Office of the Historian

134. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1

Washington, April 16, 1956—8:56 p.m.

6182. For Ambassador and Stassen. Assuming the draft … to Parts III and IV of USSR proposal (ur 4583)2 is made part of record,3 the most immediate problem of avoiding deviation from Geneva position that reunification is linked to European security is met and serious dangers of discussing the relation between disarmament and reunification in connection with disarmament appears obviated.

I remain seriously concerned, however, at possibility those dangers may crop up again. Mollet statement in U.S. News and World Report and German Foreign Office statement thereon4 indicate that either French or Germans might reopen this subject. Also disturbed at Nutting’s statement (ur 4494)5 after seeing Selwyn Lloyd that he was not sure it might not be desirable to make link between German reunification and disarmament stronger than before. The possibility exists that these matters may arise in connection with the Khrushchev–Bulganin visit to London.

I think that, subject your views, it would be desirable to send Selwyn Lloyd a message from me before Soviet leaders arrive. If you and Stassen see no objection, please deliver it.6 In addition, we are considering speaking to UK, French, Canadian, and German Ambassadors Washington on this subject.

Proposed text of message to Selwyn Lloyd follows:

“As Mr. Hoover wrote you,7 in acknowledging your message of March 17,8 we are appreciative of the efforts your representatives in the disarmament talks are making to keep the Western position a reasonably united one. In connection with the disarmament talks, [Page 376] however, I am seriously concerned at the way in which the question of relation of German reunification to disarmament has become the subject of discussion as a result of the Mollet interview in the U.S. News and World Report and the German Foreign Office reply thereto.

It would be only playing into Soviet hands if we allowed ourselves to be drawn into discussing the substance of this matter even tentatively in the disarmament talks.

I am gratified that agreement has been reached on the text of a reply to Parts III and IV of the Soviet proposal in the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I hope that it will become part of the record. However, there are other ways in which it might arise again.

The subject involves matters of highest policy. The position on the relationship of reunification of Germany to European security was agreed between the French, Germans, yourselves, and ourselves in preparation for the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers only after the most thorough discussion of the many grave aspects involved. I would hope that if there is any thought of modifying that position, or of relating reunification more closely to disarmament, it would be the subject of discussion and agreement at governmental level between all of us rather than be dealt with in connection with the disarmament meetings.

The question of accepting additional force limitations or weapons limitations in return for German reunification raises most serious problems which can only be solved over a period of time. In this respect, you are aware of our serious concern over discussing the concept of thinning out of forces or armaments with the Soviet. The Soviet proposal for limitations on nuclear weapons in Germany is, of course, most dangerous.

I hope that our representatives on the Disarmament Committee will be able to keep the discussion of this subject there centered on the questions within the competence of the Subcommittee. The relation of German reunification and European security to disarmament is very complex and involves so many other considerations that I believe we should exchange views on it through regular channels. I consider it most important, particularly in light of Franco-German differences on this subject that we should be very careful to abstain from dealing with the substance of this problem either in public or with the Soviets until it has been thoroughly discussed between us.

We would like to talk with Embassy as we did before Geneva on this subject, and would appreciate any views you may have to pass on through it. We shall also be talking privately with the French and German Ambassadors here, emphasizing the importance of not letting this subject get out of hand and affording the Soviet a major divisive advantage. I feel sure you will agree with me that this is a most serious problem on which we must proceed cautiously.”

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–1156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wolf and approved by Dulles. Repeated to Paris, Bonn, and Ottawa by pouch.↩
  2. Dated April 11, not printed. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Nutting introduced the reply of the Western powers, as reported in telegram 4583, into the subcommittee on April 23. (Ibid., IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.82)↩
  4. In an interview with journalist Robert Kleiman, Mollet stated, among other things, that first priority should not be given to German reunification but to disarmament. (U.S. News and World Report, vol. XL (April 6, 1956), pp. 46–48, 50, 52, and 54) For the summarized April 4 statement of the German Foreign Office to this interview, see The New York Times, April 6, p. 6.↩
  5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/4–656)↩
  6. Telegram 4684 from London, April 17, indicates Stassen’s concurrence in delivering the note to Lloyd; telegram 4702 from London, April 17, indicates it was delivered. (Ibid., 330.13/4–1756)↩
  7. Hoover sent a note through Makins to Lloyd on March 19 indicating that Dulles would respond more fully upon his return from a trip to the Far East. (Ibid., 330.13/3–1956)↩
  8. Not printed. (Ibid., 330.13/3–1756)↩