Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

164. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen)¹

Washington, October 30, 1956.

Dear Harold: Reference is made to your letter of September 7, 1956² regarding methods to be used in determining the relationship between levels of manpower and armaments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, and I concur, that although a weapons/manpower ratio can be applied in the conventional armaments area, the many variables in nuclear weapons prevent the development of a realistic system of computation of nuclear weapons/manpower relationship. The problem therefore becomes mainly one of finding an approach which provides a method offering satisfactory safeguards for enforcement under a comprehensive disarmament system and offers minimum security risk for the United States if the method should be subverted or circumvented by the Communists.

It is fully recognized that every possible avenue should be explored to preclude a surprise nuclear attack on the United States and its Allies. The advantages to be gained by continuing to exhibit interest and leadership in the establishment of an acceptable armaments control system are also recognized. While we continue this vigorous initiative, however, the United States and free world strength must be maintained. We must avoid erosion of this strength by proposals calling for less than adequate control at the start. In the absence of any confidence in the good faith and integrity of the USSR, it is considered mandatory that adequate safeguards be installed at the outset to provide against the probability of Soviet circumvention.

Under these circumstances the problem of reducing the probability of a surprise nuclear attack through the limitation of nuclear delivery systems appears to be the most satisfactory first step. The Inclosure hereto outlines a method for initial limitations of nuclear delivery systems. Upon the satisfactory implementation of the first step, the proposal provides for, as a second step, additional limitations of delivery systems, concurrent with limitations in the manpower/ conventional armaments area. Provisions are also made for controlling future production of nuclear weapons materials as well as past stockpiles.

The Department of Defense is of the opinion that in arriving at any acceptable agreement with the Soviet Union on a satisfactory armaments control system, the methodology by which each participating state reduces its armaments is secondary in importance to the degree to which such reductions are verified.

The method outlined in the Inclosure represents an approach to the problem which appears worthy of further consideration. The concept of this method is in consonance with NSC Action 1513³ and the President’s policy statement of 18 September 1956 on control of armaments.⁴ It is not intended as a final immutable formula complete in every detail, but rather as another idea to be considered in the search for an acceptable system.

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

[Enclosure]

A METHOD OF DETERMINING LEVELS OF ARMAMENT UNDER A COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT SYSTEM

1. During the course of staff discussions with the British in January 1956, the United Kingdom submitted for U.S. consideration a proposal for computing numerical levels of conventional armaments under a comprehensive disarmament system.⁵ The basic concept of the U.K. proposal was that limitations on armed forces and armaments would be expressed initially in terms of manpower, with the armament levels to be determined by establishing a ratio of weapons to men. The U.K. proposal did not attempt to control or limit nuclear weapons.

2. Although the weapons/manpower ratio is applicable in the conventional armaments area, it is not feasible to apply the same general yardstick to the weapon systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Because of the many variables in nuclear weapons, little meaningful control would result from any attempt to establish a nuclear weapon/manpower ratio. Also, the relationship of manpower to armaments in the missile fields seems totally unpredictable at this time.

3. The initial effort in any limitation and control of armaments should be made in the field of those armaments capable of long-range delivery of nuclear weapons in a surprise attack.

4. From the viewpoint of the United States, the basic objectives of any armaments limitation and control system should be:

a. To reduce initially the capability of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, in terms of major armaments capable of delivering nuclear weapons, through a gradual and safeguarded method, to a level below that necessary to inflict critical damage on the United States and its Allies.

b. To reduce the remaining atomic delivery capability, conventional weapons, and the armed forces of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a point which should eliminate the capability of the Communists to (1) obtain a victory in military conflict with the Western powers or (2) use the threat of military forces to obtain their objectives in conditions short of military conflict.

c. To allow maximum flexibility of U.S. forces and weapon systems, to include modernization.

d. To eventually complement the reduction in armaments by a corresponding reduction in military manpower.

5. The proposed method for control and limitation of armaments of major powers is broken down into three phases as outlined below. It is emphasized that this method must be considered within a comprehensive disarmament system and not in isolation.

Phase I

A. Set up the initial organizational structure required to implement the Armaments Control Plan. The executive body will consist of representatives from the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, Canada and France as permanent members.⁶ Representatives from these states, hereafter to be called “Participating States,” will constitute the Executive Committee. Unanimous agreement of the Executive Committee is mandatory on all matters of armaments control.

B. The Executive Committee will devise an inspection plan for the initial verification of the military blueprints⁷ in Phase II, and continuous verification for adherence to the Armaments Control Plan.

C. Effective with the commencement of negotiations for this Plan, Participating States shall not give, sell, lease or otherwise transfer any nuclear weapon delivery systems, or parts thereof, to include plans or specifications, to any other state, for a period of three months.

D. Upon agreement to an effective inspection system each Participating State will submit to the Executive Committee a complete set of military blueprints.

E. The Executive Committee will prescribe the procedures for the investigation of any alleged violation(s), and based on the findings thereof, the Executive Committee will determine if the Armaments Control Plan should continue, and if so, under what conditions.

