Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

150. Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy) to the President’s Deputy Special Assistant (Peaslee)¹

Washington, August 16, 1956.

Dear Mr. Ambassador: I have reviewed the proposal for a small United Nations “Atoms for Peace” police force contained in Governor Stassen’s memorandum of June 29, 1956 to the members of the National Security Council,² and described in greater detail in his memorandum to Secretary Dulles dated July 16, 1956.³ The Department’s conclusions are set forth briefly in a separate letter relating to Governor Stassen’s proposals as a whole,⁴ but I should like to explain more fully the reasons underlying these conclusions as they relate to the proposed United Nations police force.

In general, I have always felt that the concept of a United Nations military force is a good one. I am confident that at such time as it is feasible for the United Nations to develop armed forces, even on a limited basis, it will be a stronger organization in the service of peace. Nevertheless, I do have doubts about both the timing and the form of the proposal.

In addition to questioning whether such a proposal would have a substantial deterrent effect on the development of weapons capability by non-nuclear nations, I think it is unlikely under present international circumstances to have a favorable psychological impact. A proposal such as you envisage might readily be interpreted as an attempt by us to get the moral sanction of the United Nations in support of the use of atomic weapons. It is also possible that if such a proposal were made in the foreseeable future it would be thought of as addressed to the Arab-Israeli conflict or other problems of the Near East. If so, it would certainly incur strong Arab opposition.

As to the form and content of such a proposal, I doubt seriously that we should base such action on Article 43.⁵ Article 43 has been a dead letter for so long that few would seriously believe it was intended as a constructive proposal. Moreover, while it is doubtful that it would be possible to implement such a proposal at this time, its discussion might stimulate a revival of the Military Staff Committee⁶ which would bring up the question of Chinese representation in an acute form. Moreover, forces operating under the United Nations flag would, according to the provisions of Articles 46 and 47,⁷ be under the strategic direction of the United Nations Military Staff Committee whose chairmanship is rotated monthly. In that sense our forces could be under the strategic direction of Soviet, French, UK or Chinese representatives. As you are aware, the Military Staff Committee operates under the United Nations Security Council where the veto applies.

We have also considered as a possible alternative the desirability of making such a proposal pursuant to the Uniting for Peace resolution. In view of the fact that the Soviet Union has always boycotted the Uniting for Peace program and has held consistently that it was illegal, such an announcement on our part would be interpreted by others largely as an empty propaganda gesture devoid of intention to implement it constructively.

For several years after the adoption in 1950 of the Uniting for Peace program, the United States sought actively to encourage other Members of the United Nations to earmark forces for possible use in the event of aggression. We did not succeed largely because Member States wished to avoid committing themselves in advance without knowing the aggressors or the circumstances surrounding the aggression. This feeling will probably be reinforced in the present General Assembly, with a majority of its Members seeking increasingly to remain aloof from the East-West differences. It seems to me, therefore, that, while a proposal along the lines you suggest has merit, we must defer it for the time being.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Murphy⁸

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330/7–1656. Confidential.
2. Document 143.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330/7–1656)
4. Supra.
5. See footnote 4, supra.
6. For documentation on the Military Staff Committee of the U.N. Security Council, including the U.S. role in creating and supporting it, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. I, pp. 719 ff.
7. Articles 46 and 47 of the U.N. Charter set forth the functions and powers of the Military Staff Committee.
8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.