157. Memorandum of Discussion at the 298th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 27, 19561
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]
[Page 430]4. Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (NSC 5507/2; Annex II to Part 3 of NSC 5611; NSC Action No. 1360, Progress Report, dated August 15, 1956 by the Operations Coordinating Board on “Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs”)2
Mr. Lay briefly explained the nature of the progress reports and the difference between them and then said that Admiral Strauss would summarize the content of the State-AEC Progress Report on NSC 5507/2. Admiral Strauss proceeded to read a summary report several pages in length. He was interrupted from time to time by questions from the President with respect to the power reactor program, the atomic propelled merchant ship, and other matters. Admiral Strauss concluded his report by reading verbatim the second paragraph of Part 2 of the Progress Report (Evaluation of Policy).3 He then asked if there were any further questions.
The President replied that he had two questions in particular in mind. The first dealt with the newly erected atomic power plants in Great Britain. If one disregarded the capital costs, said the President, could these atomic power plants produce electricity at costs which were competitive with electric power produced by conventional fuels? Admiral Strauss replied in the negative and followed with a brief explanation. He indicated that electric power produced by these plants would be very expensive power, perhaps costing between twenty and thirty mills per KW. The President then inquired as to the size of the British plants which he said he thought were very small. Admiral Strauss pointed out that the President had been misinformed and that these plants would actually produce 60,000 KW, the same amount that our Shippingport reactor was originally designed to produce although the latter installation would, when completed, produce 100,000 KW. The President then went on to say that essentially what he was trying [Page 431] to find out was whether our Shippingport plant would be more economical than the British atomic power plants. Admiral Strauss replied in the affirmative.
The President said his second question concerned the weight of the atomic fuel which had been sent to Belgium as a one-time fuel for their new reactor. Admiral Strauss said that the atomic fuel sent to Belgium would weigh approximately 24 pounds and that it should last between two and three years.
Dr. Flemming said that he had read somewhere in the press that Admiral Strauss had authorized a study with respect to the possibility of developing an atomic-powered tanker. Admiral Strauss answered that Dr. Flemming was correct and that he had authorized a feasibility study for a very large atomic-powered tanker. Such a tanker, however, was probably five years off.
Secretary Humphrey said that he was a good deal worried about the possibility that the atomic fuel furnished foreign powers for peaceful uses might be turned by these nations to use in weapons. Admiral Strauss replied that none of the atomic fuels thus far sent abroad were of the sort that could be converted to weapons use. The uranium we had sent was not of weapons grade and could not be enriched without more U-235 which these nations cannot get. Admiral Strauss went on to explain the principles governing our release of atomic fuels to foreign powers and expressed the opinion that we were secure against the likelihood that these fuels could be turned to weapons use as long as we adhered to the aforementioned principles and that there was an inspection system.
Governor Stassen likewise expressed anxiety that the general spread of knowledge and the possible availability to other nations of other sources of uranium, might ultimately result in the development of weapons capabilities by nations which did not now possess such capabilities. Secretary Humphrey added his own skepticism as to the likelihood that certain nations would loyally observe any inspection system to which they initially agreed. Admiral Strauss admitted that there could be no final assurance that none of these nations would disregard the terms of the contract but he presumed that we would not do business with a nation whose good faith we had reason to doubt. Governor Stassen stated his position that unless an overall inspection agreement were achieved, the capability to make atomic weapons would ultimately spread to nations which do not at the moment possess this capability.
Admiral Strauss then pointed out that the report which he had just summarized was a joint report by AEC and the Department of State. Possibly, therefore, Secretary Dulles desired to add a comment. Secretary Dulles turned to Under Secretary Hoover and asked him if he had anything to add to the remarks made by Admiral Strauss.
[Page 432]Secretary Hoover said that he would merely emphasize the great danger that a lot of people in the world would come to feel that it would presently be possible to build power reactors which would be economically competitive with power obtained from fossil fuels. This could be very disillusioning, thought Secretary Hoover, because it was unlikely for at least five years—short of a scientific breakthrough— that economically competitive power could be obtained from atomic power reactors.
Governor Stassen reminded the Council of recent Soviet atomic agreements with East Germany and with Egypt and warned of the possibility that the Soviets might out-distance the United States in the field of peaceful uses.
The Council discussion of this item was concluded by Mr. Lay who emphasized certain aspects of the OCB Progress Report which had not been touched upon in the prior discussion.
The National Security Council:4
Noted and discussed the reference Progress Report by the Department of State and the Atomic Energy Commission on implementation of NSC 5507/2, contained in Annex II to Part 3 of NSC 5611; and the reference Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board on related nuclear energy projects.
[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on September 28.↩
- NSC 5507/2 is printed as Document 14. The Joint Progress Report (State Department and AEC) on Implementation of NSC 5507/2, Annex II to Part 3 of NSC 5611, August 13, is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up) NSC Action No. 1360, March 24, 1955, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions) The OCB Progress Report on Nuclear Energy Projects and Related Information Programs, August 15, 1956, is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5507 Series)↩
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The second paragraph of Part 2 of the joint State–AEC Progress Report reads as follows:
“The strong emotional response to Atoms-for-Peace which has been exhibited since the President’s speech of December 8, 1953, is gradually being moderated. While some disappointment of expectations of other nations has accompanied this moderation, it is basically healthy. This moderation represents a gradual necessary recognition that atomic energy will not solve all the economic problems of underdeveloped areas, that many technical problems must be solved in developing nuclear power plants, that strict control and safeguards must accompany nuclear power facilities if dangerous diversions to unauthorized military use are to be avoided, and that health and safety standards must be devised and strictly adhered to.” (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up)
↩ - The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1611, approved by the President on September 27. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)↩