F. When the Executive Committee determines that Phase I has been completed satisfactorily, the earliest possible date for the beginning of Phase II will be determined, which will take into consideration the time necessary to develop the organizational structure for the implementation of Phase II.

Phase II

(Approximate Duration One Year)

A. Participating States will place in operational storage,⁸ on an orderly time schedule, ten per cent of each type⁹ of nuclear weapon delivery systems as declared in the military blueprints submitted to the Executive Committee in Phase I. Such armaments will be stored in the geographical confines of the mother country (e.g., U.S. nuclear weapon delivery systems will be stored in the United States), but in the custody of the Executive Committee.

B. Concurrently with the implementation of the provisions of paragraph A, above, complete inspection of military blueprints will be conducted and the unimpeded right of access to verify such blueprints (for inclusion and omission) by aerial and ground inspection will be granted, thus providing a foundation of good faith on the part of Participating States for the further expansion of armaments control.

C. Production of new armaments by each Participating State will be permitted. Since the lethal destructive capability of nuclear weapon delivery systems of any category generally does not increase radically in any given year, each Participating State will be permitted to substitute a modernized type of nuclear weapon delivery system for its predecessor on a like for like basis; e.g., one heavy bomber for one heavy bomber. Quantitatively, no more than 20 per cent of any category nuclear weapon delivery system can be modernized in Phase II. In no case will any Participating State at the end of Phase II have in its active inventory of nuclear weapon delivery systems more than 90 percent of those categories of weapons so declared in the initial exchange of military blueprints, or as amended as a result of subsequent inspections.

D. Upon unanimous determination by the Executive Committee that Phase II has been satisfactorily completed, Phase III will commence.

Phase III

(Approximate Duration 18 Months)

A. Participating States will place in operational storage, on an orderly time schedule, an additional 15 per cent of each type of nuclear weapon delivery system as declared in the military blueprints submitted to the Executive Committee in Phase I, or as amended as a result of subsequent inspections. In no case will any Participating State have in its active inventory at the end of Phase III more than 75% of the weapon delivery systems declared in the initial exchange of blueprints, or as amended as a result of subsequent inspections.

B. The Executive Committee will implement a previously developed weapon/manpower formula in the conventional armaments area, generally along the lines of the U.K. proposal, based on weapon/ manpower ratios developed from verified military blueprints. This will be applied in the reduction of conventional armaments. For illustrative purposes such reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, active military force levels of 2.5 million men for the US, USSR and China;¹⁰ 750,000 for the UK and France. The force levels of other participating states would be considerably below the levels of the major members of the Executive Committee, account being taken of agreed criteria including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors, and providing that the first phase levels of the active military forces of these states shall not exceed 500,000 unless special circumstances require an agreed exception. Excess conventional weapons will be placed in operational storage in a manner similar to that in effect for nuclear weapon delivery systems.

C. The Executive Committee will determine the procedure necessary to control not only future production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, but also existing stockpiles of such material.

D. Upon completion of Phase III, the Executive Committee will evaluate the methodology used, and the degree of good faith manifested by each Participating State in implementing the control of armaments during Phases I, II, and III. Based on these findings, the Committee will determine what additional procedures or actions should take place.

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.
2. Document 153.
3. Document 112.
4. Reference is presumably to Eisenhower’s statement following the White House meeting on September 11, which Jackson communicated to Dulles, Wilson, Stassen, Strauss, and Radford on September 18; see footnote 2, Document 155.
5. The British proposal was discussed with U.S. representatives in working level meetings, January 23–27, before the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in late January. The British proposal is best detailed in the British undated paper, “Numerical Levels of Conventional Armaments—Summary,” attached as Annex A to a memorandum of conversation of the January 26 meeting (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/1–2656), and a longer undated version of this summary, entitled “Numerical Levels of Conventional Armaments,” attached as Annex A to a memorandum of conversation of the January 27 meeting. (Ibid., 600.0012/1–2756)
6. In view of the political difficulties involved, negotiations toward an agreement may proceed with the understanding that if the principal measures are accepted by the Soviet Union and other key states, such of these measures as appropriate should be applied to Communist China in such manner as the political problems then permit. If application of the essential parts of the agreement to Communist China proves infeasible the United States should reserve the right to refrain from carrying out the commitment until all states having significant military potential become participants. [Footnote in the source text.]

7. As defined in Second Report of the Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, DC/71, dated 7 October 1955, Annex 20. [Footnote in the source text. Annex 20, entitled “Outline Plan for the Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva Regarding Disarmament”, submitted by the United States to the subcommittee on August 30, 1955, reads in part:

   “The term ‘blueprint of military establishments’ is defined as consisting of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and paramilitary; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations.” (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/31)]

8. Operational Storage. A condition wherein the elements of a system are delivered to a specified storage point, placed in a minimum state of preservation, where such procedures are applicable, and accessible to designated personnel for preventive maintenance. [Footnote in the source text.]
9. “Type” is considered to be a specific model within a category of nuclear weapons delivery systems, e.g., a B–52 as well as a B–36 within the heavy bomber category. [Footnote in the source text.]
10. See first “Footnote,” Page 2. [Footnote in the source text.]