its program. I said to the Ambassador that while I would not dispute the point that the role of the U.S. in the General Assembly was bound to be a very important one in the eyes of France, I thought it would be most unfortunate if, on the French side, people took the line that once the “Loi-Cadre” had been published it was then up to the U.S. to get others to accept it by endorsing it actively. Apart from the fact that this would hardly be consistent with the French desire to treat the Algerian question as a French problem, I thought that the determining factor in the acceptability of the “Loi-Cadre” would be the substance of what it had to offer, and not external efforts by other powers to promote it. I said to the Ambassador that I thought he was probably familiar with an American expression which could be translated into French as: “mettre le singe sur le dos de quelqu’un”. I said that, speaking quite personally, I thought it would be important to avoid any implication that the French strategy in the UN could be interpreted in this manner. The Ambassador agreed and said that such reports probably emanated from circles close to Lacoste who was both impatient and optimistic, and felt that the new proposals went further than was necessary in view of what he felt to be a constant improvement in the Algerian situation.
The Ambassador said that it was important to note that the new proposals provided ultimately for negotiation between freely elected representatives of Algeria and the French Parliament on a future statute for Algeria which could lead to independence. He said, however, that this word was politically unmentionable in France at this time and that this reality must be realized.
In discussing the possibility of political support in the UN from Tunisia and Morocco, the Ambassador reflected the French Government’s current distrust of Bourguiba, and said that he thought that the Moroccan Government was more likely to be effective and to play a moderating role.
In general, the Ambassador seemed to be unaware of the extent of information that has already appeared in the press about the French proposals, and sometimes emphasized to me the secrecy of various aspects of the French plan which have already been reported in American newspapers.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/8–3157. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.↩